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UNCUSTOMARY PRACTICE: REFRAMING EARLY  
AMERICAN LITERARY STUDIES 
 
At a time when transnational migration and decolonization, multinational 
capitalism and neocolonialism have steadily been challenging the ethnic, 
demographic, political, and economic bases of modern national borders, 
histories, and canons, the academic disciplines have had to rethink not 
only their conventional boundaries but also their very epistemological 
foundations.  … A comparative colonial American studies might begin, 
then, by investigating the patterns in the multiplicities of rhetorical and 
discursive situations that colonial Americas offer with the ultimate aim of 
formulating a poetics of colonial American writing that allows us to 
apprehend the colonial text in more interesting ways than as the precursor 
to nineteenth-century national literatures or as the raw material for 
contemporary European literary history. 
 – Ralph Bauer, “Further Reflections on the Tucson 
 Summit” (281, 304). 
 
For some time now there has been a sense that the mainstream critical tradition of 
American literary history, represented most particularly by the work of Sacvan 
Bercovitch, is no longer adequate to the complexity of its subject.  As early as 1979, in a 
review of Bercovitch’s The American Jeremiad, Nina Baym expresses a deep concern 
about his insistence on reading American literature as having a continuous development 
from its Puritan origins to the canonical authors of the nineteenth century, as well as the 
emphasis he places on a broad ideological consensus rooted in the idea of America 




historians are increasingly uncomfortable and dissatisfied with the consensus approach, 
which may well be indispensable to Bercovitch’s work” (350).  This is echoed in another
 contemporary review, where Stephen Stein writes that “the idea that the ‘anti-jeremiad,’ 
constructed by those who rejected the symbol of America, can always be inverted to 
become yet another statement of consensus seems painfully strained” (1142, citing 
Bercovitch American Jeremiad 191).  What troubles Baym in particular about 
Bercovitch’s slighting of dissent is a sense that this approach simply affirms the 
marginalization of those groups who have had the most cause to dissent: women, 
African-Americans, Native Americans, and basically everybody else who is not a white 
male, preferably a Protestant of Anglo-Saxon stock. 
 
In the years since The American Jeremiad appeared, early American literary studies have 
indeed gone far in the direction Baym envisions, with new anthologies (beginning with 
the first Heath Anthology of American Literature in 1993) and any number of journal 
articles and books devoted to considering the subjects of race, gender, ethnicity, and 
nationality in early American letters and to recovering the writings of these marginalized 
groups in order to restore them to their rightful place in the literary history of the United 
States, which has resulted in a body of scholarship that is generally and loosely grouped 
under the rubric of multicultural or multiculturalist early American studies.  It has also 
sought to reach beyond the geographic boundaries of the United States themselves, both 
into the other Americas and across the ocean to consider transatlantic continuities.  As 
Ralph Bauer notes, “In Spanish America, early American literary scholarship has taken a 
similar trajectory from nationalist particularism to transatlantic cosmopolitanism” (285).  
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Even Bercovitch, in his Cambridge History of American Literature (co-edited with Cyrus 
Patell), adopts a multiculturalist perspective on American literary history. 
 
Yet, in a number of articles addressing the state of the field critics from Annette Kolodny, 
Leonard Tennenhouse, and R. C. DeProspo have continued to suggest that Bercovitch’s 
legacy has been to narrow our perspective on American literature by insisting on 
historical continuity and ideological consensus as its key attributes.1  As Philip Gura 
states in “Early American Literature at the New Century,” Bercovitch’s work “remains a 
primer in our field” (603), though he also notes that it is ceding ground to the work of 
scholars like Michelle Burnham who have cleared the way for us to think about “different 
kind[s] of continuity” and “awakened us to new questions about early American texts” 
(608), namely questions about the history of the book in the Americas, about the 
transatlantic dynamics of American literary history, about the role of manuscript 
circulation in early American society, about the continuities within particular literary 
genres, and, finally, about the place of the “non-US” Americas in American literary 
history.  The last frontier, as it appears to Gura, is to open the field to writings in 
languages other than English, recasting “American literature as a sub-field of 
Comparative Literature” (610). 
 
The comparative approach to early American literary studies has rapidly been gaining 
traction, as evidenced by books by Walter Mignolo, Gordon Sayre, Ralph Bauer, and, 
                                                
 
1 See Kolodny’s “Letting Go Our Grand Obsessions: Notes Towards a New Literary History of the 
American Frontiers”; Tennenhouse’s “American literary history in the age of critical theory and 
multiculturalism”; and DeProspo’s “Marginalizing Early American Literature.” 
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most recently, Jorge Cañizares-Esguerra that offer extended comparative analyses of 
Anglo-American texts and those of the French and Spanish Americas.2  Bauer has also 
done a great deal to foment this study by organizing the Anglo and Ibero-Americanist 
Summit in Tucson in 2002, upon which he reflects in the epigraph above, and its 
successors, including “Beyond American Studies: An Interamerican Encounter,” which 
brought together early Americanists from around the globe who presented not only on 
English and Spanish colonial writings, but those in French, Portuguese, German, Dutch, 
and Latin.  Despite this gathering momentum, Bercovitch’s vision of American literary 
history still persists, presenting a challenge in his Rites of Assent and in an essay, 
“Discovering America: A Cross-Cultural Perspective,” adapted from that book, which 
argue that recent developments in the field have not displaced his vision of the 
overarching continuity of American literature from its origins among the Puritans to the 
present day, even as he recognizes that there is greater dissensus in the field than there 
has perhaps been at any point before. 
 
That Bercovitch should identify such a dissensus, however, is in fact evidence of the 
health of comparative early American studies, since, as Bauer suggests, we “must remain 
respectful of these [regional] differences and resist assimilating them too quickly into 
historical and philosophical teleologies, as has happened all too often in the Pan-
Americanism of the past” (296-297).  Where Bauer highlights regional difference, Gura 
focuses on temporal difference, asserting that “we should marvel at how much there still 
                                                
 
2 See Mignolo’s The Darker Side of the Renaissance: Literacy, Territoriality, and Colonization; Sayre’s 
Les Sauvages Américains: Representations of Native Americans in French and English Colonial 
Literature; Bauer’s The Cultural Geography of Colonial American Literatures: Empire, Travel, Modernity; 
and Cañizares-Esguerra’s Puritan Conquistadors: Iberianizing the Atlantic, 1550-1700. 
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is to learn from literature about the past’s ‘otherness’” (620).  Taken together, Bauer and 
Gura would seem to offer a coherent alternative to Bercovitch’s paradigm of ideological 
consensus and historical continuity: why then do scholars continue to agonize about his 
influence on the field?  I would suggest that it is precisely because they are conscious that 
his paradigm, in offering a lucid, coherent, and strictly delimited idea of America and 
American literary history that purports to be universal, offers a comforting totality that 
cannot (or at least cannot yet) be constructed out of the great variety of multiculturalist 
and comparative studies that have been done to this point.  This consciousness is 
reflected, I believe, most particularly in our continuing use of culture as a key term of 
analysis in early American literary studies. 
 
As I discuss at greater length below, the use of the term culture in the analysis of the 
period of European expansion in the colonial Americas is highly problematic.  The 
primary reason is the vagueness of its now predominant definition, which is exacerbated 
by the wide range of uses to which it is put.  As Raymond Williams states in his 
Keywords, “[c]ulture is one of the two or three most complicated words in the English 
language” (87); it is a complicated and loaded term in French as well, as the work of 
Michel de Certeau, among others, has shown us.3  While Williams’ and de Certeau’s 
work has done a great deal to excavate possibilities for making good use of the concept of 
culture, it is all too easy to fall into a loose and uncritical use of the term, naming this and 
that culture in a fashion that presupposes coherent totalities (of people, of historical 
periods, of literary texts, of social practices, of religious rites, and so on) where such 
                                                
 
3 See de Certeau’s La culture au pluriel, translated as Culture in the Plural, and L'invention du quotidien, 
translated as The Practice of Everyday Life. 
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coherence may not in fact exist.  Used in this fashion, culture becomes a synonym for 
identity: one speaks, for example, of “Puritan culture” and “American culture” rather than 
“Puritan identity” and “American identity.”  This rhetorical move obscures the complex 
discursive processes at work in the transformations of the concept of identity in the 
sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries. 
 
Because of the great influence of Clifford Geertz’s Interpretation of Cultures, however, 
the word is omnipresent not only in early American literary studies, but in the 
transatlantic scholarship of New Historicist critics as well—indeed, with the rise and 
spread of the interdiscipline of cultural studies, we might well say that the word is 
omnipresent throughout the humanities and social sciences.4  But if culture is 
everywhere, what are we to put in its place?  And how are we supposed to study the 
formation of collective identities without it? 
 
To answer these questions I turn, below, to the writings of Michel de Montaigne and 
Francis Bacon, where we find the concept of custom elaborated with a precision and 
theoretical complexity suited to the task of thinking through the processes of identity 
formation.  As Zsolt Almasí, whose Problematics of Custom is the only book-length 
study to date of the concept of custom in the work of Montaigne and Bacon (as well as in 
                                                
 
4 To gain a sense of Geertz’s pervasive impact, we might note that, as of June 11, 2007, there were over 
6,000 citations of Interpretation of Culture in the ISI Web of Knowledge citations index.  These citations 
occur in journals treating virtually every field in the social sciences and humanities; the 100 publications in 
which Geertz’s essay collection is most frequently cited include PMLA, College English, New Literary 
History, and Daedalus.  One could also point to the influence of German scholars from Johann Gottfried 
von Herder to Norbert Elias (and English adaptors such as E. B. Tylor and Matthew Arnold) whose work 
on the concept of kultur has had a clear influence not only on Geertz himself, but on many New Historicists 
and cultural materialists. 
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Shakespeare’s Hamlet and the John Wilkinson’s Elizabethan translation of Aristotle’s 
Nicomachean Ethics), suggests, it would “be misleading to try to provide a definition that 
could include all of the ideas meant by the use of the word” (5).  This danger 
notwithstanding, I believe it possible to usefully define a custom as a corporeal human 
practice that has taken on a habitual or traditional character through its repetition.  
Nonetheless, in the early modern world this word and its variants have a broad range of 
applications: there is religious custom, customary law, and “the custom of the country”; 
there are customs-houses, customers, and costumes.   
 
What underpins all these particular usages for Montaigne and Bacon is the power of 
custom to transform an individual practice into both a mark of collective identity and a 
potential source of social strife.  Custom, for them, is not simply a visible manifestation 
of a collective identity, but its motive force.  Because of custom’s transformative power, 
these authors align custom with what is most natural to humankind and, simultaneously, 
what is most novel and corrupt.  Thus, the figure of custom bridges discursive 
oppositions—nature/artifice, for example, or beginning/end—in which culture, in our 
modern sense, often falls strictly to one side. 
 
That custom can bridge these oppositions is indicative of the upheavals of Montaigne and 
Bacon’s own time—the rise of vernacular languages, the spread of the printing press, the 
Reformation and the religious wars, and the exploration and colonization of the New 
World.  Colonization in particular, with the concerns it raises about maintaining national 
and religious identities in different lands, is central to both authors’ writing on custom.  
  15 
Montaigne’s understanding of custom emerges from the intersection of his meditation on 
the “savages” of the New World and the savagery of the religious wars in France; 
Bacon’s from the English experience in Ireland and Virginia, from the Spanish 
experience in South and Central America, and from his project to establish a new, 
empirical science, which he figures as analogous to the discovery of the Americas (see, 
for example, New Organon 91).  Montaigne and Bacon share a conception of custom as a 
process whereby novelty becomes convention, the particular becomes general, and the 
material abstract through sheer, and often unthinking, repetition.  Further, because of 
custom’s ability to take on a life of its own, Montaigne and Bacon agree that it is not a 
benign phenomenon, but rather an active and dangerous force that must be contained and 
controlled to the benefit of society at large. 
 
As I demonstrate in the course of this project, Bacon’s and Montaigne’s understanding of 
custom opened up a new discourse of group identity that finds its most developed 
expression in the writings of the French and English men and women who first colonized 
North America, and that paved the way for a radical reconceptualization of collective 
identities before the writings of the “American” authors Cotton Mather and Joseph-
François Lafitau refined the meaning of custom to the brink of irrelevance early in the 
eighteenth century.  
 
I am not the only critic to have suggested a similar trajectory.  Mary Baine Campbell, in 
her Wonder and Science, offers us “a single story [that] begins in a jumbled, shocking, 
and marvelous diversity [and] ends in an Enlightenment serenity of system, bolstered by 
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imperial growth, inspired by the imperial ideal of universalism, but still marbleized with 
trouble by the shocks of passage” (221).  And Nicholas Hudson, in his essay, “From 
‘Nation’ to ‘Race,’” tracks “the changing meaning of the term ‘race,’ along with the 
associated terms ‘nation’ and ‘tribe’” finding a shift from the “wealth of detailed 
descriptions of innumerable ‘nations’” in the seventeenth century to “the use of the term 
‘race’ to describe ever larger populations” over the course of the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries (248).  What both Campbell and Hudson notice, then, is a gradual 
shift from the writings of the sixteenth and seventeenth century, which highlight the 
diversity of peoples, and those of the eighteenth century, which group peoples into ever 
larger categories until the notion of continentally delimited “races” emerges only to be 
further defined in terms of genetic inheritance by the turn of the nineteenth century.  
While my own argument clearly intersects with those of Campbell and Hudson at various 
points—most particularly in the last chapter, where I consider the disciplinary division 
between history and ethnology, one of the key steps in this shift from “nation” to 
“race”—my focus is rather narrower than theirs because I regard the changes in European 
conceptions of communal identities (such as nations and races) as being most strongly 
influenced by the colonization of North America. 
 
The starting point of my project is the recognition of several basic traits shared by all of 
the Western colonial powers: that they sought to establish colonies in the Americas, that 
they encountered native inhabitants when they did so, that this encounter placed the 
colonists in an intermediate position that was deemed to be a threat to their continued 
identity with their metropolitan peers, and that they produced writings (both published 
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and unpublished) to rhetorically counter this supposed threat in order to justify their 
continued presence in the Americas.  To say this may seem to equate early American 
literary studies with postcolonial studies—and certainly much of the recent work in the 
field that I find most compelling draws on the insights of postcolonial theorists from 
Mary Louise Pratt to Homi Bhabha—but these particular colonies (and thus these 
literatures) retain a shared specificity because of their geography and the time period in 
which they were produced. 
 
My decision to focus more narrowly on the North American colonies of New England 
and New France begins with the recognition that both England and France established 
permanent mainland colonies at virtually the same time (1607 and 1606, respectively) 
and, further, that they shared not only a timeframe for colonization, but also a mindset.  
From my perspective as a comparative literary critic analyzing the way the colonists 
wrote about their identities, the deeply intertwined intellectual and political environments 
of England and France in this period are perhaps the most significant justification of my 
focus.  As my final chapter makes explicit in a way not immediately possible in the 
others, all of the authors I consider belong to a larger, transnational intellectual 
community that included most of Western Europe in its bounds, a burgeoning république 
des lettres as it would be identified in one of the early learned periodicals that helped to 
cement this transnational intellectual identity.5  Within this broader community the 
relationship between England and France was perhaps the most developed—and certainly 
the most charged—of any two nations.   
                                                
5 For an indication of how much Anglo-America in particular would take part in this transnational republic, 
see Norman Fiering’s “The Transatlantic Republic of Letters: A Note on the Circulation of Learned 
Periodicals to Eighteenth-Century America.” 
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Witness, for example, the large Huguenot population living in exile in London around the 
turn of the seventeenth century.  Among this group we find a number of individuals 
responsible for bringing knowledge of French exploration in the Americas to the attention 
of an English audience: Pierre Erondelle, for example, with his 1609 translation of part of 
Marc Lescarbot’s Histoire de la Nouvelle-France, or Jacques le Moyne de Morgues, 
whose sketches from a voyage to Brazil were added to John White’s of Virginia for 
publication in the multilingual De Bry edition of Thomas Harriot’s Briefe and True 
Report of the New Found Land of Virginia.  To this traffic in letters across the English 
Channel must be added the famous 1603 translation of Montaigne’s Essais by John 
Florio, a Protestant of Italian descent.  In the other direction, we might cite the strong 
influence of English scientific thought in France, beginning with the works of Bacon and 
continuing through those of Newton and Locke.  English connections in France became 
particularly strong during the Civil War and the Interregnum, with Hobbes, to name only 
one exile among many, living in Paris and making the acquaintance of René Descartes, 
Pierre Gassendi, and other important French thinkers.   
 
Given the increasing contiguity of their colonies in the Americas, and as control of 
Acadia and Newfoundland, in particular, was traded back and forth (though the English 
also briefly took control of Québec in 1632), there was also an increasing mutual 
awareness in the colonies themselves as to each other’s presence, and even the 
development of certain shared trading interests, most particularly in the borderlands of 
Maine and Acadia, where the English had taken administrative control of a primarily 
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French-speaking population.  By the time Cotton Mather was writing at the close of the 
seventeenth century, there was also a Huguenot exile community (driven out by the 
revocation of the Édit de Nantes in 1685) living in Boston, and others in the mid-Atlantic 
colonies of Virginia and Maryland. 
 
By focusing, then, on these two colonies over this period of time, I am able to 
demonstrate a shared set of concerns about collective identity and a shared range of 
discursive responses to those concerns that undermine the notion of a distinct “American” 
(read US) identity that can trace its roots exclusively or primarily to Puritan New 
England.  Further, by focusing on a period in which custom was simultaneously regarded 
as central to the formation of a coherent and potent collective identity and as subject to 
the force of innovation, I provide a cogent framework for a comparative understanding of 
these two colonies without recourse to the concept of culture or to a notion of continuity 
that extends to the era of national consolidation or to the present day. 
 
 
BY CULTURE AND BY CULTURE CURSED 
 
Inevitably, when a fellow Americanist discovers that I am working on the subject of 
custom in seventeenth-century North America, they ask me whether I have read Philip 
Round’s book, By Nature and By Custom Cursed.  The answer, of course, is that I have, 
and that it has been extremely useful in helping me refine my project—though not in the 
way one might imagine.  While his detailed attention to the dynamics of Puritan “civil 
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conversation” in the seventeenth century casts a good deal of light on how the colonists 
used printed texts and correspondence as a vehicle for authorizing their (ongoing) 
presence in New England to their counterparts back in England, Round never really digs 
in to the concept or figure of custom itself, as his brief explication of his title phrase—
taken from Anne Bradstreet’s “Contemplations”—reveals.   
 
Round begins by establishing these two terms—nature and custom—as opposites that 
“designated the dialectical space within which the emerging nation-state of Britain 
negotiated its self-representation” and “set the parameters of conversations about 
everything from church doctrine to village order” (1).  This is well enough, since it gives 
us a clear sense of what is at stake in his book, though I would take issue with his 
establishing such a fixed opposition between these terms; indeed, in a phrase that he takes 
from Richard Helgerson’s Forms of Nationhood (which Helgerson, in turn, took from 
Samuel Daniel’s 1603 Defense of Ryme)—“custom that is before all law, nature that is 
above all art” (1-2, citing Helgerson 11, citing Daniel 37)—we can see that these terms 
can equally well serve as analogues, though Round cites this passage in support of their 
opposition.  However, having set the debate in terms of nature and custom, the two terms 
quickly disappear, only to be replaced by “culture.” 
 
Initially, Round’s use of culture is very precise, being grounded in Pierre Bourdieu’s 
definition of a “cultural field” as “a discursive space where objects and discourses 
marked as ‘culture’ are produced by social systems” (6, citing Bourdieu The Field of 
Cultural Production 162-163).  As I suggested above, however, one of the singular 
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dangers of culture as an analytic term is that, by virtue of its high degree of abstraction, it 
lends itself to vague uses that blur any precision it might otherwise possess.  Thus, over 
the course of Round’s introduction, culture is invoked more and more frequently until, in 
its concluding paragraph, we find reference to “transatlantic cultural formation,” the field 
of “cultural studies,” the “culture wars of early modern England,” a “cultural landscape,” 
and finally a “cultural rhythm” that shaped “one of America’s most potent literary 
cultures” (16).  To be fair to Round, the strange sounding “cultural rhythm” makes more 
sense when it is understood to be the product of a dialectic process.  Still, the last usage in 
this string offers a restrictive use of “culture,” referring to a subset (literature) of the 
productions of a subset (New Englanders) of one nation (the United States of America) 
descended from a subset (the Puritans) of the people of another nation (England), that 
points us towards another difficulty inherent in the term’s abstractness. 
 
Because culture always aims to refer to a coherent totality, yet continually gets applied to 
smaller and smaller particularities, it becomes easy for us to lose track of what particular 
totality or sub-totality it is referring to in a given moment unless it is coupled to some 
word that modifies and delimits it—Puritan culture, or English culture, say.  In linking 
culture to this or that word, though, we elevate it to the status of a coherent totality, 
thereby assuming the very identities that we are seeking to analyze precisely because they 
were in such flux during this period of migration, expansion, and contact with new 
peoples.  In other words, once we have named this or that culture as a culture, we have 
assumed that there is a shared identity there without necessarily having specified the 
particular characteristics or processes of that identity. 
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Nobody in the early modern world identifies his or herself as belonging to a “culture” the 
way we do today.  The problem is not simply one of anachronism; it lies in the 
importance of making a distinction between process and result.  In his brief essay, 
“Culture,” composed for Frank Lentricchia’s Critical Terms for Literary Study, Stephen 
Greenblatt notes that early modern authors like Shakespeare would hardly have used the 
word “culture” in the sense we do today, although they might have made use of its 
cognate “cultivation” in much the same sense as we would, as an “internalization and 
practice of a code of manners” (227).  This fits well with Greenblatt’s definition of 
“culture” as an “ensemble of beliefs and practices [that] function as a pervasive 
mechanism of control” and thereby serve both to “constrain” human actions and to enable 
a certain “mobility” within them because it emphasizes the processual nature of human 
identities rather than suggesting that they are a fixed and final result of a process that has 
run its course (225).  However, Greenblatt’s etymological sleight-of-hand obscures the 
fact that we tend to identify culture precisely as a result—and, what’s more, as a given—
such that we lose sight of the process by which collective identities are articulated and 
simply accede to received (and often implicit) notions of what constitutes this or that 
culture. 
 
A major part of the problem with culture is that it is a word that has lost touch with its 
own history.  The earlier meaning of culture as “[t]he action or practice of tilling the soil” 
(Oxford English Dictionary Online, definition 2.a) is almost totally divorced from its 
modern sense as outlined by Greenblatt above, despite his attempts to recuperate some 
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continuity between the two through his reference to cultivation.  Thus we find Round 
making his references to “cultural fields” and “cultural landscapes” without any 
hesitation about the radically different connotations these phrases would have had for the 
early modern people who are the subject of his study.  In pointing this out, I do not seek 
to blame Round or Greenblatt.  Very intelligent people have written very intelligently 
about culture; and yet, these same people fall prey to the pitfalls of culture, allowing its 
capacity to name “the most complex whole” to reduce that complexity to naught or next 
to naught (Greenblatt 225).  The primary problem with culture, as I see it, is that it is 
often used to name both a process and its outcome at the same time: culture, in other 
words, is the product of culture.  This referential circularity invites the reification of 
culture that is rife in contemporary literary scholarship. 
 
If we pause for a moment, however, and consider why it is that we try to make use of the 
word culture in the first place, it becomes clear why we continue to do so despite its 
shortcomings.  As Greenblatt suggests, it offers us a way to start thinking about the 
processes that govern the organization and development of human societies.  To put it in 
somewhat less abstract and somewhat more restricted terms, we might say that we study 
“culture” in order to better understand what it is that binds us together in communities.  
In turning to custom as an alternative for culture as a central term for understanding 
collective identities in colonial North America, however, we can avoid some of these 
difficulties while gaining certain advantages, not least of which is the fact that it is a term 
that was then in frequent use precisely to consider these very problems. 
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Custom, of course, is not without its own vagaries and limitations as an analytic term.  
Foremost among these is that, in its singular form, it can refer both to a particular custom 
(say, the raising of a maypole on Mayday) and to a more generalized notion of custom as 
a body of tradition.  And yet, viewed from another angle, this is one of its virtues since it 
allows us to work our way back and forth between these more concrete and more abstract 
meanings as we seek to understand the place of a given custom within a collection of 
social practices particular to a given group of people.  As Montaigne and Bacon will 
show us, while custom has the capacity to dull our intellect and reduce us to machines, if 
we can return to our senses then we can still gain an understanding of how it works to 
produce (and potentially undermine) collective identities and social order. 
 
 
“COUTUME HEBETE NOS SENS” 
 
In the very first of his essays, Montaigne sets the stage for his investigation into human 
customs, stating that “l’homme [est] un subject merveilleusement vain, divers, et 
ondoyant” and that “[i]l est malaisé d’y fonder jugement constant et uniforme” (1.1.9).6  
This statement fits well with our received notion of Montaigne as the forerunner of 
modern pluralism, a notion that encourages us to take at face value Montaigne’s claim 
that “[l]a diversité des façons d’une nation à autre ne me touche que par le plaisir de la 
                                                
6 “Truly man is a marvelously vain, diverse, and undulating object.  It is hard to found any constant and 
uniform judgment on him” (1.1.5).  This and all subsequent translations of Montaigne are from Donald 
Frame’s translation. 
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varieté” (3.9.985).7  And yet, in his most extended meditation on the subject of human 
customs, “De la coustume et de changer aisément une loy receüe” [Of Custom and the 
Difficulty of Changing a Received Law], Montaigne evinces a much more pessimistic 
take on human diversity, arguing that “l’usage nous desrobbe le vray visage des choses” 
(1.23.116), that every custom is grounded in a “desgoust[ante … nouvelleté” (1.23.119), 
and that, because of the strife produced by these novel customs, kings and governments 
would best “faire vouloir aux loix ce qu’elles peuvent” (1.23.122).8 
 
Still, it is not without reason that this thoroughly pessimistic Montaigne, who seems 
willing to see laws twisted in the hands of kings and magistrates, jars against our sense of 
Montaigne as a champion of honest dealing.  It is difficult to believe that this is the same 
Montaigne who says that “[e]n vérité le mentir est un maudit vice [car n]ous ne sommes 
hommes, et ne nous tenons les uns aux autres que par la parole” (1.9.36).9  However, 
what emerges from a careful rereading of Montaigne’s writings on custom is an image of 
the author as a much more complex figure than either of these reified positions suggests, 
one who not only grudgingly accepts the need to make personal accommodations to 
custom in the name of social order, but actively engages in a practice of reading—and 
writing—that he hopes will further that good by serving as a model of how to engage 
creatively with custom in order to better society. 
                                                
7 “The diversity in fashions from one nation to another affects me only with the pleasure of variety” 
(3.9.916). 
 
8 “usage robs us of the true appearance of things” (1.23.101); “disgust[ing] innovation” (1.23.104); “make 
the laws will what they can do” (1.23.108);  I am hardly the first to have noticed this mix of liberal social 
critique and conservative politics in Montaigne’s work on custom.  Ullrich Langer (“Justice Légale” 223), 
Papa Gueye (39), and Dean Frye (21-22) all make reference to it in their work. 
 
9 “In truth lying is an accursed vice.  We are men, and hold together, only by our word” (1.9.28). 
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The initial strategy in Montaigne’s critique is to use figures of blankness, purity, and 
naturalness as a ground from which to launch his assault on European society at large.  A 
justification for this strategy can be found in Montaigne’s essay “Des Menteurs” [Of 
Liars], where he argues that his faulty memory does not necessarily mean that he has 
faulty judgment “car il se voit par experience plustost au rebours, que les memoires 
excellentes se joignent volontiers aux jugements debiles” (1.9.34).10  For Montaigne a 
blank memory is precisely what makes it difficult for one to fall into lying, or to rely 
excessively on the authority of written texts, practices which could actually dull one’s 
sense of judgment.  Similarly, writing, like a good memory, can lead one to lie; thus he 
notes that “[i]l est bien aisé à verifier que les grands autheurs, escrivant des causes, ne se 
servent pas seulement de celles qu’ils estiment estre vraies, mais de celles encores qu’ils 
ne croient pas, pourveu qu’elles ayent quelque invention et beauté” (3.6.898-9).11   In 
other words, blankness, not text, ensures for Montaigne that one can speak—and judge—
the truth. 
 
And custom, for its part, operates very much like writing, gradually accreting in a 
haphazard fashion until it overwhelms our senses and our judgment.  The very 
organization—or lack thereof—of Montaigne’s chapter “Des coustumes” echoes the 
haphazardness suggested by his statement, in another essay on custom, that “[j]e veux icy 
entasser aucunes façons … que j’ay en memoire, les unes de mesme les nostres, les autres 
                                                
10 “the opposite is seen by experience: that excellent memories are prone to be joined to feeble judgments” 
(1.9.25). 
 
11 “It is quite easy to verify that great authorities, writing of causes, do not only make use of those they 
esteem true, but those that they do not believe, provided they have a certain inventiveness or beauty.” 
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differentes” (1.49.297).12  In “Des coustumes,” Montaigne does precisely this, providing, 
at one point, two full pages of undigested and decontextualized customs—Ullrich Langer 
calls them “simultaneous” and “vertiginous,” suggesting the image of “examples in a 
void” (“Montaigne’s Customs” 82, 93)—distinguishable only by the bald, anaphoric “où” 
[“where”] that precedes each of them (1.23.112-114).  At first the effect is jarring, but 
ultimately it is numbing: we can become accustomed, Montaigne suggests, to this variety 
of customs, but “l’accoustumance hebete nos sens” (1.23.109).13  Thus, the sounding of 
“une fort grosse cloche … aux premiers jours me semblant insupportable, en peu de 
temps m’apprivoise, de maniere que je l’oy sans offense et souvent sans m’en esveiller” 
(1.23.110): the price of becoming accustomed to something is that we become deaf and 
blind to the existence of custom itself.14 
 
The ramifications of this numbing quality of custom, according to Montaigne, are 
twofold and contradictory: first, it causes us to view our own customs as natural, and all 
others as strange, fixing people “sur le train auquel ils sont nais” (1.49.296); second, it 
produces a taste for novelty in us, making us “capable de changer l’opinion et d’advis 
tous les mois, s’il plait à la coustume” (1.49.296).15  This paradoxical capacity of custom 
to both encourage and discourage change could perhaps be seen as a rational process in 
                                                
 
12 “I want to pile up here some … fashions that I have in my memory, some like ours, others different” 
(1.49.262). 
 
13 “habit stupefies our senses” (1.23.94) 
 
14 The ringing of “a very big bell … seems unendurable at first, but in a short time it has me tamed, so that I 
hear it without disturbance and often without awaking” (1.23.94). 
 
15 “the ways to which they were born” (1.49.261); “capable of changing opinion and ideas every month, if 
custom pleases” (1.49.262) 
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which there is room for minor changes in custom, but not for more significant changes.  
For Montaigne, however, it is simply further evidence of how custom is capable “de nous 
saisir et empieter de telle sorte, qu’à peine soit-il en nous de nous r’avoir de sa prinse et 
de r’entrer en nous, pour discourir et raisonner des ses ordonnances” (1.23.115).16   
 
In order to try and jolt us out of our corrupted state, Montaigne appeals to the example of 
the “sauvages” of Brazil, arguing that “nous appellons sauvages les fruicts que nature, de 
soy et de son progrez ordinaire, a produicts : là où, à la verité, ce sont ceux que nous 
avons alterez par nostre artifice et detournez de l’ordre commun, que nous devrions 
appeller plustost sauvages” (1.31.205).17  So as to justify this assertion that the 
“sauvages” are still ruled by “[l]es loix naturelles” (1.31.206), and not simply by a 
different set of customs than our own, Montaigne erases virtually all marks of custom 
from them, stating that they are “une nation … en laquelle il n’y a aucune espece de 
trafique; nulle cognoissance de lettres; nulle science de nombres; nul nom de magistrat, 
ny de superiorité politique” (1.31.206).18  Their position having been granted the 
authority of natural law, the Brazilians are then able to come over to Rouen and offer 
their critique of French society, observing that they “se soubsmissent à obeyr à un enfant, 
                                                
 
16 “But the principal effect of custom is to seize and ensnare us in such a way that it is hardly within our 
power to get ourselves back out of its grip and return to ourselves to reflect and reason about its 
ordinances” (1.23.100). 
 
17 “we call wild the fruits that Nature has produced by herself and in her normal course; whereas really it is 
those that we have changed artificially and led astray from the common order, that we should rather call 
wild” (1.31.185) 
 
18 “[t]he laws of nature” (1.31.185); “a nation … in which there is no sort of traffic, no knowledge of 
letters, no science of numbers, no name for a magistrate or for political superiority” (1.31.186); I say 
virtually all because Montaigne later discusses both their religious practices and poetic arts.  One possible 
reason for his excepting these two fields from the cultural blankness of the Brazilians is his desire to keep 
them free from pernicious European influences: as Bacon’s scientific writings demonstrate, such a blank 
space serves as the perfect canvas for colonial aspirations. 
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et qu’on ne choisissoit plus tost quelqu’un d’entr’eux pour commander” (1.31.213), and 
that the poor can suffer to see the wealth of others without grabbing them “à la gorge, ou 
missent le feu à leurs maisons” (1.31.214).19 
 
The Brazilians, though, made a third observation, one which Montaigne claims to have 
forgotten. George Hoffmann, however, has argued convincingly that, given the 
“organiz[ation of] the essay in sequences [of three] involving food, war, and religion, 
evidently patterned on the three orders into which contemporaries divided their society: 
commoners, nobility, and the clergy” (208), this observation must have been about 
religion, and that it was, more specifically, a criticism of a people who find fault with 
cannibals, but eat their own God.  Still, Montaigne’s suppression of such a criticism 
makes sense not only because, as Hoffmann argues, Montaigne “must [dodge] if he is to 
avoid unskeptical criticism or uncritical skepticism” (215), but also because of the view 
which underpins Montaigne’s self-critical skepticism: that meddling in matters of religion 
is not for humankind because “les choses inconnuës [sont l]e vray champ et subject de 
l’imposture” (1.32.215).20  Montaigne makes a similar suppression in his essay “Des 
coustumes,” setting “à part la grossiere imposture des religions, dequoy tant de grandes 
nations et tant de suffisans personnages se sont veux enyvrez : car cette partie estant hors 
de nos raisons humaines, il est plus excusable de s’y perdre, à qui n’y est 
extraordinairement esclairé par faveur divine” (1.23.111).21  Yet, precisely because men 
                                                
 
19 “submit to obey a child, and that one of them was not chosen to command instead” (1.31.193); “by the 
throat, or set fire to their houses” (1.31.193) 
 
20 “things unknown [are] the true field and subject of imposture” (1.32.194) 
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do engage in the imposture of trying to divine God’s will, and he himself has experienced 
the consequences of this imposture during the Wars of Religion, Montaigne must return 
to this subject eventually; and when he does so, he does it with a vengeance. 
 
What precipitates Montaigne’s discussion of the Wars of Religion is his realization that 
custom does not simply produce the desire for novelty, but that the origin of custom itself 
is novelty.  This occurs when Montaigne recounts how he once had to “faire valoir 
quelqu’une de nos observations [observances]” but did not want to do so “seulement par 
la force des loix et des exemples, mais questant tousjours jusques à son origine” 
(1.23.116).22 When he finds that origin, however, he finds its “fondement [est] si foible, 
qu’à peine que je ne m’en degoutasse, moy qui avois à la confirmer en autruy” 
(1.23.117).23  This disturbing experience causes Montaigne to doubt the justification for 
any novelty, which sets him off on an extended critique of both sides in the war: 
 
Je suis desgousté de la nouvelleté, quelque visage qu’elle porte, car j’en ay 
veu des effets tres-dommageables.  Celle [la Réforme] qui nous presse 
depuis tant d’ans, elle n’a pas tout exploicté, mais on peut dire avec 
apparence, que par accident elle a tout produict et engendré : voire et les 
maux et ruines, qui se font depuis sans elle, et contre elle. …Mais si les 
inventeurs sont plus dommageables, les imitateurs [la Ligue Catholique] 
sont plus vicieux (1.23.119).24 
                                                                                                                                            
21 “I leave aside the gross impostures of religions, with which so many great nations and so many able men 
have been seen to be besotted, for since this matter is beyond the scope of our human reason, it is more 
excusable for anyone who is not extraordinarily enlightened by divine favor to be lost in it” (1.23.95-96). 
 
22 “not as is usually done, merely by force of laws and examples, but by tracking it to its origin” 
 
23 “foundation so weak that I nearly became disgusted with it, I who was supposed to confirm it in others” 
(1.23.101). 
 
24 “I am disgusted with innovation, in whatever guise, and with reason, for I have seen very harmful effects 
of it.  The one [the Reformation] that has been oppressing us for so many years is not the sole author of our 
troubles, but one may say with good reason that it has accidentally produced and engendered everything, 
even the troubles and ruins that have been happening since without it , and against it.  But if the inventors 
have done more harm, the imitators [the Catholic League] are more vicious” (1.23.104-105). 
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Though his disgust is directed at both parties, Montaigne places the blame squarely on 
the shoulders of those individuals who, because of “grand amour de soy et presomption” 
(1.23.120), have “estim[é leurs] opinions jusque-là que, pour les establir, il faille reverser 
une paix publique, et introduire tant de maux inevitables et une si horrible corruption de 
meurs que les guerres civiles apportent” (1.23.120).25  In other words, the novelty of an 
individual opinion, in the process of spreading throughout society at large, produces 
massive social disorder: the birth throes of custom are, for Montaigne, the death knell of 
an ordered and peaceful society. 
 
Religion, of course, provides individual presumption with a particularly dangerous means 
of grounding its authority, as Montaigne is well aware.  And yet, the temptation to such 
presumption, especially if backed with the best intentions, is so strong that even 
Montaigne cannot avoid momentarily giving in to it.  His essay “D’un enfant 
monstrueux” [Of a Monstrous Child] begins straightforwardly enough, with the statement 
that “[c]e conte s’en ira tout simple, car je laisse aux medecins d’en discourir” (2.30.712), 
and most of what follows lives up to this promise, being primarily a physical description 
of the child, which has two bodies and one head.26  Montaigne then notes, however, that 
this feature “pourroient bien fournir de favorable prognostique au Roy de maintenir sous 
l’union de ses loix ces pars et pieces diverses de nostre estat” (2.30.713).27  Montaigne 
                                                
 
25 “a lot of self-love and presumption”; so “esteem[ed their] opinions to establish them[, to] overthrow a 
public peace and to introduce so many inevitable evils, and such a horrible corruption of morals, as civil 
wars and political changes bring with them” (1.23.105). 
 
26 “This story will go its way simply, for I leave it to the doctors to discuss it” (2.30.653). 
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quickly moves to disclaim this position, though, saying that “de peur que l’evenement ne 
le démente, il vaut mieux le laisser passer devant, car il n’est que de deviner en choses 
faictes” (2.30.713).28  And the essay closes with Montaigne reading the child back to a 
position of blankness, arguing that “[c]e que nous appellons monstres, ne le sont pas à 
Dieu” and that “[n]ous appellons contre nature ce qui advient contre la coustume : rien 
n’est que selon elle [la nature], quel qu’il soit” (2.30.713).29  Still, Montaigne has 
ventured a prognostication of his own here, and, while it could be argued that his moving 
to reject it gives further credence to his critique of the practice in others, it is difficult to 
wipe this interpretation from our memory. 
 
This problem resounds throughout the Essais.  Everywhere Montaigne tries to erase 
custom, novelty, and presumption, it continues to exist.  Thus, while the people of the 
New World are “si nouveau et si enfant qu’on luy aprend encore son a, b, c” (3.6.908), 
Montaigne ends by fearing “que nous aurons bien fort hasté sa declinaison et sa ruyne par 
nostre contagion” (3.6.909).30  Though his intent in piling up customs is supposedly that, 
“ayant en l’imagination cette continuelle variation des choses humaines, nous en ayons le 
jugement plus esclaircy et plus ferme” (1.49.297), all he ends up with is a pile of customs 
                                                                                                                                            
27 “might well furnish a favorable prognostic to the king that he will maintain under the union of his laws 
these various parts and factions of our state” (2.30.654) 
 
28 “from fear that the event should belie it, it is better to let it go its way, for there is nothing like diving 
about things past” (2.30.654) 
 
29 “We call contrary to  nature what happens to be against custom; nothing is anything but according to 
nature, whatever it may be” (2.30.654). 
 
30 “so new and so infantile that it is still being taught it’s A B C” (3.6.842); “that we shall have very greatly 
hastened the decline and ruin of this new world by our contagion” (3.6.842) 
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and a pile of books: “[m]ais il y a des livres entiers faits sur cet argument” (1.49.300).31  
The disease of custom spreads and infects so uniformly and pervasively that, in the end, 
Montaigne would end in up in the same predicament as when he finds he has lost his 
point in writing a given essay: “Si je portoy le rasoir par tout où cela m’advient, je me 
desferoy tout” (1.10.40).32  Thus, any attempt to reform custom leads one towards the 
same perverse path that followed upon the Reformation. 
 
This paradox of producing dangerous novelty in the attempt to reform custom poses a 
problem for Montaigne not only in the venue of religion, which, after all, he holds by 
definition to be beyond human understanding, but also in that of government and laws, 
which deal precisely with the regulation of human activity, and therefore ought to be 
within our intellectual grasp.   As Montaigne convincingly asks, “quelle chose peut estre 
plus estrange, que de voir un peuple obligé à suivre des loix qu’il n’entendit onques” 
(1.23.117)?33  And yet, despite his disgust at the baselessness of so much customary law, 
Montaigne’s faith in our ability to reform it has been seriously undermined by his 
experiences in the Wars of Religion, such that he claims that “[i]l y a grand doute, s’il se 
peut trouver si evident profit au changement d’une loy receue, telle qu’elle soit, qu’il y a 
de mal à la remuer” (1.23.119).34  His reason for this claim is that “une police, c’est 
comme un bastiment de diverses pieces jointes ensemble, d’une telle liaison, qu’il est 
                                                
31 “that we may strengthen and enlighten our judgment by reflecting upon this continual variation of human 
things” (1.49.262); “[b]ut there are entire books written on this question” (1.49.265) 
 
32 “If I erased every passage where this happened to me, there would be nothing left of myself” (1.10.32). 
 
33 “what can be stranger than to see a people obliged to obey laws that they never understood” (1.23.102) 
 
34 “It is very doubtful whether there can be such evident profit in the changing of an accepted law, of 
whatever sort it be, as there is harm in disturbing it” (1.23.104). 
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impossible d’en esbranler une, que tout le corps ne s’en sente” (1.23.117).35  In other 
words, the effects of reform are unpredictable precisely because the body of laws and 
customs is the body that holds us together. 
 
And yet, the paradox has another side, one which is hinted at in Montaigne’s gesture of 
tendering and retracting an interpretation of the monstrous child: if what has been written 
cannot be fully erased, it can be mutated and distorted in a fashion that enables an 
alternative reading.  In fact, precisely that necessity which brings people together can be 
used to remotivate the law: 
 
[c]ar, à la verité, en ces dernieres necessitez où il n’a y a plus que tenir, il 
seroit à l’avanture plus sagement fait de baisser la teste et prester un peu 
au coup que, s’ahurtant outre la possibilité à ne rien relascher, donner 
occasion à la violance de fouler tout aux pieds; et vaudroit mieux faire 
vouloir aux loix ce qu’elles peuvent. (1.23.122)36   
 
If Montaigne can will the laws to do our will, however, what remains to separate him 
from “ceux qui sont duicts à ceste subtilité, de les replier et desnouer, seroyent en tous 
escrits capables de trouver tout ce qu’ils y demandent” (1.11.44)?37 
 
                                                
 
35 “a government is like a structure of different parts joined together in such a relation that it is impossible 
to budge one without the whole body feeling it” (1.23.104) 
  
 
36 “For in truth, in these ultimate necessities where there is nothing more to hold on, it would perhaps be 
more wisely done to lower your head and give way a little to the blow than, by struggling to let nothing go 
when this is impossible, to give violence an occasion to trample everything underfoot; and it would be 
better to make the laws will what they can do” (1.23.108). 
 
37 “those who are trained in this subtle trick of tying and untying knots would be capable of finding, in any 
writings, whatever they want” (1.11.35) 
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The answer to this question lies in the gesture that accompanies the willing of the law to 
do one’s will: lowering one’s head and giving way to the blow.  Where the subtlety of the 
innovators is grounded in the kind of vanity and self-importance that hardens them 
against all other points of view, Montaigne’s is based upon a sense of humility and even 
servitude that requires him to take the opinions and the good of others into account.  Seen 
in this light, it becomes clear that when Montaigne grants that a born commander of 
people “sçavoit non seulement commander selon les loix, mais aux lois mesme, quand la 
necessité publique le requeroit” (1.23.123), this concession is grounded in the belief that 
the role of such a commander is to act only in the interests of the public good, “car, à le 
prendre exactement, un Roy n’a rien proprement sien; il se doibt soy-mesmes à autruy” 
(3.6.903).38  This explains why Montaigne, who is ultimately so critical of custom and its 
effects, is still willing to give way to the customs of other people even if it discomfits 
him: “Je ne crain point de ceder ou preceder iniquement pour fuir à une si importune 
contestation; et jamais homme n’a eu envie de ma presseance à qui je ne l’aye quittée” 
(3.9.980).39  Like “[l]e sage Perpaticien[, il] ne s’exempte pas des perturbations, mais il 




                                                
 
38 “knew not only how to command according to the laws, but how to command the laws themselves, when 
the public necessity required” (1.23.108); “to be precise about it, a king has nothing that is properly his 
own; he owes his very self to others”  (3.6.836) 
 
39 “I have no fear of ceding or preceding unfairly to avoid such a bothersome argument, and never did a 
man covet my right to go first but that I yielded it to him” (3.9.911). 
 
40 “The Peripatetic sage does not exempt himself from perturbations, but he moderates them” (1.12.37). 
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“EDUCATION, WHICH IS … BUT AN EARLY CUSTOM” 
 
At times, Bacon shares much of Montaigne’s skepticism about custom’s power: like 
Montaigne he characterizes it as a “tyrant” with the capacity to turn people into automata 
(“Of Custom and Education” 179), like him he fears that alterations in custom can 
produce civil disorder (“Of Seditions and Troubles” 104), and he likewise identifies 
custom as much with novelty as with tradition (“Of Innovations” 132).  But despite their 
shared misgivings, Bacon ultimately evinces a radically different attitude toward custom, 
portraying it as a force that can be controlled and cultivated through reason and education 
in order to improve social, political, and educational institutions. 
 
Where Montaigne sees only a possibility of mitigating the ill effects of custom, Bacon 
holds out a much more hopeful prospect, suggesting that reason can in fact overcome the 
power of custom by enabling us to examine our individual and collective practices and 
institute an educational and scientific program that can shape children and society for the 
better.  If Montaigne’s radical innovation in the conception of custom, then, is to have 
seen it as contaminating even the purported products of reason, such as written laws, 
Bacon’s is to flip this equation on its head and argue that the force of custom can operate 
in the service of reason in order to help mold nature to human will.  As Zsolt Almasí 
aptly suggests, in moving from Montaigne to Bacon, “the perspective of the discussion 
must be charged from the skeptical to the institutional” (99). 
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As Almasí is perhaps alone in recognizing, custom plays a central role in Bacon’s project 
to establish an empirical scientific practice grounded in the close examination of natural 
phenomena.  The foundational gesture of Bacon’s renovated scientific endeavor, as it is 
laid out in The Advancement of Learning and the New Organon, is a radical slate-
cleaning of a kind unthinkable to Montaigne.  “The only hope … of any greater increase 
or progress lies in a reconstruction of the sciences” (New Organon 24).  Thus, Bacon 
famously identifies four sets of “Idols” to be cleared to make way for natural philosophy: 
Idols of the Tribe, Idols of the Cave, Idols of the Market Place, and Idols of the Theatre.  
Though each of these constitutes a distinct group of obstacles to proper scientific 
practice—the Idols of the Tribe, for example, are those that “have their foundation in 
human nature itself” (48), while those of the Market Place are “formed by the intercourse 
and association of men” (49)—the common thread that binds them all is their basis in 
received and unquestioned opinion.  As Bacon argues several pages later, the main reason 
that people follow this or that school of philosophical thought is “because they have 
bestowed the greatest pains upon them and become the most habituated to them” (54).  
Bacon particularly disapproves of “the customs and institutions of schools, academies, 
colleges, and similar bodies destined for the abode of learned men and the cultivation of 
learning, [where] everything is found adverse to the progress of science” (89).  The goal 
of overcoming custom is, for Bacon, to restore philosophy to its proper object of study: 
the phenomena of the natural world. 
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In the Essays, Bacon suggests that custom is itself a product of human nature.  The essay 
that precedes “Of Custom of Education” is “Of Nature in Men,” wherein he points out 
that “custom only doth alter and subdue nature”—though he distinguishes between 
individual inclination, which holds primary sway over mental faculties, and custom, 
which he characterizes primarily as a social phenomenon that drives people to act in 
certain pre-established ways.  As part of nature, however, custom is thus subject to 
scientific examination—in fact, Bacon addresses custom explicitly from such a point of 
view in his New Organon (185-187).  Further, in The Advancement of Learning, Bacon 
emphasizes the power of custom to alter nature through force of repetition, citing the 
example of a glove that stretches to fit the hand of its wearer through repeated use (124).  
Custom, in other words, offers Bacon a mechanism for training human behavior in 
fashion analogous to that of the empirical method itself. 
 
The key is that haphazard effects of ungoverned custom be corrected by its reasoned and 
systematic application.  As Bacon states in the New Organon:  
 
Many other axioms there are touching the managing of exercise and 
custom; which being so conducted, doth prove indeed another nature; but 
being governed by chance, doth commonly prove but an ape of nature, and 
bringeth forth that which is lame and countefeit.  (185) 
 
The value judgments underlying this statement give a clear indication of the complexity 
of Bacon’s attitude towards nature.  On the one hand, Bacon suggests a distinction 
between a “true” nature and a “false” nature, wherein the “true” nature is clearly held to 
be superior.  Yet, in a seeming paradox, “true” nature is precisely dependent on the 
methodical alteration of custom, rather than the acceptance of custom as it comes to us.  
  39 
This preference for artificed or artificial nature is reflected throughout Bacon’s scientific 
writings—indeed, it is a central facet of his method, since he sees the experimental 
isolation of particular aspects of the natural world as the ideal method by which to learn 
more precise facts about it. 
 
Bacon’s utopian narrative, New Atlantis, offers us any number of examples of this 
artificial nature, portraying special “caves … for the imitation of natural mines” and 
“engines for multiplying and enforcing of winds” (266-267).  It likewise insists on the 
very naturalness of using art to help perfect nature, noting that the people of Bensalem, 
his fictional society, give “reverence and obedience … to the order of nature” even as 
they make things “by art greater much than their nature” (258, 267).   If we put this 
observation together with Bacon’s insistence on the role of custom in helping to educate 
young children according to the dictates of reason, we see that his vision of the 
relationship between nature and custom is completely opposed to that of Montaigne.  
Where Montaigne sees custom as force that limits and constrains the potential of nature, 
Bacon regards it as a means by which that potential can be released.   
 
However, by placing his utopia “beyond both the Old World and the New” (243), he also 
signals his conviction that those places that have not yet been subject to custom are most 
apt to take well to its scientific application.  Thus, in his essay “Of Plantations,” he 
emphasizes the potential for colonies, when founded according to reasoned principles, to 
prosper greatly and, in “The True Greatness of Kingdoms and Estates,” he insists on the 
“planting of colonies” as “the sure path to greatness” for an empire (151).  The potential 
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for colonies in the Americas is, for Bacon, analogous to the potential for science in the 
Americas, as he indicates in the New Organon when he compares his scientific writings 
to those of Columbus, who “before that wonderful voyage of his across the Atlantic … 
gave reasons for his convictions that new lands and continents might be discovered” (91).   
 
Meanwhile, in the New Atlantis, he makes it perfectly clear that the ends of this scientific 
project are nothing less than the extension of power and of empire: “[t]he end of our 
foundation is the knowledge of causes … and the enlarging of the bounds of human 
empire, to the effecting of all things possible” (265).  With this presentation of the 
discovery of America as an analogue to the project of empirical science coupled to his 
insistence on the value of colonies as a means of extending political empire, Bacon 
anticipates the writings of later British authors such as Hobbes and Locke, who would 
take the purported blankness of America as an invitation to philosophical and scientific 
inquiry as well as colonization. 
 
 
CUSTOMARY PRACTICE IN COLONIAL NORTH AMERICA 
 
The two modes of thinking about custom that I have outlined above—we might call them 
Montaignian and Baconian—establish the framework within which the French and 
English colonists would use custom to conceptualize and even transform their collective 
identities. Montaigne’s emphasis, for example, on the maintenance of traditional customs 
as a means of maintaining social order found particular resonance with the earliest 
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colonists, while Bacon’s on education as a means of producing an ideal social order made 
sense to later colonists as they sought to raise up English and French children in what 
they saw as a wilderness.  Similarly, Montaigne’s belief in the impossibility of wiping the 
slate of custom clean is echoed by those colonists who respected the presence and the 
customary practices of the Native Americans, while Bacon’s utopian desire to reform 
custom through the methods of empirical science finds expression in the writings of those 
colonists who preferred to see America as a land devoid of history—and therefore the 
ideal location in which to construct utopia.  So, as the North American colonists sought to 
account for their presence in the “New World”—and to insist that they indeed remained 
English or French—they found that these two conceptions of custom, alone or in 
combination, helped them to answer the troubling questions raised by colonization.   
 
My first chapter thus compares Marc Lescarbot’s Histoire de la Nouvelle France [History 
of New France] and Thomas Morton’s New English Canaan, which are positively 
saturated with the figure of custom.  While Lescarbot and Morton share a sense of 
theatricality with their contemporary colonial authors Samuel de Champlain and John 
Smith, what they perform is not so much the individual prowess demonstrated in the 
writings of the latter pair as their national identity represented by its characteristic 
customs.  Given the virtual absence of custom in Smith and Champlain’s writings, the 
logic behind Morton and Lescarbot’s use of this figure as a framework for their writing 
becomes all the more important to understand.  What motivates these men to juxtapose 
ethnographic descriptions of the “savage” inhabitants of the New World with rhetorical 
assaults on those who challenged their authority to colonize?  By linking the theatrical 
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politics of the court masque with the emphasis on performance in early modern 
anthropology, I demonstrate how these authors seek to create authority by criticizing their 
opponents for their lack of certain key national practices and traits and by staging 
performances that not only portray the behaviors appropriate to people of their national 
community, but also symbolically assimilate the New World natives into that community.  
In this way their performances and writings open up a radical new way of talking about 
national identity, situating it in the possession (or lack) of particular habits and customs 
rather than the land itself. 
 
If Morton and Lescarbot’s grounding of national identity in custom represents a radical 
break, its rapid assimilation into the writings of early colonists such as Anne Bradstreet 
and Marie de l’Incarnation suggest that it serves as a potent rhetorical tool in the ongoing 
dialogue with the metropole about maintaining Englishness and Frenchness in the 
Americas.  People in the metropole also began to use custom as a way of speaking about 
their identity, as their concerns are increasingly expressed on its terms: did the colonists, 
they wondered, still eat bread, drink beer and wine, and dress their meat with salt, as had 
been their custom in Europe?  As it is used more frequently, the concept of custom 
becomes more complicated, raising a whole series of new questions: why, for example, 
do the colonists increasingly figure the relationship between the colony and the home 
country as familial in nature?  Why do de l’Incarnation and Bradstreet in particular—a 
cloistered nun and a minister’s wife—turn to the figure of the family, and how is it 
inflected by their religion?  Further, how does this figure fit in the larger discussion of 
custom, of which it will become such a central part? 
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It is key to recognize that a shift takes place from thinking about the maintenance of 
identity (among emigrants) in the colonies to thinking about its reproduction (in the 
children who would be born there), suggesting not only why the figure of the family takes 
on so much importance, but also why the mother/child relationship is emphasized above 
all others.  (The mere fact that the works considered in the second chapter are the 
publications of a pair of mothers indicates the significant social shift that accompanied 
this discursive shift, although this discursive shift is apparent in the writings of male 
authors as well.)  The family as the site and product of reproduction is, in Bradstreet’s 
The Tenth Muse and de l’Incarnation’s L’École sainte [The Sacred School], 
metaphorically projected onto the community as a whole and then rhetorically linked 
with the role of education as a bulwark against the influences of a strange new 
environment.  Even religious community, in their writings, is conceived of more in terms 
of family relations than congregations.  This metaphorical expansion of the family 
enables imperial expansion as well, justifying the assimilation of Native Americans.  
Ultimately, these texts imagine a mother country turning to the colonies for succor in a 
reversal of the traditional hierarchy: the same colonies that vented the excess populations 
of the metropole—and which the metropolitans feared would develop degenerate 
customs—turn out to have preserved those customs and qualities the mother country has 
lost and so badly needs.  
  
In chapter three I examine Mary Rowlandson’s Sovereignty and Goodness of God and 
Pierre–Esprit Radisson’s Voyages in order to show how thinking about national identity 
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in terms of custom exposes that identity to corruption at the same time as it makes the 
colonization of the Americas rhetorically feasible: after all, if Native Americans can 
adopt a European way of life, what is to stop Europeans from adopting theirs?  The 
family remains central in this chapter, not only in the mother/child pair, but as an 
extended kin group under the threat of dissolution in the face of “savage” resistance to 
colonization.  By placing Rowlandson’s captivity narrative alongside that of Radisson—
who belonged to French, English, and Mohawk communities at different points in his 
life—I reveal the link between “keeping the family together,” which is a central motif in 
Rowlandson’s narrative, and the mistrust of those, whether Native American or colonial 
European, who converted to another way of life.  Rowlandson’s insistence on the 
distinction between “true Christians” and “praying Indians” (Native American converts) 
ultimately exposes the limits of education as a means of assimilation, and, consequently, 
the limits of custom as a means of quelling metropolitan fears of degeneration in the 
colonies.  More troubling is her complete inability to recognize Native Americans as 
anything other than a devilish shadow of English Puritan society, hollowly mimicking the 
colonists’ appearance and behavior while secretly harboring malice towards them.  
Radisson’s narratives reinforce Rowlandson’s sense of the dangers of international 
relations, but Radisson responds to those dangers by remaining open to those relations, 
rather than refusing them as does Rowlandson.  Because of this openness, manifest in his 
ability to establish kin relations with diverse groups, Radisson becomes a successful 
international merchant, helping to remind us of the intersection between custom’s 
commercial implications and its broader social significance.  
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In turning to the writings of Cotton Mather and Joseph–François Lafitau, which I treat in 
my fourth and final chapter, the contradictory impulses of both Rowlandson’s and 
Radisson’s texts find an outlet.  Mather and Lafitau show us the rise to dominance of a 
rhetoric of Christian universalism that, paradoxically, helped reinforce the sense of a 
binary opposition between “civilized” Europeans and “savages” while it forced a radical 
rethinking of custom.  For both of these authors customs are to be interpreted not as signs 
of distinct national and religious identities, but rather as proof of the ultimate sameness of 
all people.  Thus, in Mather’s sermon on “Evil Customes,” all custom is a symptom of 
man’s fall from grace, while, in his Moeurs des sauvages amériquains [Customs of the 
American Indians], Lafitau proves God and Christianity to be the source of all custom, 
and sees the variation between customs as an indication of the degree of degeneration 
from the state of grace that has occurred in a particular community.  In order to effect this 
refiguration of custom, Lafitau and Mather draw on the work of their Enlightenment 
contemporaries, insisting on the split between literate and oral societies, and using the 
rationalizing and totalizing generic features of the system to neutralize the threat—and 
many of the possibilities—that custom had represented to their predecessors.  In the end, 
Lafitau and Mather reduce custom from an independent force to be reckoned with to a 
mere datum from which reasoned principles can be abstracted. 
 
Even as Mather and Lafitau significantly restrict the importance of custom (though not its 
scope), much of their rhetoric still draws on tropes that are already present in the writings 
of Morton and Lescarbot a full century earlier: the diversity of human practices as the 
confirmation, rather than the negation, of the unity of humankind, for example, or Native 
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American society as a tabula rasa.  Similarly, all four of these authors are highly 
conscious of the potential national and international political consequences of their 
respective texts, taking care to situate themselves in an ongoing European and 
transatlantic discussion about the significance of the Americas vis-à-vis European 
identity.  As such, they lend credence to my argument that British and French North 
America were, in the seventeenth century, as conceptually contiguous as they were 
geographically so. 




IMPERIAL MASQUES, ALIEN CLIMES – THE  
ETHNOGRAPHIC PERFORMANCE OF NATIONAL IDENTITY  
IN MARC LESCARBOT AND THOMAS MORTON 
 
Ainsi j’espere que nôtre Roy tres-Chrétien, tres-Auguste et tres-victorieux 
HENRY IIII. apres le tonerre des sieges de villes et des batailles cessé, 
reverent les Muses et les honorant comme il a desja fait, non seulement il 
remettra sa fille ainée en son ancienne splendeur … [m]ais aussi établira 
sa Nouvelle-France, et amenera au giron de l’Eglise tant de pauvres 
peuples qu’elle porte affamez de la parole de Dieu, qui sont proye à l’enfer 
: et que pour ce faire il donnera moyen d’y conduire des Sarronides et des 
Bardes Chrétiens portans la Fleur-de-lis au coeur, lesquels instruiront et 
civiliseront ces peuples vrayment barbares, et les ameneront à son 
obeïssance. 
–– Marc Lescarbot, Histoire de la Nouvelle France (3.6.370-71)41 
 
This striking passage announces the colonial pretensions of the French empire at a 
moment when that empire consisted of a single building on the margins of a vast 
continent.  It is striking, certainly, in its conformity to the work of Anthony Pagden and 
others who have drawn our attention to the role of translatio studii, or the transmission of 
knowledge, in translatio imperii, the transfer and extension of imperial power.  More
                                                
 
41 “Thus I hope that our most Christian, most august, and most victorious King Henry IV, after the thunder 
of the sieges of cities and battles has ceased, revering the Muses and honoring them as he has already done, 
will not only restore them to their ancient splendor in their oldest daughter … but also establish his New 
France, and bring into the fold of the Church so many poor people who hunger for the word of God, and are 
prey for hell; and that, in order to achieve this, he will send Christian Sarronides and Bards with the fleur-
de-lis in their hearts, who will instruct and civilize these truly barbarous people, and lead them to 
obeisance.”  While my citation of Lescarbot’s French text is taken from the bilingual edition of W. L. Grant 
and H. P. Biggar, The History of New France, this and subsequent translations of Lescarbot’s Histoire are 
my own. 
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 striking still if we properly understand Lescarbot’s reference to the “Muses’ oldest 
daughter” as a call to re-establish the Université de Paris, creating an imperial role not 
only for the international transfer of knowledge, but also for its intranational cultivation, 
which serves as the justification for France’s (and Lescarbot’s) imperial ambitions.  Read 
such a light, this passage also affirms recent work by Barbara Fuchs and others who insist 
on the mutually reinforcing relationship between the internal consolidation of “empire” in 
Europe’s emerging nation-states—“empire” understood in its broad sense as “[s]upreme 
and extensive political dominion” (Oxford English Dictionary Online, definition I.1) —
and their external expansion through colonization and military conquest.42 
 
Examined in its context—a comparative ethnography, and, more particularly, a chapter 
on “Letters”—this passage illuminates facets of the relationship between translatio 
imperii and translatio studii that have been hitherto neglected, particularly the 
relationship between ethnographic writing (and printing) and imperial expansion.  The 
scholarship of Pagden and, more recently, Mary Baine Campbell has ably shown that the 
discovery of the Americas helped fuel the development of anthropological discourse, but 
the role of anthropological writings in imperial expansion has been relatively neglected to 
this point.43  Steven Mullaney’s notion of a “rehearsal of cultures” in The Place of the 
Stage has offered perhaps the most suggestive work in this direction, establishing a 
                                                
42 See, for example, the introduction to Fuchs’ Mimesis and Empire as well as her more recent article 
“Imperium Studies.” 
 
43 The third chapter of Joyce Chaplin’s Subject Matter constitutes a notable, though limited, exception to 
this, offering a reading of early English ethnographic reports about Native Americans as a form of military 
intelligence. 
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connection between the published records of ritual performances and the nascent imperial 
power of France and England. 
 
My concern in this chapter is to explore some of the possibilities opened up by 
Mullaney’s work, particularly by the attention he draws to the roles of ritual performance, 
writing, and printing in establishing (and policing) the boundaries of an emergent 
national identity.  If we understand writing and printing to be part of the process by 
which rituals and other customary practices are promulgated—a notion which, in the 
wake of our reading of Montaigne and Bacon, should not seem so terribly strange—then 
Lescarbot’s Histoire de la Nouvelle-France (1608, 1612, 1617) and the New English 
Canaan (1636) of his English counterpart, Thomas Morton, can be read as part of a 
larger, European project of forming coherent, pervasive, and potent national identities, 
rather than simply a text “consacré aux singularités animale et botanique”—an opinion 
held by even such a sympathetic reader as Éric Thierry, Lescarbot’s most recent (and 
successful) biographer (179).44   
 
Though both authors have historically occupied a marginal place in American literary 
studies, their significance has been increasingly recognized of late, in part because of 
critical attention to literary performances in the early modern world and in part because 
of their significant role in contemporary colonial conflicts.  While this recent criticism 
has cast new light on these texts, even now we generally find a focus on their activities in 
the Americas without much attention to their import in the emerging imperial discourses 
                                                
 
44 “consecrated to botanical and zoological oddities” (translation mine) 
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of national identity.45  In order to understand these texts properly we must note, for 
example, that Lescarbot and Morton respond in their texts to contemporary concerns, 
fueled by early modern climate theory in particular, that transplanting Europeans to the 
New World would radically alter their character.46  By appealing to ritual and customary 
behaviors as the basis for individual and communal identity, however, Morton and 
Lescarbot separate identity from its traditional “ground,” as it were.  National identity 
thereby becomes a question of phenomenology rather than ontology: something that one 
performs, and thus a question of appearances, rather than something that one is.   
 
Mullaney’s work on the “rehearsal of cultures” offers us a salient framework in which to 
understand Morton and Lescarbot’s publications, and the ritual performances that 
preceded them, as part of the project of constructing a national identity.  In Mullaney’s 
conception, “rehearsal of cultures” refers to the early modern practice of recreating—or 
“staging”—alien and rural customs as a means of determining which to ignore, which to 
suppress, and which to assimilate into the dominant cultural code.  Mullaney explicates 
                                                
45 The majority of recent work on Lescarbot focuses, generally rather narrowly, on the “Theatre de 
Neptune.”  For example, Bernard Andrès and Rick Bowers basically recount the stages and immediate 
context of the work’s initial performance, and seem all too ready to accept that it “celebrates a mutualized 
sense of power … in which each culture appropriates the desirable and exploitable elements of the other” 
(Bowers 485, 483; compare Andrès 15); Paolo Carile offers a more thorough literary and intellectual 
contextualization of the “Theatre,” but still limits its larger import by characterizing it as “un 
divertissement colonial” (144).  Martin Gosman, by contrast, provides an illuminating analysis of 
Lescarbot’s Histoire, placing it in the context of an international debate over American colonization, 
drawing attention to its influence on an emergent secular intellectual discourse, and (most significantly for 
my purposes) demonstrating how Lescarbot effectively negates the “difference” of the Native Americans in 
New France.   
 
46 Lescarbot, for example, directly cites the French polyglot Jean Bodin, who played a vital role in the 
production of early modern theories of climate.  Meanwhile Morton’s obvious debt to William Wood’s 
New England’s Prospect, which addresses the climate question directly, makes it unlikely that he was 
unaware of this theory.  For more on early modern climate theory and the Americas, see Karen 
Kupperman’s “Puzzle of American Climate in the Early Colonial Era” and “Fear of Hot Climes in the 
Anglo-American Colonial Experience.”   
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this concept by recounting the recreation (and subsequent destruction) of a pair of 
Brazilian villages for Henri II and Catharine de Medici’s 1550 entrée royale to Rouen.  
He then implicitly links this process with a “proliferation [of] written accounts of public 
ceremonies” in the second half of the sixteenth century (14), citing such texts as Laurent 
Joubert’s Erreurs Populaires (1578) and Philip Stubbes’ Anatomie of Abuses (1583) that 
“rehearse” through their elaborate recapitulation the very practices they deride.  Though 
his account of Henri II’s entrée royale points us to some of the colonial aspects of this 
early modern ethnographic discourse, Mullaney’s primary focus is on the intranational 
consolidation of monarchical power, not its transatlantic reach.  More significantly still, 
Mullaney short-circuits the connection between printing and the rehearsal of cultures by 
contending that the proliferation of written accounts of rituals in fact occurs because 
“traditional forms of public ritual were on the wane” (14), not because, as his own work 
suggests, they are being selectively transformed and remotivated in service of imperial 
expansion. 
 
Lescarbot’s vision of a transatlantic French empire, bound (and bounded) by a shared 
literacy, plainly indicates why such a link exists: how else but through writing and 
printing to translate an empire across an ocean?  This vision was certainly unusual 
enough for its time; as Joyce Chaplin has noted, Francis Bacon was one of few early 
modern natural historians to causally link developments in printing and navigation with 
the colonization of the New World (1).47  The role of improved navigation in imperial 
                                                
 
47 Though Chaplin does not provide the citation herself, she is clearly referring to the famous Aphorism 129 
from Bacon’s Novum Organum, which appears, notably, as an epigraph to the introduction to Mary Fuller’s 
Voyages in Print.  The passage reads, in translation: “We should note the force, effect, and consequences of 
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expansion is clear enough: ships serve as a vehicle for the transmission of people and 
goods.  The role of printed books is analogous: they are vehicles for ideas and textualized 
customs that serve as mechanisms of social control.  This is precisely what scholarship by 
Richard Helgerson, Mary Fuller, and others has demonstrated by drawing our attention to 
how “Elizabethan and Jacobean voyage texts [were] central to forming an idea of an 
English nation” (Fuller 1).48 
 
Yet Lescarbot also calls for Christian “Bards … with the fleur-de-lis in their hearts” to be 
sent across the ocean to New France, a trope which brings us back to Mullaney’s 
insistence on the inseparability of the ethnographic performance from the writing that 
records it: what Lescarbot’s text aims at, as his figurative language makes clear, is 
nothing less than the inscription of Frenchness on the land and people of the Americas 
through the embodied, ritual performance of a French identity.  That Lescarbot 
announces this in an ethnographic account of the customs of the Native Americans 
themselves indicates how national and transatlantic empire are intertwined in the project, 
                                                                                                                                            
invention which are nowhere more conspicuous than in those three which were unknown to the ancients, 
namely printing, gunpowder, and the compass.  For these three have changed the appearance and state of 
the whole world” (cited by Fuller 1).  The original Latin: “Rursùs, vim et virtutem et consequentias Rerum 
inventarum notare iuvat : quae non in alijs manifestiùs occurrunt, quàm in illis tribus, quae Antiquis 
incognitae; et quarum primordial, licèt recentia, obscura et ingloria sunt: Artis nimirùm Imprimendi, 
Pulveris Tormentarij, et Acûs Nauticae.  Haec enim tria, rerum faciem et statum in Orbê terrarium 
mutaverunt” (147-8).  Chaplin has, of course, demonstrated the limited impact of gunpowder in the Anglo-
Americas prior to Bacon’s Rebellion and King Philip’s War (i.e., 1675-6), but, as both she and Fuller note 
(following Stephen Greenblatt’s observations in “Invisible Bullets”), guns did operate as a kind of “cultural 
magic” even if their efficacy as weapons was limited by their inaccuracy and unreliability (Fuller 1; see 
Chapter 3 of Chaplin’s Subject Matter in addition to Greenblatt’s essay). 
 
48 Though somewhat less has been written on this question in the scholarship on New France, Lescarbot’s 
career has served as a model for scholars seeking to advance similar arguments about the link between 
colonial empire and intranational politics.  In particular, Éric Thierry’s recent biography of Lescarbot 
announces the role of writing (and, by implication, publishing) in its very title: Un Homme de plume au 
service de la Nouvelle-France.  The course of Lescarbot’s career, from student in the regional center of 
Vervins to lawyer in the Parlement de Paris to French diplomatic envoy in Switzerland, and the fact that it 
was furthered by a series of published compositions and translations, makes this connection clear. 
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carried out in ethnographic writings such as Lescarbot’s, of constructing and enforcing a 
national identity—precisely what early and mid twentieth-century ethnography, with its 
scientific pretensions, obscures by constructing a conceptual firewall between its 
“civilized” European and Euro-American practitioners and its “primitive” subjects (as 
James Clifford has shown in The Predicament of Culture).  That Lescarbot carried out 
such an ethnographic performance himself, composing and performing in an elaborate 
“entrée royale” in honor of the Port Royal colony’s founder, Jean de Biencourt, Seigneur 
de Poutrincourt, and staging the obeisance of the Native Americans as part of this 
ceremony, indicates the lack of such an absolute division in Lescarbot’s own thought. 
 
If the expansiveness of Lescarbot’s vision is unusual for his time, however, he is certainly 
not alone in using ethnographic writing to further his colonial ambitions.  Earlier French 
explorers and settlers such as Jean de Léry and André Thevet had used their ethnographic 
observations about Native Americans to couch religious arguments for and against the 
Reformation, while English authors from Thomas Hariot to John Smith give varying 
amounts and types of information about the Native Americans, according to whether their 
purposes are primarily scientific, strategic, or promotional.  The Spanish Jesuit José de 
Acosta deserves a special mention here since his Historia Natural y Moral de las Indias, 
newly translated into French, served as an important model for Lescarbot’s Histoire.49  
                                                
 
49 The French translation, by Robert Regnault Cauxois, was first published in 1598, appeared in a revised 
edition in 1600, and was subsequently reprinted in 1606, 1616, 1617, and 1621; an Italian translation was 
published in 1596; distinct German translations appeared in 1598, 1601, 1602, and 1605; a Dutch 
translation of 1598 was reprinted in 1624; and an English one appeared in 1604.  Numerous Latin editions 
were published as well, including, most notably, one in 1602 as part of Theodore de Bry’s America series.  
Though Acosta’s text had first appeared in Latin as De natura novi orbis in 1588, most of the vernacular 
translations are based on the Spanish edition of 1590, entitled Historia Natural y Moral de las Indias. 
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Among his various French and English counterparts, however, Thomas Morton stands 
out as having most fully incorporated an emphasis on the ritual performance of national 
identity into an ethnographically-informed colonial polemic.50 
 
Morton’s New English Canaan, like Lescarbot’s Histoire, consists of a combination of 
historical and ethnographic information, as well as useful notes about the flora and fauna 
of the Americas.  Unlike Lescarbot, Morton does not try to situate his own colonial 
experience in a redaction of previous accounts of the New World, yet a number of textual 
references indicate his awareness of contemporary publications about the Americas, 
particularly William Wood’s New England’s Prospect, which Morton obliquely refers to 
as the “wodden prospect” at several points throughout the New English Canaan (27, 28, 
53, etc.).  Further, Morton engages in an explicit polemic against his primary colonial 
competitors, the Puritans of the Plymouth and Massachusetts Bay colonies, thus echoing 
Lescarbot’s own attacks on his Jesuit counterparts.  Finally, Morton provides as the 
centerpiece of his text an account of his May Day celebrations of 1627, including an 
enigmatic poem that he nailed to his Maypole as part of the elaborate ceremonies, as well 
as the violent reaction of his Puritan antagonists. 
 
Examined against the context in which they were published, Lescarbot’s and Morton’s 
works stand apart not in their use of ritual performance to produce and maintain a 
coherent national identity, nor in their publication of learned treatises on the flora, fauna, 
                                                
50 I am not, I should note, the first Americanist to have placed Morton and Lescarbot side-by-side: Rosalie 
Murphy Baum suggests “juxtaposing” the pair as part of a course integrating French and English colonial 
writings (119, see 121), and Norman Grabo offers them up as a (brief) example of how the American 
“frontier” could be “absorbed … into natural experience by treating it as literature” (280, see 278-281). 
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geography, and inhabitants the New World as a means of authorizing a particular version 
of colonial engagement; rather, it was the combination of these two facets that 
distinguished these authors from others on the increasingly crowded shelves devoted to 
the newly-discovered continent.  Bacon is a good reference point here, since he is clearly 
concerned, as Ralph Bauer contends, with “the building of a cohesive national 
infrastructure supporting an overseas empire that would allow England to compete in the 
geo-political contest against her European neighbors” (16), but in his disparagement of 
courtly theatrical productions—which pitted him against his king and the character of his 
time—he fails to recognize the radical potential for these genres to influence the 
customary behaviors that are a key part of such an infrastructure.   
 
Given the rationalist bent of Bacon’s thought, his priorities are unsurprising; for him, it is 
new, empirically-derived technologies that serve to further human potential and power, 
not elaborate and expensive courtly theatrical productions, which he implicitly relegates 
to the realm of purely aesthetic entertainments by insisting that they ought to appeal to 
the senses without emptying the pocketbook (Essays 175).  In the ever-widening wake of 
Stephen Orgel’s Illusion of Power, however, we now recognize that these performances 
occupied a central place in the politics of early modern Europe, that they were “not 
entertainments in the simple and dismissive sense we usually apply to the term” but 
“expressions of the age’s most profound assumptions about the monarchy” and about 
political authority more broadly (Orgel 8).  Bacon, for all his insight elsewhere in his 
writings into the workings of state, underestimates theatrical performances as a means of 
exerting power within a body politic. 
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Meanwhile Morton, in staging a masque-like celebration of Mayday at his New England 
habitation, and Lescarbot, with his “entrée royale,” demonstrate how powerful ritual 
performance could be in the New World; in fact, ritual performance was perhaps doubly 
important for these colonial authors because of their need to prove that living in the New 
World would not alter their national and religious identities.  Their subsequent 
publication of the written accounts of these performances as part of their larger accounts 
of the New World not only reinforces Mullaney’s sense that printing is part of the 
“rehearsal of cultures,” but also indicates how these authors conceived of these 
performances as having a metropolitan audience in addition to their colonial one.  As 
Lescarbot’s appeal to Henry IV implies, such publication is necessary to increase 
“empire” both within and without a nation’s boundaries: as a monarch seeks to exert 
greater social control over his or her subjects through the promulgation of ritual practices, 
the need to publicize those rituals becomes as important as the rituals themselves. 
 
Such publicity is especially important given the contested status of the Americas in the 
early seventeenth century.  Not only were England and France latecomers to the 
Transatlantic colonial enterprise—with both Spain and Portugal long and well established 
at the point when England and France made their first decisive forays onto the continent 
(1607 and 1606 being, respectively, the years in which the first permanent, mainland 
American colonies were established by these two countries)—they were also subject to 
internal debates about how best, or even whether, to carry out colonizing missions of 
their own.  Any number of groups angled to have their views and interests reflected in the 
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official and unofficial practice of American colonization—merchants, fishermen, 
ecclesiastical authorities, secular intellectuals, and even governmental functionaries all 
had their own opinions, many focused more on trade advantage and the increasing of 
customs revenues than on the possibilities of extensive settlement.  Read against this 
background, Lescarbot’s and Morton’s texts must be understood as arguments in favor of 
a particular vision of colonization, one that linked the settlement of the Americas with the 
consolidation of imperial power and national identity. 
 
We must also understand these texts as participating in contemporary religious debates as 
well.  Lescarbot is an interesting case in this regard, because his early career was fueled 
by his connections with prominent Counter-Reformation figures, including members of 
the Ligue Catholique.  His first two publications, produced shortly after he received his 
Licentier ès Droits in Toulouse, celebrate the negotiation and ratification of the 1598 
Treaty of Vervins, overseen by Alessandro de’ Medici, the Cardinal of Florence, which 
established peace between Spain and France.  These works, as Éric Thierry notes, affirm 
the Treaty as “une œuvre de l’Eglise de Rome, une Pax Romana vers laquelle Dieu a 
conduit les rois de France et d’Espagne” (60).51  They also appear to have helped him 
gain a position in the Parlement de Paris the following year. 
 
Several subsequent translations, undertaken by Lescarbot on behalf of the arch-ligueur 
Geoffroy de Billy, Abbot of St. Vincent of Laon, evince his continuing concern with the 
restoration of the unity of the Catholic Church as well as his emergent concern with ritual 
                                                
51 “a work of the Church of Rome, a Pax Romana towards which the kings of France and Spain were driven 
by God” (translation mine). 
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practices.  One of them treats the submission of (a portion of) the Russian Orthodox 
Church to the authority of Pope Clement VIII and another is of Pastorum Instructiones 
[Instructions for Pastors] by Charles Borromeo, the Archbishop of Milan and a central 
figure at the Council of Trent.  However, the suppression of the latter translation by de 
Billy seems to have cooled Lescarbot’s ardor for the cause of the Counter-Reformation.  
This paved the way for his introduction by one his clients, Jean de la Rocque, to Pierre du 
Gua de Monts, an ethnic Italian Huguenot whom Henry IV had granted, in 1603, a 
monopoly over the trade with and colonization of “New France.”  Of course, at that 
moment, New France was more an intellectual construct than a reality, as the French had 
only a single settlement in the Americas, the ill-fated “île de Sable” colony, the remnants 
of which would transfer to the Port Royal site, in modern-day Nova Scotia, in 1606. 
 
Thus began Lescarbot’s relationship with a number of Protestant associates of Henry 
IV—who had himself converted to Catholicism in 1598—and, simultaneously, his 
interest in the colonization of the New World.52  By 1606, when Poutrincourt, another of 
Lescarbot’s clients, had obtained a grant from de Monts to settle at Port Royal, Lescarbot 
was ready to leave for a “New” France that he hoped would be less corrupt than the old 
one (H. P. Biggar History 1.x).  Lescarbot, while no longer involved in the Counter-
Reformation, nevertheless maintained a missionary zeal that found ready outlet in the 
New World.  As Thierry notes, “[i]l est convaincu d’appartenir à un groupe d’élus devant 
œuvrer pour diffuser la perfection chrétienne” and this conviction was grounded in an 
                                                
 
52 Ultimately, these relationships would stand Lescarbot in good stead when he became a diplomatic envoy 
to Switzerland and helped encourage the political union of the Catholic and Protestant cantons. 
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insistence on the importance of elaborating and adopting “des codes 
d’autocontrainte” (120).53  Thus, Lescarbot’s continued belief in the role of behavior in 
establishing a religious and political unity came to be linked with the development of a 
transatlantic French empire. 
 
Though Lescarbot never ceded his abiding interest in the proselytization and religious 
conversion of the Native Americans, he tempered his religious fervor with a belief in the 
supremacy of the secular political state.  As he says at one point in his Histoire, citing 
“un bon et ancien évêque,” “Ecclesia est in Republica, non Respublica in Ecclesia” 
(1.1.215).54  Thus, while the religious aspects of Lescarbot’s colonial project pitted him 
against the commercial interest of Basque fishermen and Dutch fur traders on one side, 
his secular political bent meant an increasing opposition to the Jesuits on the other.  
Lescarbot’s general mistrust of the Jesuits stemmed not only from his belief that they had 
little respect for the governments of individual political states, but his suspicion—one 
commonly held in France at the time—that they had played a role in the 1610 
assassination of Henry IV.  Lescarbot’s ire found further fuel in the wrangling of Jesuit 
Father Pierre Biard, who militated against Poutrincourt’s ongoing involvement in the Port 
Royal colony and derided the early colonists’ precipitous conversion of the local Native 
Americans.55  Such religious controversies, however, had little impact on Lescarbot’s 
                                                
53 “He was convinced that he belonged to an elect group compelled to work for the diffusion of the 
Christian religion”; “codes of self-constraint” (translation mine). 
 
54 “The church is in the republic, not the republic in the church.”  The “good and ancient bishop” he cites is 
St. Optatus, Bishop of Milevia, whose De Schismate Donatistarum includes the phrase in a slightly 
different form: “Non enim respub[lica] est in Ecclesia, sed Ecclesia in rep[ublica] est.” (3.81). 
 
55 For a full discussion of this issue see Paolo Carile’s “Lescarbot e Biard: La prima ‘querelle’ 
sull'evangelizzazione in Nouvelle-France ovvero lo sguardo impedito.” 
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success as an administrator, a diplomat, and, finally, a land-owning member of the 
gentry. 
 
Morton’s career was rather less successful than Lescarbot’s, in large part because he 
seems not to have benefited from his political connections to the gentry in the same way 
that Lescarbot had.  Morton was, like Lescarbot, a trained lawyer, having been a member 
of Clifford’s Inn.  Morton’s departure for the Americas likewise seems to have been 
fueled by frustration with the legal system—Morton and his wife had unsuccessfully 
fought a lawsuit with her son from a previous marriage over portions of her first 
husband’s estate in 1623—as much as by the possibilities for advancement in the New 
World.  Morton arrived in New England in 1624 and, during the next few years, 
succeeded in antagonizing the Puritan colonists enough that they shipped him back to 
England twice, in 1628 and 1630, on charges of illegally selling arms and ammunition to 
the Native Americans.  The second time, the Puritans arranged things so that Morton 
would see his habitation burn to the ground from his cell in the ship that transported him 
back to England. 
 
Morton’s attempts at revenge against the Puritans were made possible by his 
acquaintance with such well-positioned figures as Sir Ferdinando Gorges, chair of the 
Council for New England, and Archbishop William Laud, member of the Privy Council 
and head of the Lords Commissioners for Plantations.  Laud was, in particular, a close 
collaborator with King Charles I during his eleven-year “Personal Rule” to bring about 
the unification of Church and state, a cause aided by the publication and enforcement of 
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the revised 1633 Declaration of Sports, which covered all manner of ritual practices.  
Laud and Gorges employed Morton after his expulsion from New England to prosecute a 
quo warranto for Charles, who sought to have the Massachusetts Bay colony’s charter 
revoked.56  Though this case was successful, Morton (and Charles for that matter) never 
succeeded in removing the Puritans from New England.  As Orgel notes, Charles may 
have held sway over the English courts, but without tax revenues to maintain his army 
such legal decisions were unenforceable (79).  Morton thus returned to New England in 
1643, only to be imprisoned by the Puritans a third time—“in his dotage” at the age of 
69, Cohen notes (4)—before being released and settling in Agamenticus, Maine, where 
he died in 1647.  
 
While Lescarbot’s career outstripped Morton’s, in the end, however, he too suffered a 
setback in his colonial ambitions.  In 1607, Henry IV, under pressure from Dutch traders 
and French Catholic leaders, revoked de Mont’s monopoly on trade in New France, 
thereby undermining the financial basis for the settlement at Port Royal.  The trifling 
outcomes of Morton’s and Lescarbot’s colonial efforts, when measured against the 
colonial possibilities envisioned in their texts, thus expose the gap between national, 
royal, and imperial interests—or, put in slightly different terms, between conflicting 
visions of empire—revealing the problems of assuming that these are one and the same.  
And yet, their writings work to further imperial power by promoting a body of traditional 
customs as a means of policing the boundaries of national identity, even as their 
metropolitan and colonial interlocutors (and competitors) thwart their material aims. 
                                                
56 A quo warranto, literally “by what warrant,” was a form of legal procedure by which the monarch of 
England could call upon a person, persons, or a corporate body to provide proof of their right to a particular 
office, franchise, or privilege. 
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In order to argue that colonization was the right thing for the nation to do, and they were 
the right men to do it, Lescarbot and Morton construct in their writings a figure of the 
orthodox national self: someone who speaks the right language, observes the right 
customs, and respects the right authorities—all the while vehemently opposing those who 
stand in their and their nation’s way, including people who are themselves, at least from a 
geographical perspective, members of those nations.  Their arguments, even if they failed 
to sway the monarchs to whom, in part, they were addressed, nevertheless became an 
important part of the ongoing dialogue about religious and national identities, with their 
focus on custom taking part in a reconception of identity as something that is produced, 
rather than inborn; mobile, rather than fixed; and transmissible, rather than 
incommunicable. 
 
In the remainder of this chapter, I examine how Morton and Lescarbot use ritual 
performance as a means of justifying colonial expansion, symbolically incorporating 
Native American peoples and carefully establishing the grounds for monarchal authority 
over the New World.  I then situate these ritual performances in the context of the 
publications which record them and the larger discourse on custom and identity of which 
they are a part, starting with Lescarbot’s response to Michel de Montaigne’s paradigmatic 
writings on custom, wherein he challenges the notion that custom necessarily acts to 
alienate and divide people from each other and insisting upon the possibility of 
civilization as a process of positive cultural transmission—a possibility which could only 
be realized, however, if carried out by those properly suited for the task.  I likewise 
    63 
examine Morton’s response to William Wood’s New England’s Prospect, showing how 
Morton uses his critique of Wood’s theory of the origin of the Native Americans to 
radically rethink English identity and, paradoxically, defend a very traditional conception 
of that identity, thereby positioning the Puritan colonists outside the margins of English 
society.  What Morton and Lescarbot share, then, is not only their use of ethnography to 
link the cause of colonization with the production of national identity, but their studied 
response to competing conceptions of identity expressed by their fellow countrymen.  
Taken together, they show us the early development of a potent and rhetorically supple 
ethnographic discourse that would go on to play a dominant role in seventeenth century 
French and English debates about the impact of North American colonization.  
 
 
“A TRUTH OF APPEARANCES” 
 
One of the many virtues of Orgel’s The Illusion of Power is the total absence of the word 
“culture” from its pages.  Given the course of the study of the masque since that volume’s 
publication—and the course of New Historicism, with which it is indelibly associated—
that fact becomes all the more striking.  In order to understand the difference this absence 
makes, we need look no further than Orgel’s conclusion, where he simultaneously 
underlines the failure of Charles I’s court masques to produce anything other than “a truth 
of appearances” with its “assert[ion of] power … through analogies” and points out that 
“the Puritan invective against royal theatricals reveals, ironically, an accurate sense of 
their most powerful effects” (88).  Orgel hereby maintains a carefully restricted 
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opposition between the “authority” of symbolic language use (broadly construed to 
include not only legislation and political exhortation, but also painting, acting, and other 
forms of representative art) and its “power” to drive people to act in certain ways and 
produce certain material effects; as he notes in his discussion of King Charles’ period of 
“Personal Rule,” a “government’s power depends on its ability to enforce its authority” 
(79).  This decidedly partial opposition, which establishes the terms under which “power” 
and “authority” can sometimes coincide, sometimes not, would be virtually unthinkable 
once one has acceded to a Geertzian concept of culture.   
 
As evidence of this, witness Geertz’s own study of Balinese court theater in Negara, in 
which, as Adam Kuper has noted, “[c]ulture is epitomized by … royal rituals” (116).  
Where Orgel sees an opposition between power and authority, Geertz completely 
collapses the two through a process of radical abstraction, “depict[ing] a society whose 
true life is governed by ideas, expressed in symbols, enacted in rituals” (Kuper 117).  
Culture, for Geertz, means not only the total identification of power and authority, but a 
dematerialization of knowledge that tends to neglect the material processes through 
which the transfer of knowledge and the production of meaning impact human behavior.  
While I think Kuper’s criticism borders on misprision at times in its unforgiving 
interpretation of Geertz’s work, I am struck by the way that even such an astute scholar 
as Stephen Greenblatt can, under the sway of Geertz’s thought, be led to reduce “culture” 
to a series of symbolic “‘control mechanisms’” in the same breath as he denigrates an 
“anthropological interpretation [that] address[es] itself … to the mechanics of customs 
and institutions” (Greenblatt Renaissance 3, citing Geertz 44).  Orgel’s account of 
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Charles’ troubles reminds us, though, of the dangers of separating semantics from 
mechanics in order to elevate the former to a superior position, and thereby reducing 
power to a question of (purely) symbolic authority. 
 
Maintaining, with Orgel, such a partial distinction between authority, as the symbolic 
expression of behavioral standards, and power, as the ability to realize (or, as Orgel puts 
it, “enforce”) that symbolic authority, is vital to a proper understanding of the 
performances and writings of Lescarbot and Morton.  This is particularly true because 
they lived at a moment when the traditional authorities of church and state were being 
widely and hotly contested, complicating any attempt to directly translate symbolic 
authority into political power.  Understanding this helps to clarify the significance of 
Mullaney’s conception of the “rehearsal of cultures”: the ritual performances he analyzes 
offer a mechanism for translating authority into power by instantiating a set of coherent 
and predictable behaviors in a given community as a basis for a greater political order.  
What Lescarbot and Morton are up to, to return to terms I have already employed, is 
mobilizing the translatio studii in service of a translatio imperii.  In order to carry out 
this singularly Baconian enterprise, however, they have to turn to the rather unbaconian 
means of public theater, adapting the rituals of their own society to a radically new 
context.  This adaptation serves in particular to “refuse[r] … à l’Indien [i.e., Native 
American] toute dissemblance religieuse et/ou politique” (Gosman 42), 57 symbolically 
assimilating the Native American societies they encountered and thereby establishing 
their (and their respective nations’) authority to colonize the Americas.   
 
                                                
57 “to refuse to the Indian all dissemblance religious and/or political” (translation mine) 
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Thankfully for both authors, the period in which they lived produced a variety of 
dramatic genres that partook in what David Bevington and Peter Holbrook have 
characterized as “the Renaissance theatricalization of power” (9).  Lescarbot could thus 
find in France numerous examples of réceptions, entrées royales, and other pageantries 
upon which to base his “Théâtre de Neptune,” the production that he wrote and 
performed to mark the return of Poutrincourt to the Port Royal colony in November of 
1606.  Meanwhile, Morton, as a member of the Inns of Chancery, likely attended, if he 
did not play a part in, many of the extravagant revels and other entertainments of the 
Elizabethan and Jacobean period, which would have given him ample material for his 
carefully orchestrated revels of Mayday, 1627.   
 
Chief amongst the theatrical genres these authors had recourse to was, of course, the 
masque, which lends itself, as Martin Butler has noted, to “the coalescence of the 
political and the aesthetic” (21).  The critical tradition has led us to conceive of the 
masque as bringing about the containment of disorder within a carefully choreographed 
hierarchical world with the monarch firmly in control—a conception which fits well with 
the intended ends of Morton’s and Lescarbot’s own theatrical productions.  And yet many 
recent critics have, like Butler, challenged us to push this analysis still further by reading 
the politics of the masque not as simply “co-terminous with [its] aesthetic closures” but 
rather as “interventions within a material history” (22), insisting, as do Bevington and 
Holbrook, that “the court masque needs to be viewed as a diverse expression of 
conflicting arenas of interest within the court culture, rather than as primarily a symbolic 
ceremony vital to the reproduction of monarchal power” (8).  There is much in 
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Lescarbot’s and Morton’s works to reward those who are up to this challenge since, while 
their purpose is to maintain an identity that is entirely conventional, the texts that they 
produced are not. 
 
Their performances are a feature of Morton and Lescarbot’s ethnographic strategy that 
not only sets them apart from their contemporaries in England and France, but also 
grounds their work in the ethnographic practice of the time, since, as Mullaney affirms, 
the distinction between modern ethnography and early modern ethnography is that the 
latter is “geared not toward the interpretation of strange cultures but toward their 
consummate performance” (69).  What Lescarbot and Morton carry out in the more 
literary portions of their texts, however, is not simply a consummate performance of 
strange cultures, but a consuming performance, one which domesticates the strangeness 
of these cultures, assimilating them into the nation that is colonizing them, at the same 
time as it estranges those, like the English Puritans, whose place of birth ought to 
guarantee their identity. 
 
Morton’s and Lescarbot’s performances were not necessarily unconventional in their 
deployment of different generic characteristics.  Morton’s Mayday revels incorporate the 
jumble of features typical of the masque—poetry, singing, dancing—within the narrative 
frame of his New English Canaan.  Meanwhile, Lescarbot’s “Théâtre de Neptune” blends 
features of the entrée royale with those of the réception: a representative of the king 
pauses on the threshold of a “city,” he is received by representatives of all the major 
categories of local inhabitants, and is finally invited into the “city” for a celebration and a 
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feast (see V. E. Graham 185 and Mullaney 66), though there is no mock battle, nor is 
there a progression through the “city” as such.  The major difference between these 
works and their models, however, is that their immediate audience was not the royals and 
nobles before whom (and by whom) such pieces would have been staged in Europe.  
While there were several French nobles present for Lescarbot’s “Théâtre de Neptune,” 
the immediate audience for both performances was the Native Americans whom 
Lescarbot and Morton were so eager to incorporate into their national empires. 
 
As such, these theatrical presentations offer their Native American audiences a glimpse 
into the rituals and values of English and French society.  Interestingly, allusions to 
Classical mythology play a major part in both sets of festivities.  Morton, for example, 
highlights the intellectual playfulness and deep literary knowledge that he holds to be 
characteristic of the English nobility through his recital of enigmatic poetry peppered 
with references to Proteus, the Hydra, Scylla, and Charybdis.  Lescarbot, for his part, uses 
references to Neptune, Jupiter, and Pluto to emphasize a coherent and divinely sanctioned 
geo-political order in which the French and their King have earned the approbation of 
Neptune and, therefore, the right (as Neptune says at the beginning of the piece) to 
“établir ici [en Amérique] un Royaume François, | Et y faire garder mes statuts et mes 
loix” (3.474).58   
 
By portraying the obedience of Neptune’s Tritons and repeatedly referring to role of the 
French King, Henri IV, in spreading “gouvernement” and “loix” (3.477, 3.476), 
                                                
58 “to establish here [in America] a French Kingdom, | and to maintain my statutes and laws there” 
(translation mine) 
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Lescarbot further promulgates a sense that obedience to this government and these laws 
is a means to “tout ce que nous desirons” (3.477), as one of his characters puts it.59  The 
greatness of Neptune and Henri is, in Lescarbot’s work, strongly linked with their 
“courage” and “renom” (3.475), which, as the first of Neptune’s Tritons points out, it is 
the responsibility of their subjects to announce to the world-at-large.  Thus, in his poem 
“Au Roy,” Lescarbot asks Neptune to give him “des vers | Propres à resonner la gloire | 
Du plus grand Roy … | Cornant son renom jusqu’au pole” (3.465).60  This appeal to the 
renowned Neptune on behalf of Henri IV makes clear that one of the primary aims of 
Lescarbot and Morton’s allusions is to link the as yet uncertain fate of their colonies to 
the more established renown of their respective monarchs, and the renown of those 
monarchs, in turn, to the thoroughly established renown of these Classical figures.   
 
Morton and Lescarbot further link political authority to generosity, with Lescarbot 
referencing the “clemence” of Henri IV (3.466) and closing the “Théâtre” with a 
gustatory cornucopia straight out of Rabelais’ Gargantua, including “rotisseurs, 
depensiers, cuisiniers, | Marmitons, patissiers, fricasseurs, [et] taverniers” (3.479).61  
Elsewhere in his Histoire, Lescarbot refers to the Ordre du Bon Temps, a pseudo-
Chivalric supper club made up of the French and Native American nobility.  Each 
member of the club would, by turns, hunt for meat to provide for the dinner of the others, 
while the wine that the colonists had brought from France was served for all to share.  
                                                
 
59  “all that we desire” 
 
60 “verses fit to resound the glory of the greatest King … announcing his renown clear to the poles” 
 
61 “roasters, provisioners, cooks, busboys, pastry chefs, fry cooks, and barkeeps” 
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This “order” thus simultaneously established reciprocal bonds between the elite members 
of each group and served to reinforce their elite status.  Lescarbot also uses his discussion 
of the club to emphasize the abundance and quality of game in New France, going so far 
as to suggest that the fare prepared for these feasts is superior to that available on the 
renowned Parisian rue aux Ours, the center of a burgeoning metropolitan restaurant trade 
fueled, in part, by its proximity to the bankers on rue Quincampoix (2.4.568-569).  
Morton, meanwhile, points repeatedly to the surfeit of food and drink, or “good cheare” 
he made available to his native guests during his Mayday revels (132ff.).  He likewise 
draws attention to his rank-based distribution of alcoholic beverages, noting that he only 
offered spirits to “Sachem[s] and Winnaytue[s]”—that is, chiefs and nobles (54).  While 
the general values thus modeled in Morton and Lescarbot’s performances—courage, wit, 
and generosity—seem to lack the precision they would require to serve as the basis for a 
coherent collective identity, in their performance they take on nuances that establish both 
the external (nation-based) and internal (rank- and gender-based) boundaries of these 
socio-political bodies. 
 
In addition to using their performances to model European identities, Morton and 
Lescarbot both incorporate important roles for aboriginals into their performances, even 
though these roles remain marginal in the accounts they give of them.  Lescarbot’s piece 
is particularly revealing in this regard, since the roles of the “savages” who welcome 
Poutrincourt were actually played by Frenchmen dressed up in “savage” garb.  They 
appear, in canoes, in front of Poutrincourt’s ship to offer presents of moose or deer meat, 
of beaver pelts, and of “matachiaz”—an aboriginal word usually rendered in English as 
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wampum, which Lescarbot glosses as “echarpes, et brasselets” (10).62  Or, at least, the 
first three “savages” offer presents, while the fourth has nothing to offer Poutrincourt 
except this speech: 
 
SAGAMOS, pardonne moy, 
Si je viens en telle sorte, 
Si me presentant à toy 
Quelque present je n’apporte. 
Fortune n’est pas toujours 
Aux bons chasseurs favorable, 
C’est pourquoy ayant recours 
A un maitre plus traitable, 
Apres avoir maintefois 
Invoqué cette Fortune?  
Brossant par l’epés des bois, 
Je m’en vay suivre Neptune. 
Que Diane en ses foréts?  
Ceux qu’elle voudra caresse,”  
Je n’ay que trop de regrets 
D’avoir perdu ma jeunesse 
A la suivre par les vaux, 
Par les monts, et par les plaines, 
Avecque mille travaux, 
Souz des esperances vaines. 
Maintenant je m’en vay voir 
Par cette côte marine 
Si je pourray point avoir 
Dequoy fournir ta cuisine: 
Et cependant  si tu as 
Quelque part en ta chaloupe 
Un peu de caraconas, 
Fournis-en moy et ma troupe. (11-12)63 
 
                                                
 
62 “Scar[ves] and bracelets” (24) 
63 “Sagamos, pardon me, | If before you, here, I stand, | Present, in this company, | With no present in my 
hand. | Fortune is not always kind | Her good hunters cheering! | For this reason I must find | Another 
field—I’m fearing. | For, through many useless days | I invoked frail Fortune, | Her wooden swords I toss 
away | To follow after Neptune. | Let Dian hold in sylvan shade | Those she would caress, in truth, | My 
regrets will never fade | That I lost my lusty youth | And her clumsy cattle chased | Over hills and near-by 
plain; | Many a hundred trails I traced | And always found my hopes were vain. | Now, I am about to try | 
My luck upon this rocky coast. | Perchance upon the shore will lie | Something for your cook to roast. | And 
now, monseigneur, if you see | Within the locker of your sloop | Some caraconas, give to me | And I will 
share it with my troop” (25-26). 
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This passage gives a clear demonstration of how carefully Lescarbot incorporates 
aboriginal elements and words into what is essentially a European text.  First we have the 
“matachiaz,” which operated as a kind of symbolic currency in Native American society, 
then we have Poutrincourt addressed as “Sagamos”—not only in the passage I have cited 
but seven times throughout the brief text—and finally we have the word “caraconas,” 
which Lescarbot glosses here simply as “bread.”  This word, however, had an added 
significance, since the aboriginal request for bread from the French had developed into a 
ritual in the years preceding Lescarbot’s arrival in Port Royal; Lescarbot himself 
witnessed such an exchange at Canso (the southwesternmost tip of present-day Cape 
Breton Island) on his trip from France.  Through the evocation of this new ritual prior to 
an actual feast in which actual aboriginals took part, the speech of the final “savage” 
encapsulates the unequal reciprocity that characterizes the piece: he willingly trades the 
pursuit of game for the pursuit of fish, altering his practices in deference to Poutrincourt’s 
authority, which is cemented by this Frenchman’s generosity in sharing with the natives a 
foodstuff they could not themselves produce, and possibly even suggesting that, one day, 
these peoples will cultivate the earth itself to produce the wheat needed for this bread.  
What Lescarbot’s text ultimately stages, then, is not the equality of distinct peoples, but 
rather the assimilation of the native peoples into French society. 
 
In Morton’s Mayday revels the role played by the Native Americans is not so much one 
of an “Other” to be assimilated as of a people whose customs are already in harmony 
with those of the English.  While the natives participate happily in his drinking, dancing, 
singing, and general merrymaking, however, the Puritans vehemently object to Morton’s 
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indulgence in what he calls an “old English custom” (132), one whose revival had been 
actively encouraged by James I, Charles I, and Archbishop Laud.  Perhaps the best 
indication of Puritan antipathy for this practice can be found in a passage from Wood’s 
New England Prospect that transforms the “inhuman homicides” of the “cannibal” 
Mohawks into a devilish pastiche of Mayday, in which they “fatten up” a “neighbor” and 
“br[ing that person] forth each day to be new painted, piped unto, and hemmed-in with a 
ring of bare-skinned morris dancers, who presented their antics before him.  In a word, 
when they sported enough about this walking Maypole, a rough-hewn satyr cutteth a 
gobbit of flesh from his brawny arm, eating it in his view” (76).  Where Wood’s text 
defamiliarizes English Mayday customs, though, Morton’s defamiliarizes the Puritans 
themselves, mocking their Old Testament vocabulary by having them call his Maypole 
“the Calf of Horeb” (134), and thereby casting them, symbolically, as Jews rather than 
Englishmen.64  Morton also belittles the Puritans for their inability to interpret the 
enigmatical poem, “Rise, Oedipus,” which he nails to the Maypole in the midst of the 
revels, an inability which reveals their distinctly unenglish intellectual poverty. 
 
In their vocal objections to Morton’s performance, as recorded in Morton’s account of his 
Mayday revels, the Puritans play the role of antimasquers, threatening the social order 
that he is attempting to establish.65  Morton thus notes that after the revels the Puritans 
“sought occasion … to overthrow his undertakings and destroy his plantation quite and 
                                                
64 See Nicholas McDowell’s excellent article “The stigmatizing of Puritans as Jews in Jacobean England” 
for an enlightening analysis of several possible sources for Morton’s rhetoric here, including Ben Jonson’s 
plays and Francis Bacon’s political speeches.  Particularly noteworthy is McDowell’s observation that this 
rhetoric was linked to the Puritan resistance to King James’ Book of Sports, which, among other things, 
encouraged the erection of Maypoles as part of the celebration of Mayday. 
 
65 The Oxford English Dictionary aptly and succinctly defines an antimasque as a “grotesque interlude 
between the acts of a masque, to which it served as a foil.”  
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clean” (136).  What this resistance demonstrates, however, is that the Puritans actually 
did understand the message behind Morton’s poem, as well as behind the antlers which 
he nailed to the top of his maypole.  They knew that he meant to cuckold them, to 
husband the land out from under them, and thus they acted to preempt Morton by jailing 
him and razing his maypole to the ground in an act of symbolic emasculation.  In this 
fashion the antimasquers take control of the masque, averting the political and social 
union between “Old” and “New” English that was its intended end. 
 
The remainder of the third book of the New English Canaan consists of Morton’s 
attempts to reverse the symbolic defeat that he suffered at the hands of the Puritans, 
reworking these events in a masque-like agglomeration of history, allegory, poetry, and 
polemic that offers a characteristically Jacobean blend of Biblical and Classical allusions.  
In this endeavor Morton resorts to ever more baroque symbolism, fabricating a truly 
Protean set of transformations in his recounting of the destruction of the maypole and its 
aftermath.  The maypole first becomes, in the poem entitled “Bacchanal Triumph,” a 
“prodigeous birth” that the Puritans perceive as “a hiddeous monster [with] a forked tail” 
(146): the Hydra.  The Puritans are then transformed into “Squires of low degree” (146), 
and set forth on a mission to “give to Hidraes head the fall” (147).  They are successful, 
of course, and the Hydra, being captured, is “bound [and] conveyd by Stix unto the 
godds” (148).  This last detail establishes a symbolic identification of the Hydra—and, by 
extension, the maypole itself—with Morton: it having been felled, so is he, and the two of 
them are sent back across the “Styx”—that is, to England. 
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Having thus portrayed his defeat in classical heroic terms, Morton then stages his 
symbolic resurrection in a similar fashion, generating an identification between the 
maypole, the boat which took Morton to England, and the Trojan Horse, all of which, as 
William Scheick has observed, are made of wood.  This symbolic transformation of the 
maypole into the Trojan Horse serves as the pivot to yet another motif, which plays upon 
Morton’s use of gendered imagery: the tomb become womb.  If the maypole serves as a 
priapic assertion of Morton’s “masculine virtue”—which, as we shall see, is a vital aspect 
of his campaign to cast himself as the ideal Englishman—and the tale of the Hydra as his 
symbolic death, then Morton’s trip back to England—on a ship called, appropriately 
enough, the Jonas—becomes an opportunity to be reborn.  The Trojan Horse contained 
the troops who ultimately defeated Troy with a surprise attack, and what Morton 
suggests, in the final chapters of New English Canaan, is that he too will spring from the 
belly of the horse, which is also the belly of the biblical whale, to defeat the Puritans. 
 
This last transformation of the ship from horse to whale enables Morton to cast himself as 
Jonah, and thus turn the Puritans’ own paradigm of religious typology against them.  
Morton underlines this in his recounting of the troubled voyage he and his fellows aboard 
ship made back to England, when he states several times that “it was the great mercy of 
God that they had not all perished” (186, 187), suggesting the omnipresent threat of 
death.  But, like Jonah, Morton emerges from the whale’s belly, and thus what was a 
tomb becomes a womb:  
 
Mine hoost of Ma-re Mount [that is, Morton] (after hee had bin in the 
Whales belly) was set a shore to see if hee would now play Ionas, so 
metamorphosed with a longe voyage, that hee looked like Lazarus in the 
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painted cloath.  But mine Host (after due consideration of the premises) 
thought it fitter for him to play Ionas in this kinde, then for the Separatists 
[that is, the Puritans] to play Ionas in that kinde as they doe.  … And now 
mine Host, being merrily disposed, haveing past many perillous 
adventures in that desperat Whales belly, beganne in a posture like Ionas 
and cryed Repent you cruell Separatists repent, there are as yet but 40. 
days if Iove vouchsafe to thunder, Charter and the Kingdome of the 
Separatists will fall a sunder.  Repent, you cruell Schismaticks repent.  
(187-188) 
 
Seen in the light of these complex transformations, Daniel Shea’s conclusion that “[w]hat 
Morton’s text represents is the attempt to write New England as masque” makes sense.  
Morton attempted to use his book “to effect the magical end and essence of the form, a 
metamorphosis that by its very nature could exclude the Separatists, make them exiles in 
their own kingdom, and forbid them entry into Canaan” (58): by becoming Jonah he 
could bring the vengeance of God down upon the Puritans’ heads.  And, at least 
symbolically, this strategy worked.  Jove, ultimately, did thunder: in 1637, shortly after 
the publication of New English Canaan, the quo warranto Morton had prosecuted on 
behalf of Laud and the Council for New England was ruled valid, and Charles recalled 
the Massachusetts Bay charter to England.   
 
The problem remains, however, that neither Morton nor the King himself were able to 
actualize what they had symbolically represented, and thus failed to achieve the union of 
real and ideal that is the aim of both the masque as a literary genre and the law as a tool 
for social regulation.  Internal political and religious strife in England prevented the quo 
warranto ruling from being carried out, and so the Puritans retained their charter and 
their control of the Plymouth and Massachusetts Bay colonies.  Because Morton had 
identified himself with a political order whose effective power had been radically 
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reduced, the potential for his own performance was limited as well.  The confiscation of 
the initial, London imprint of New English Canaan by English civil authorities, evidence 
of which has been recently discovered by Paul Sternberg, is emblematic of this reduced 
capacity to effect real political change. 
 
Comparing the wild transformations and reversals of Morton’s text with the balance and 
order of Lescarbot’s “Théâtre de Neptune” suggests not only the latter’s more stable 
social and political position but his greater confidence of ultimate success.  In Lescarbot’s 
text the only element even approximating an antimasque is a speech made in Gascon by 
one of Neptune’s tritons, who playfully suggests that Neptune is too busy chasing after 
girls to be able to keep his promise always to protect French ships on the sea.  That he 
speaks in Gascon and not French is suggestive, given Lescarbot’s concern for linguistic 
purity; he stands for all the sub-national ethnic groups—Gascons, Basques, 
Languedociens, and so on—that Lescarbot holds to be a threat to the national political 
order.  Of course, Henri IV’s own Béarnaise origins complicate this iconography, though 
his ultimate acceptance of Catholicism and his role in the reunification and pacification 
of France offer an example of how assimilation can help to produce civil order.66  
Moreover, the “challenge” the Gascon Triton represents to the ordered union of the Old 
                                                
 
66 As Bernard Moleux discusses in his “Béarnais and Gascon today: language behavior and perception,” 
differentiating in any systematic way between the various dialects (Béarnais, Gascon, etc.) of Southern 
France that are collectively referred to by linguists as “Occitan” is an enterprise fraught with political and 
epistemological complications.  Moleux shows that where academically-trained philologists are apt to note 
that Occitan, taken as whole, is both distinct and substantial enough to constitute a language, speakers of 
these various dialects tend to reject the idea of a shared Occitan language, and will even refuse to speak it 
with their children and grandchildren who have learned the language in an academic setting.  Given his 
overwhelming desire for political and social unity, it is hardly a challenge to imagine whom Lescarbot 
would side with in this debate. 
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French and “New French” is barely even that, since the speech is more humorous than 
serious, and does not prevent the performance from ending in its ritual communal feast.   
 
In terms of his metropolitan audience, Lescarbot’s relationship to Henri IV and, later, 
Louis XIII certainly put him on a much more stable footing than did Morton’s with 
Charles.  Similarly, Lescarbot’s relationship with his immediate patrons was much 
stronger than Morton’s with Archbishop Laud and Sir Gorges, since both de Monts and 
Poutrincourt were present in the Port Royal colony to appreciate his efforts on their 
behalf.  The support of Laud and Gorges for Morton was partial at best, extending only in 
so far as their interests coincided.  Even the publication history of the New English 
Canaan itself suggests this, for, if the patronage of Laud and Gorges, not to mention 
Charles, had extended beyond their use of Morton to prosecute the quo warranto against 
the Puritans, then the first print run might well have been restored to him. 
 
Patronage alone, however, was not enough to fully secure the results Lescarbot desired 
either, since Henri IV ultimately gave in to the protests of merchants from Holland and, 
in 1607, revoked the monopoly that he had granted to de Monts in 1603.  This removed 
the all-important financial basis upon which Port Royal and other colonies were to be 
based; fishing and fur-trading could be more profitably carried out without the 
establishment of permanent planter colonies, which would only serve as a drain on their 
profits.  Where Morton’s New English Canaan lays bare the challenge to his authority but 
cannot contain it, Lescarbot’s “Théâtre de Neptune” underestimates the threat represented 
by oppositional forces within his own society rather than neutralizing them.  The fate of 
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these two theatrical productions—marginal both in the location of their performance and 
in their generic status—thereby ably demonstrates the complex power struggles that 
Butler suggests are at play behind (between? beyond?) the scenes of a performance 
designed to reinforce the monarch’s authority. 
 
The difficulties that Morton and Lescarbot faced in their attempts to regulate the 
colonization of the Americas not only confirm for us how divided these nascent nation-
empires were, especially when it came to the hotly contested problem of how to respond 
to the “discovery” of the New World, but also remind us that there are serious limits to 
the power of language and literature to bring about material changes in the world.  These 
limits are particularly evident in the New World, where, as Stephen Greenblatt has noted, 
“[w]ords … seem always to be trailing after events that pursue a terrible logic quite other 
than the fragile meanings that they construct” (Marvelous Possessions 63).  As a literary 
scholar, however, I must insist with Greenblatt that the “contemptuous dismissal of th[is] 
discourse” is as flawed a response to these writings as the belief in “linguistic 
omnipotence” (63, 62).  The “fate” of these texts, after all, lies not only in their 
immediate effect—or lack thereof—but in their reception over the long term as well. 
 
 
“LIKE A BLANK SLATE” 
 
Custom, as we saw it portrayed by Montaigne and Bacon, is a force that can work both 
for and against social and political cohesion.  For Montaigne, however, this force cannot 
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by any means be brought under the control of reason—in truth, as the process of 
“accoustumance hebete nos sens” (1.23.109), it is reason that becomes subject to the 
power of custom.67  Thus any attempt to manage custom is, for Montaigne, more apt to 
produce civil disorder than to reduce it.  Bacon, too, is wary of such forays into social 
engineering, echoing Montaigne’s concerns in his essay “Of Seditions and Troubles,” 
where he notes that the “alteration of law and customs” can lead to the revolt of the 
people by, paradoxically, “join[ing] and knitt[ing] them in common cause” (104).68  
Despite their various differences, then, Montaigne and Bacon share a fear of custom’s 
capacity to provoke the disintegration of a body politic and, likewise, an association of 
custom with written or code law.  Yet, as Ullrich Langer notes, Montaigne goes further 
than Bacon on this point, radically collapsing the distinction between customary law and 
code law by suggesting that “laws vary as much as customs” and thus are equally the 
product of a “local, contingent phenomenon” (89-90).  Montaigne looks to the origin of 
laws and sees a “fondement … si foible” (1.23.117);69 Lescarbot takes Montaigne’s 
discovery as an excuse to look right past the law to the mutability of mores and manners, 
where he finds the potential for remaking America in the image of France by asserting 
the transcendent and universal value of local customs. 
 
                                                
 
67 “habit stupefies our senses” (1.23.94). 
 
68 A similar concern is expressed in his anonymously published Brief Discourse Touching the Happie 
Union of the Three Kingdomes of England and Scotland, where he advises King James that “a consent in 
[manners] is to be sought industriously; but, not to bee inforced.  For, nothing amongst people, breedes so 
much pertinacie, in houlding their customes, as suddaine and violent offer to remoove them” (C3[r]). 
 
69 “foundation so weak” (1.23.101) 
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Perhaps the best indication of how radically Lescarbot’s ethnographic writings 
reconfigure Montaigne’s notion of custom is in his turning to quasi-synonyms like 
“mœurs” and “façon de vivre”—“mores” and “mode [literally “fashion”] of living”—that 
take the legal meanings of “coutume” out of play and thereby neutralize key associations 
with institutional government and, more significantly, with writing.  This “custom in 
sheep’s clothing,” as presented by Lescarbot, is still capable of producing difference, but 
it also provides an opportunity for differences to be erased, a means by which the native 
inhabitants of the Americas can be converted to European practices.  While human 
diversity disorients and at moments even disgusts Montaigne, Lescarbot carefully parses 
and organizes it to produce a comforting sense of unity in diversity.  This is not to say 
that he ignores how marvelous and threatening the customs of the Native Americans can 
seem to their European audience, but rather that he carefully negates the threat these 
customs present by showing how much the two groups actually have in common.  Where 
their practices do in fact differ, Lescarbot offers the transformative power of custom as a 
means of correcting them, thus enabling the creation of a unified society of Old and 
“New” French.   
 
Lescarbot facilitates this symbolic assimilation through his frequent portrayal of the 
Native Americans of New France, the Micmacs or “Souriquois,” in direct opposition to 
the Brazilian natives, the Topinamba, as “semblable à tableau nud” (3.6.352)—“like a 
blank slate”—upon which the French can inscribe their own national customs.  Lescarbot 
explicitly links this blankness to the lack of alphabetical writing, while he uses the 
possession of writing as a justification for intellectual and political dominion.  Thus in his 
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chapter “Des lettres” Lescarbot argues that the French, not the Phoenicians, were the 
originators of the alphabet, since Xenophon says that the Greeks received their letters 
from the Galatians—and as Lescarbot has it: “Galates[:] c’est à dire Gaullois” 
(3.6.370)—a rhetorical move that positions the French as the source of all European 
learning.  The Native Americans are, as Montaigne notes, members of a world “si 
nouveau et si enfant qu’on luy apprend encore son a, b, c” (3.6.909), but where 
Montaigne sees this as a reason to leave them be Lescarbot sees it as a call to arms.70   
Lescarbot reasons that since the French are the originators of the alphabet, they are also 
the European people best suited to civilize the Native Americans, and thereby collapses 
any distinction between studii and imperii, knowledge and political authority. 
 
Lescarbot’s motif of the universal in the particular pervades the sixth book of his 
Histoire.  What that book ultimately performs is nothing less than a contextualization of 
the social practices of all human societies within a single narrative timeline framed by life 
and death—”[U]ne pareille entrée est à tous à la vie, et une pareille issuë.” (3.6.346)71—
and containing a series of necessary intervening steps: being clothed and fed, learning to 
speak, getting married, going to war, and so on.  Within this broad framework, however, 
Lescarbot also takes note of more specific similarities between the peoples of New and 
Old France, often citing classical, Biblical, or more recent historical sources to provide an 
added authority to his assertions of similarity where none would seem, initially, to 
appear.  Thus, in a discussion of how the natives of New France wear their hair long, he 
                                                
 
70 “so new and so infantile that it is still being taught its A B C” (3.6.842) 
 
71 “The same entry is given to all in life, and the same exit.” 
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notes that this was the practice of many early French kings, as evidenced by their being 
named “Chevelus” or “Hairy” (3.6.377).  By placing this strange practice in France’s own 
history, Lescarbot contains its strangeness, making it no more foreign than one’s own 
ancestors. 
 
The very motif of the universal in the particular announces Lescarbot’s own “inscription” 
in a particular intellectual tradition and its attendant practices, positioning him as the 
inheritor of a body of ethnographic writing that traces its roots back through Jose de 
Acosta to Pliny the Elder.  From these authors Lescarbot borrows his carefully calibrated 
comparative method, designed to reduce and contain the difference of the Americas 
within the frame of classical and Biblical history, and, simultaneously, to distinguish 
between “good” and “bad” populations located (at least geographically speaking) within 
the French nation and its nascent colonies. 
 
The rhetorical power of this gesture is hardly limited to explaining away superficial 
differences like hairstyles; in Lescarbot’s able hands, even an extremely threatening 
practice like cannibalism can be contained.  The Micmacs and the Penobscots (Lescarbot 
calls them the “Armouchiquois”) were widely suspected to engage in cannibalism, a 
suspicion grounded in accounts of Jacques Cartier’s voyages up the St. Lawrence River.  
Lescarbot assuages these concerns by pointing out that these groups actually engage in 
scalping, a practice that, at first glance, hardly seems much better.  His trump card, 
however, is that this custom, as gruesome as it may seem, was in fact practiced by the 
Ancient Gauls.  Thus Lescarbot establishes a parallel between the progenitors of the 
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French nation and the Micmacs, subtly implying the ease with which a people can learn 
to forego barbarous rituals in favor of more civilized ones.  And given that the Old 
French themselves once engaged in such a practice, who better than them to correct it in 
the natives of New France? 
 
Of course, for Montaigne such a notion would have been anathema; he emphasized the 
relative freedom of the Native American from irrational customs, and was, in fact, much 
afraid that “nous [Européens] aurons bien fort hasté sa declinaison et sa ruyne par nostre 
contagion” (3.6.910).72  But Lescarbot is convinced that the French can harness the power 
of acculturation for the good of the Native Americans, especially the Micmacs.  This is 
most evident in his discussion of Native American religious practices.  Lescarbot asserts 
that the Micmac have no religious customs or rituals, which makes them far better 
candidates for colonization than the Brazilians, who worship the sun and the moon.  He 
compares them to a tabula rasa—“un tableau nud”—which, “n’est[ant] imbu d’aucune 
mauvaise opinion[,] est beaucoup plus susceptible à la vraye adoration” (3.6.352).73  This 
figure is hardly accidental, since the trope of writing as identity formation structures 
Lescarbot’s understanding of acculturation.   
 
This understanding is what drives the, at first glance, bizarre development of his chapter 
on letters, which moves from noting the absence of writing among the Native Americans, 
to arguing that the French themselves first devised the alphabet used by the Greeks, to 
                                                
72 “I am much afraid that we [Europeans] shall have greatly hastened the decline and ruin of this new world 
by our contagion” (3.6.842). 
 
73 “And what’s more, those who have imbibed no ill opinions are more susceptible to true adoration than 
others.” 
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insisting on the dual mission of Henri IV to restore French learning to its former glory 
while simultaneously colonizing the Americas.  Of course, Lescarbot is hardly the only 
author during the seventeenth century to make such a bold connection between learning, 
colonization, and the Americas.  Bacon, too, as Bauer has shown, symbolically linked the 
development of scientific knowledge with the voyages of discovery, and in his essay, “Of 
Plantations,” and his New Atlantis, he provides an important link between earlier 
Renaissance utopias by More and Campanella and the utopian aims of later political 
philosophers, such as Hobbes, Berkeley, and Locke, who came to see America as a 
literally blank land, or terra nullis, upon which Europeans could inscribe, at least in 
theory, a perfectly rational political state. 
 
Placing Bacon’s utopian vision alongside Lescarbot’s, however, makes clear the 
nationalistic impulses that often lurk behind such universalism.  Lescarbot’s argument for 
colonization is explicitly predicated on the proven cultural superiority of the French 
nation, and his “Théâtre de Neptune” serves to bolster this argument by giving a further 
instance of successful acculturation produced by a ritual performance that symbolically 
incorporates the Micmacs into French society. 
 
Of course, the rhetorical slight of hand that undergirds Lescarbot’s case for French 
superiority—“Galates[:] c’est à dire Gaullois” —may strike us as transparent sophistry, 
but then a sophisticated and learned tone is much of what lends Lescarbot and Morton’s 
theories their rhetorical force.  Part of what is so fascinating about the work of these two 
authors is how we can see an almost medieval concept of auctoritas—that is, an authority 
    86 
grounded in the canonical texts of the Biblical and Classical traditions—alongside a 
newly-articulated and still-developing rhetoric of experience as a source of authority.  A 
third ground for authority, closely aligned with the first, is also present in the appeals 
both authors make to social rank as a source of authority.  In Lescarbot’s work, however, 
this discourse is only implied by his focus on figures like his patron, Poutrincourt, and 
Membertou, the Grand Sagamos, or “Great Chief,” of the Micmacs, while Morton is 
explicit and insistent throughout New English Canaan about his status as an educated 
gentleman and the credibility this lends to his writings.   
 
This insistence on status sets Morton apart from many of his contemporary promoters of 
colonization, who, as Paul Lindholdt has argued, preferred to emphasize the limits of 
their knowledge in order “to offset [their] outrageous materials with a humble tone” (62).  
Morton, however, was nothing like the “typical promoter,” as is especially manifest in the 
vehemence of his polemical engagement with William Wood’s New England Prospect, 
which resonates throughout the entire New English Canaan.  Wood’s book was one of 
the early seventeenth century’s most popular and respected colonial promotion tracts.  
For this reason alone, Morton would want to attack it in order to further his own 
arguments, but, since Wood was also part of the advance party for the Puritans who came 
to settle Massachusetts Bay, Morton had an added incentive to do so: his attack on Wood 
becomes, by proxy, an attack on the Puritan’s theocratic vision of colonization. 
 
The most provocative and resonant of these attacks lies in Morton’s attempt to account 
for the origin of the Native Americans.  Solving the problem of the origins of these 
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people, as readers of Montaigne’s essay “Des cannibals” well know, was a concern for 
many early modern Europeans who wrote about the Americas.  After all, the Bible was 
held to account for all the diverse peoples of the world: they descended from Noah and 
his three sons—Shem, Ham, and Japheth.  And yet here was a group of people who 
seemed to have been lost to history, unaccounted for by the Bible.  Various theories were 
put forward to try to account for this mystery, often resituating them in this Biblical 
tradition by attributing their disappearance from history to an early migration from either 
Asia or Africa, though others looked to classical sources—Plato and Xenophon, for 
example—in search of evidence of their descent from Europeans, Asians, or Africans.   
 
Morton, in the first book of his New English Canaan, wades directly into this debate, 
taking full advantage of this opportunity to establish his intellectual superiority over his 
colonial competitors.  He begins by rejecting one of the more common theories, which 
claimed that the Native Americans were descended from Tartars who had traveled from 
Northeast Asia to Northwestern America and dispersed thence over the continent.  But 
this proves less interesting to him than Wood’s claim that the Native Americans were in 
fact produced from “the gleanings of all nations” (Morton 21), as evidenced by the range 
of sounds in their language, which echo, at different times, Greek, Latin, and Hebrew.  
Morton quickly pounces upon this claim, accusing Wood of overreaching the bounds of 
his learning since “time hath not furnished him with the interpretation” of the different 
languages he claims to recognize in that of the natives (21).  Morton then produces his 
own countertheory, that the natives are in fact part of the Trojan diaspora, in support of 
which he cites “the approbation of Sir Christopher Gardiner, Knight, an able gentl. that 
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lived amongst them and of David Tompson a Scottish gentl. that likewise conversant with 
those people both Scollers and Travellers that were diligent in taking notice of these 
things” (22). 
 
To our sensibilities, of course, Morton’s theory seems as specious as Lescarbot’s claim 
that the French invented the alphabet, while Wood’s has the benefit of at least being 
supported by something we can recognize as an attempt at empirical evidence.  But to 
judge the credibility of these texts according to empirical standards is to misunderstand 
their rhetorical underpinnings.  As Andrea Frisch argues, the “common view of the 
relationship between experience and the authority to give testimony about the New 
World” which developed in the sixteenth century is not the same thing as a “profound 
change … in the epistemic status of experience” (Invention 51-52); in other words, as 
Lestringant puts it, “experience … ne se rattache pas à proprement parler à un 
empirisme” (André Thevet 14).74   
 
Beyond recognizing the distinction between empiricism and experience, we must also 
take into account that reputation, although decreasing in importance as a confirmation of 
juridical credibility in the course of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, was of 
necessity more important in the court circles in which Morton moved while in England 
than it was to the Puritans he encountered in the New World (though one might well 
argue that they had their own distinct form of “reputation”).  For his primary audience 
Morton’s “evidence” would have been the more compelling because it establishes 
                                                
 
74 “Experience, properly speaking, is not really connected with an empiricism” (translation mine). 
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Morton as a reliable man whose character—and thus whose information—is vouched for 
by a pair of gentlemen who are as much “scholars” as “travelers.”  This last juxtaposition 
is particularly telling, since it shows Morton simultaneously co-opting Wood’s rhetoric of 
experience and deploying social rank as a means of undercutting Wood’s authority and 
bolstering his own. 
 
What is still more interesting about Morton’s theory, however, is that it establishes a 
genealogical link between the New England natives and the English, who traced 
themselves back to Aeneas through Brutus, his putative grandson.  This linking of the 
Native Americans with the English—as bizarre as it may seem—partakes of a potent 
rhetorical logic: it allows him to grant the New England natives with one hand what he 
will take away from Wood and the Puritans with the other.  On its own, such a theory 
would, of course, leave the Native Americans as cousins of the English, while Wood and 
the Puritans remained firmly entrenched in English society.  But, by nesting this in a 
larger behavioral critique of Puritan social practices as unenglish, Morton manages to 
parlay his own successful relations with the Native Americans into evidence of his 
authority to colonize the New World.  Thus, the natives are portrayed throughout 
Morton’s work as noble, trusting, knowledgeable, and respectful of authority in a fashion 
that contrasts harshly with his portrait of the Puritans.   
 
One facet of Morton’s writing that brings to the fore the stark distinction between the 
Native Americans and the Puritans is his use of gendered tropes such as “masculine 
virtue”—which he finds everywhere in the Native Americans and himself—and 
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“effeminacy”—which he locates in Wood and the Puritans.   The significance of these 
terms may seem self-evident, but as Edith Murphy has recently demonstrated, Morton’s 
use of gender metaphors served a nuanced rhetorical purpose, enabling him to make three 
arguments that are key to his colonial claims: “that the land could only be content when 
fulfilled by men; that the Indians were no longer able to fulfill the land…; and that the 
Pilgrims and Puritans did not have the ‘masculine virtue’ to fulfill the land” (756).  
Murphy’s essay draws our attention to the widely varied significations and associations 
that gendered terms take on in Morton’s work, allowing us to see how these terms are in 
fact key to his construction of an idealized English identity rooted in the possession of 
certain behavioral traits.   
 
Throughout the course of Morton’s book, the figure of “masculine virtue” is radically 
overdetermined, referring not only to a man’s sexual potency and his effectiveness in 
battle, but also, by symbolic association, to his success in agricultural production, to his 
intellectual faculties, and even to his legitimate possession of social status and rank.  This 
last association can be seen in passages where Morton discusses the dietary practices of 
the natives, noting that the beaver’s “tayle … is of a masculine vertue for the 
advancement of Priapus: and is preserved for a dish for the Sachems” (77), a logic which 
Morton portrays himself adhering to, as well, when he explains that he “would hardly let 
any of [the natives] have a dram [of liquor] unles hee were a Sachem, or a Winnaytue 
[that is, a nobleman].  I alwayes tould them it was amongst us the Sachems drinke” (54).  
Having firmly established this symbolic association in the first two books of the New 
English Canaan, Morton then enlarges upon it in the third book, developing an ironic 
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juxtaposition of the Native American respect for social hierarchy and the Puritan 
eagerness to usurp unmerited rank that provides much of the rhetorical force of the later 
passages of his work.  Indeed, many of Morton’s parodic character sketches could serve 
as exemplars of the genre.   
 
Perhaps the best of these is his portrait of Dr. Samuel Fuller, who came over to New 
England in the late 1620s.  At the very outset of this sketch, Morton gives a brief account 
of Fuller’s parents and education, noting that he was not in fact trained as a doctor, but 
rather “bred a butcher” (152).  This double entendre sets the tone for what follows, which 
is essentially a series of examples of how Dr.  Fuller puts his peculiar “gifts” to work.  
First he cures Captain Littleworth—that is, John Endecott, then-Governor of the 
Massachusetts Bay colonies—”of a disease called a wife” (152), an action for which he is 
rewarded with the position of “Phisition generall of Salem: where hee exercised his gifts 
so well, that of full 42. that there hee tooke to cure, there is not one has more cause to 
complaine, or can say black’s his eie” (153)—the implication being, of course,  that they 
can no longer say anything at all.  In this section Morton succeeds not only in showing 
how ridiculously unqualified the Puritans are for the positions and titles that they grant 
themselves, but also how detrimental this social climbing can be to the success of 
colonization itself. 
 
In fact, if we read Morton’s chapter in light of Murphy’s insights, then we can begin to 
see the symbolic resonance that Morton’s gender metaphors can have even in a passage 
where they are not directly called upon.  After all, a large part of the Puritan claim to 
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properly possess the land that had been (and in many cases still was) inhabited by the 
Native Americans was grounded in a reading of the Bible that emphasized man’s ability 
to maximize the productivity of the land and the people as the true test of ownership.  As 
John Cotton wrote in his “God’s Promise to His Plantation,” the Puritans’ right to the 
land is guaranteed by the “Grand Charter given to Adam and his posterity in Paradise, 
Gen 1:28.  Multiply, and replenish the earth, and subdue it” (161).  But Morton turns the 
rhetoric of the Puritans against themselves, suggesting, through his account of the death 
of Endecott’s wife, that their peculiar gift is to transform what is fertile into something 
sterile and dead, and mocking their religious idioms in a line that echoes throughout the 
Fuller chapter: “and then I hope this man may be forgiven if they [the people who died in 
his care] were all made fitting plants for Heaven” (153). 
 
In still other incidents that Morton describes, satire takes a back seat to righteous 
indignation, though the unenglish behavior of the Puritans remains front and center.  
Their treatment of John Layford, who came to Plymouth to serve as pastor, gives Morton 
ample ammunition to make the case that the Puritans are not only uncivil and 
untrustworthy, but also that they do not respect the authority of traditional English 
institutions.  When Layford arrives in Plymouth, the Puritans tell him that “before they 
would allow” him to act as their pastor, they “would have him first renounce his calling, 
to the office of the Ministery, received in England, as hereticall and Papisticall, … and 
then to receive a new callinge from them, after their fantasticall invention, which hee 
refused, alledging and maintaining, that his calling as it stood was lawful, and that hee 
would not renounce it” (118-119).  Because of his refusal to renounce his calling, 
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Layford comes under the suspicion of the colonists and so “they … found out some 
scandal; to be laid on his former corse of life, to blemish that, and … conclude[d] hee 
was a spotted beast, and not to be allowed, where they ordained to have the Passover kept 
so zealously” (119), an act which further demonstrates the double-dealing quality of the 
Puritans, as Morton portrays them, and, again, implicitly casts them as Jewish.75 
 
Morton makes his most damning accusations against the Puritans, however, when he 
suggests that their double-dealing and overweening pride bring them to the point of 
violating King Charles’ sovereignty.  These accusations are based on the events that 
follow the arrival of Captain Littleworth—that is, John Endecott—in Salem.  As Morton 
presents it, Littleworth at 
 
first pretended himselfe to be sent over as chiefe Justice … and to ad a 
Majesty (as hee thought) to his new assumed dignity, hee caused the 
Patent of the Massachusets (new brought into the Land) to be carried 
where hee went in his progresse to and froe, as an embleme of his 
authority: which the vulgar people, not acquainted with, thought it to be 
some instrument of Musick locked up in that covered case, and thought 
(for so some said) this man of littleworth had bin a fidler.  (157-158) 
 
While Morton’s use of the public ignorance about the contents of Littleworth’s case 
allows him to deflate the effectiveness of the charter as an emblem of authority, his 
characterization of it as an “instrument of Musick” also subtly implies that Littleworth 
abuses the authority granted him by the document—that he “fiddles” with it.  And fiddle 
with it he does, according to Morton, who says that Littleworth, “thinking none so worthy 
as himselfe, tooke upon him infinitely: and made warrants in his owne name (without 
                                                
 
75 The phrase “spotted beast” alludes to Genesis 30—in the King James Bible “beast” is translated as 
“cattle”—and refers to the practice of culling spotted animals from the herd for their supposed impurity.   
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relation to his Majesties authority in that place)” (158).  For Morton’s primary 
audience—Gorges, Laud, and King Charles—this passage must have come as a shocking 
final confirmation that the Puritans in New England were actively engaged in subverting 
the King’s authority, and that their authority to colonize New England should therefore 
be revoked.  This treachery adds the crowning touch to Morton’s representation of the 
Puritans as unenglish: how can they even be English, if they do not recognize the ultimate 
seat of English authority? 
 
The harm caused by the Puritans unenglish religious practices and lack of respect for 
social authority is hardly limited to themselves and to other Englishmen, however.  In one 
of the most emotionally-charged passages of the third book of the New English Canaan, 
Morton returns to an incident he had already touched upon in the first book: the 
desecration of a native grave by the Puritans, who viewed its decoration as a pagan 
abomination.  As seen through Morton’s eyes, however, it is the Puritans who are 
abominations, while the Native American burial practices are favorably compared to 
traditional English ones, and their response to this sacrilegious act is cast in heroic terms.  
The grave that the Puritans disturbed belonged to the mother of one of the local sachems, 
Cheecatawback (or Chuatawback), who, according to Morton, was visited by her in a 
vivid dream vision the night after the incident occurred.  Morton provides a translation of 
the sachem’s account of her appeal as follows: 
 
behold my sonne, whom I have cherisht, see the papps that gave thee suck, 
the hands that lappd thee warme and fed thee oft, canst thou forget to take 
revenge of those uild people, that hath my monument defaced in 
despitefull manner, disdaining our ancient antiquities, and honourable 
Customes: See now the Sachems grave lies like unto the common people, 
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of ignoble race defaced: thy mother doth complaine, implores thy aide 
against this theevish people, new come hether if this be suffered, I shall 
not rest in quiet within my everlasting habitation.  (107) 
 
This passage is one of the few instances in the New English Canaan where Native 
American speech is rendered directly, rather than as free indirect discourse, which would 
seem to suggest that Morton possessed an ability to understand and empathize with native 
resistance to colonization.  If we read this passage in light of Morton’s genealogical 
alignment of the Native Americans with the English, however, then the use of archaic 
forms and the deployment of degraded nobility as a motive for revenge in this passage 
make ready sense: Morton’s real purpose is to voice the doubts of traditionally-minded 
Englishmen about the radical religious and political agenda of the Puritans. 
 
I insist, here, upon the rhetorical deployment of the Native Americans in the service of 
English values, because it so clearly demonstrates the power that the discourse of custom 
has, in the hands of Morton, to redefine national identity: it can make “savage Indians” 
living in the wilds of New England more English than men who were born and raised in 
England.  Lescarbot, for his part, never engages in such a direct ventriloquism in his 
Histoire, but he employs a strikingly similar logic in support of his attacks on his 
competitors.  On the one hand he places “good” Native Americans together with “good” 
French, and on the other “bad” natives with “bad” Europeans, including those French 
whose cultural practices and allegiances have been compromised by their proximity to 
other nations. 
 
    96 
Interestingly, the homologies Lescarbot established within these groups seem to carry 
over even into the bodies of the people in question, as he insists that the bodies of 
Micmac and other native men north of Florida “sont generalement beaux hommes comme 
en Europe” (3.6.375),76 in part because “ilz n’ont point de levres à gros bors, comme en 
Afrique, et méme en Hespagne” (3.6.378),77 and in part because, unlike the Brazilians, 
they do not render their children “difformes par leur ecraser au bout du nez … à la sortie 
du ventre” (3.6.375).78  These children, we should note, are not only deformed but made 
different by a blow to the nose.  This realization may help us avoid the temptation to see 
in Lescarbot’s descriptions of these people a precursor of biologically-based racial 
theory; a few pages later, when Lescarbot characterizes the “façon de parler” amongst the 
Gascons and the people of Languedoc as “un peu rude,” he explains that this is something 
“qu’ilz retiennent du Gotisme & de l’Hespagnol par voisinage” (3.6.377).79  Thus it is 
social contact, and not interbreeding, that either produces national identity or undermines 
and denatures it. 
 
While I have argued that Morton and Lescarbot, unlike many of their contemporaries, 
believed in the possibility of positive social and political transformation, we cannot 
ignore that they too had a great deal of anxiety about the possibility of degeneration.  
Seen in the light of this fear of difference, we can begin to understand why Morton and 
                                                
76 “Our savages are generally as handsome as men in Europe.” 
 
77 “They do not have lips of wide girth, as in Africa, and also in Spain.” 
 
78 “The Brazilians are born as attractive as any other men, but as they exit the womb they are deformed by 
the breaking of the tips of their noses.” 
 
79 “The Gascons and people of Languedoc [have] a slightly rude fashion of speaking, which they have 
retained from Gothism and from their neighboring with Spain.” 
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Lescarbot are so concerned about who is involved in colonization in the first place: if the 
colonial population is not strictly regulated, then national identity will be corrupted.  This 
corruption can take the form of a spontaneous development of alien practices, like those 
of the Puritans, or a gradual adoption of the practices of people who are not English or 
French, but in either case the danger presented to national identity—and thus political 
authority—is clear.  Seen in this light, Morton’s righteous anger at the seditious behavior 
of the Puritans and Lescarbot’s frustration with those people who are only concerned 
about increasing trade with the Native Americans is motivated, ultimately, by their desire 
to produce a coherent national identity.  Without a large population of right-minded 
representatives of the nation in the colonies, conventional social structures will disappear; 
if, however, such a group is put in place, then even the remaining Native Americans can 
be assimilated into English or French society.   
  




ENGENDERED NATIONS – REPRODUCING IDENTITY THROUGH EDUCATION 
IN ANNE BRADSTREET AND MARIE DE L’INCARNATION 
 
[I]ls [les enfants dans la colonie] ont communément l’esprit assez bon, 
mais un peu libertins, c’est à dire, qu’on a de la peine à les captiver pour 
les estudes.  
–– Pierre Boucher, Histoire véritable (139)80 
 
I must lay double-clothes unto thy Bum, 
Then lap thee warm, and to the World commit 
The Bastard Off-spring of a New-born wit. 
Farewel, poor Brat, thou in a monstrous World, 
In swadling bands, thus up and down are hurl’d; 
There to receive what Destiny doth contrive, 
Either to perish, or be sav’d alive.   
–– George Alsop, “An Author to his Book” (a7v) 
 
The rhetoric of custom so skillfully deployed by Marc Lescarbot and Thomas Morton 
was quickly adopted by their metropolitan interlocutors.  The flexibility this rhetoric 
offered was vital to its success: it not only allowed the French and English to imagine a 
successful translation of their identities to the colonies, but also provided a mechanism 
for measuring that success, as evidenced in Pierre Boucher’s Histoire véritable et 
naturelle of 1668.  Boucher’s work was commissioned by Jean-Baptiste Colbert, Louis 
XIV’s minister of finance, as a written record of information he had provided in person
                                                
 
80 “They [the children in the colony] commonly have a good enough character, but a little libertine—that is 
to say, one has a difficult time keeping them captive to their studies” (This and all further translations from 
Boucher are mine).  
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 about the state of the colonies in New France, or Canada, as it had come to be called 
when France’s colonial holdings grew in number.  At the conclusion of his text, Boucher 
reproduces a question and answer session he had with a group of important figures in the 
French government.  The initial questions in particular read like a sort of national 
catechism—“[L]a vigne y vient[-elle] bien?” “Le bled y est-il cher?” and “Quelle boisson 
boit-on à l’ordinaire?” (135, 135, 140)81—calling on Boucher to affirm that the 
customary drinking of wine and eating of bread, which Lescarbot so insisted upon a full 
60 years before, continue là-bas.  Needless to say, Boucher gives all the right answers to 
these questions and many others, but one answer in particular, included in the epigraph to 
this chapter, signals that a major rhetorical shift has taken place between the 
performative, masculine style of the first generation’s “adventurer-colonists” and the 
pedagogical one of the second and third generations. 
 
Whereas Lescarbot and Morton focus on the performance of their national and religious 
identities as a means of assuaging metropolitan fears of the loss of an already precarious 
cultural integrity, these later colonists direct their attention to the reproduction of identity 
rather than its mere maintenance.  In certain aspects this shift had already been 
anticipated by Bacon’s conceptual linking of custom and education.  Bacon states what 
Boucher merely implies, that education of the young serves as a “most perfect” means of 
regulating the social body (180), or, to put it in Boucher’s terms, of “captivating liberty.”  
The success of education, or “early custom” as Bacon characterizes it (180), depends on 
its pervasiveness; it acts powerfully enough in individuals, but its force is multiplied 
                                                
 
81 “Do grapes grow well there?” “Is grain expensive there?” and “What do people there usually drink?” 
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when “copulate and conjoined and collegiate” (180).  By rights, then, the colonists of this 
generation ought to emphasize the role of educational institutions in the production of a 
well-ordered society—certainly this is what Bacon foresees.82  What we find instead is 
the nuclear family singled out as the site of this customary education, with the maternal 
figure in particular occupying the role of instructor, such that a fundamental symbolic 
link is made between sexual and cultural modes of reproduction. 
 
Thus we find George Alsop, in my second epigraph, addressing his book as though it 
were a child.  Interestingly, Alsop positions himself, in his poem, not as the father of his 
text, but rather its mother—with Apollo being the “unworthy man” who abandons his 
child ([a7r]).  Alsop calls here upon a long tradition of figuring genius as a masculine 
phenomenon, regendering the metaphor of reproduction by emphasizing male 
creativity.83  That said, Alsop ultimately destabilizes his gender identity by literalizing the 
metaphor, portraying himself as submissive to Apollo’s aggressively sexual advances and 
thereby registering some of the cultural anxiety attendant upon the colonial project.  The 
poem fixates upon the problem of reception, with Alsop imagining his poem-child being 
anatomized by metropolitan critics, who will wonder what to make of this “Brat as black 
as Ink,” “look to [its] Tayle, | To see if [it] wert Feminine or Male,” and ultimately 
                                                
82 In the New Organon Bacon rails against “the customs and institutions of schools, academies, colleges, 
and similar bodies” as the site of “everything … adverse to the progress of science” (89), but the fault, for 
him, lies precisely in such customs as their reliance on Classical authorities like Aristotle, not in their being 
corporate bodies concerned with education.  Thus, Bacon would later come to write his New Atlantis, a 
utopian “fable … devised, to the end that he might exhibit therein, a model or description of a College, 
instituted for the interpreting of Nature, and the producing of great and marvellous works for the benefit of 
men” (Rawley “To the Reader” 236). 
 
83 See Christine Battersby’s Gender and Genius: Towards a Feminist Aesthetics for an extended analysis of 
the historical development of this tradition.  For an earlier critical articulation of this phenomenon, see 
Sandra Gilbert and Susan Gubar’s groundbreaking The Madwoman in the Attic. 
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conclude that it ought to be hanged ([a7v]-[a8v]).84  Leaving aside the bizarre image of a 
hanged book, we might wonder what exactly Alsop’s book-child is guilty of.  The answer 
Alsop gives is that it would “encourage ill” by “bringing strange Antipodians … to storm 
our wits” ([a8v]): in other words, the contents of his book—which are, we should remind 
ourselves, “The Character of the Province of Mary-Land” itself—could threaten and 
perhaps even reverse the stable identities of English society. 
 
What Alsop’s poem makes clear, then, is that the rhetoric of custom has shifted in part 
because the nature of the anxiety has shifted: we are not simply talking about English and 
French men and women transplanting to what will be a “New” France and England, but 
about the children who will be born there, and who will perhaps even return to the 
metropole.  One can see the ramifications of the colonial project slowly, belatedly, taking 
shape in the metropolitan mind.  This shift lines up well with that which Patricia Pender 
has traced (drawing upon the work of Louis Montrose) from the masculine and erotic 
symbolism of discovery and conquest to the feminine and familial symbolism of Anne 
Bradstreet’s “Dialogue between Old England and New” (Pender 118-20, see also 
Montrose 183-9).  What is happening in these texts, in other words, is a mutation of the 
rhetoric of custom into a rhetoric of familial education as a means of explaining how 
national and religious identities will be safely reproduced in the colonies.   
                                                
84 Though Alsop’s reference here to blackness strikes a modern reader as a clear invocation of racial 
difference, work by Karen Newman, Jean Feerick, Roxann Wheeler, and others has demonstrated that the 
seventeenth century English understanding of blackness was radically different from the theories of 
biological race that developed primarily in the nineteenth century.  By invoking the color black here, Alsop 
calls upon humoral theory, which intersected with climate theory so as to produce a general anxiety 
amongst Europeans of the era about the effects of living in the Americas upon the character of European 
colonists.  His infant is black, in other words, not because of miscegenation, but because it is born in a 
different climate; that said, his infant’s blackness does have clearly negative moral connotations. 
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The larger discursive consequences of this mutation are great and far-reaching.  As 
Nancy Armstrong and Leonard Tennenhouse have shown in The Imaginary Puritan, the 
institution of “family” comes to be construed as “a cultural space where culture and 
nature collaborate to produce individuals” (17).  Ultimately, for Armstrong and 
Tennenhouse, the family becomes the primary cause of history, while it remains “outside 
of history per se” (17).  Certainly the emphasis on family in these texts, rather than other 
educational institutions, serves much the same mystifying function that it does in the 
histories that Armstrong and Tennenhouse take issue with, grounding collective 
identities, both religious and national, in much the same way that “culture” both grounds 
the collective identities it names in its various couplings (American culture, Renaissance 
culture, etc.) and mystifies the dynamics behind them.85  More than that, however, the 
shift from custom, as the masculine performance of national and religious identities, to 
the feminized and domestic space of education is precisely what enables the discourse of 
family that Armstrong and Tennenhouse critique. 
 
Whereas Armstrong and Tennenhouse focus on unpacking the sociological narrative of 
the history of the family, I seek to interrogate the family’s now conventional status as a 
“natural institution” precisely by rehistoricizing the family as a rhetorical figure 
occupying a key position within the development of the concept of custom.  In order to 
do so, I first examine the writings of Anne Bradstreet, elucidating the larger social and 
                                                
85 This is true even in the case of the New England colonies, where the education of children and servants 
was explicitly ordained to be the responsibility of the male head of household (Edmund S. Morgan 87-8), 
since what these texts provide is not an account of education as it took place, but rather a symbolic 
invocation of the family as the site of education. 
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political implications of her representation of the family produced by its conceptual 
linking with education.  My reading of her poetry, in particular, draws upon recent 
scholarship by Pender and others who have sought to overturn the conventional reception 
of Bradstreet’s work as best where it treats those subjects closest to her personal 
experience as a wife and mother.  Bradstreet, I argue, in fact presents us with a largely 
rhetorical invocation of education as a means of symbolically accounting for the problem 
of identity reproduction, a problem figured in her writings by a series of spatial 
discontinuities—between not only “Old” England and “New,” but also between heaven 
and earth.  The integrity of the nuclear family, for her, becomes the key to the nation’s 
continued health, and education the primary means of securing that integrity against the 
threat of religious degeneration. 
 
In the writings of her contemporary, the Ursuline missionary Marie de l’Incarnation, we 
find that the shift from custom to education also provides the rhetorical basis for imperial 
expansion through the assimilation of aboriginal populations.86  Like Bradstreet, de 
                                                
 
86 Marie de l’Incarnation was born Marie Guyart in Tours in 1599.  At the age of seventeen she married a 
master silkworker, Claude Martin, at her parents’ behest and contrary to her own desire to become a nun.  
A mere two years later, de l’Incarnation would be both a mother and a widow, moving in with her sister 
and brother-in-law in 1625 in order to manage their burgeoning import/export business.  De l’Incarnation’s 
religious fervor, however, had hardly weakened, and, after a series of religious visions, she became an 
Ursuline nun in 1631.  At that time her son, named Claude after his father, was only eleven years old, and 
he communicated his distress at being left by her through his actions: running away from home, appearing 
at the monastery to demand her return, and even getting himself expelled from boarding school.  Soon after 
the completion of her novitiate, de l’Incarnation expressed a desire to engage in missionary work, 
ultimately receiving permission to travel to Canada in order to establish a teaching mission in Québec; 
meanwhile her son remained in France, receiving a religious education, and becoming a Benedictine soon 
after his mother’s arrival in Canada.  De l’Incarnation died, in Québec, in 1672, having spent a full thirty-
three years in her mission to educate Native American girls and convert them to Christianity.  In the dozen 
years following her death, her son published a series of works containing her writings: La vie in 1677, 
Lettres in 1681, Retraites in 1682, and, finally, L’école sainte in 1684.  There has been a good deal of 
debate over the significance of the editorial changes Martin made to his mother’s manuscripts, with modern 
editors like Irene Mahoney lamenting “his tampering with the style and at times even with the structure of 
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l’Incarnation struggles to symbolically link the demands of family with those of religion, 
but unlike Bradstreet she maintains the integrity of the family by symbolically extending 
it.  Thus in her writings de l’Incarnation portrays the Holy Family (Jesus, Mary, and 
Joseph) as the ideal expression of a spiritual and sensual relationship that transcends the 
biological connection between mother and son.  She then uses this reconception of family 
in order to characterize her relationship with her Native American pupils, depicting them 
in her writings as her spiritual children.  Thus de l’Incarnation, like Bradstreet, situates 
education within the family, but expands the conception of family to include anyone who 
takes part in the educational process, thereby justifying the religious—and national—
conversion of Native Americans. 
 
If traditional scholarship on both of these authors singles out the domestic in their 
writing—and this is indeed the case with de l’Incarnation as well, with Réal Ouellet, a 
prominent French-Canadian literary critic, emphasizing how her texts “ne relatent pas 
l’aventure, mais la dure vie quotidienne des débuts” (14)87—we should hardly be 
surprised: this is precisely what Bradstreet and de l’Incarnation intend their readers to do.  
The relationship between family and education that they produce in their writings derives 
its power from the literalization of their metaphors; it may seem strange to baldly state 
that the nuclear family is the nation, or religion for that matter, but that is the effect of 
                                                                                                                                            
his mother’s writing” (Selected Writings 39).  My own comparison of the modern editions of Dom Jamet, 
based wherever possible on recovered manuscripts, and those of Martin suggest that the vast majority of 
differences are superficial, though there are a couple of notable omissions in his La vie that appear when it 
is compared to de l’Incarnation’s biographical Rélation of 1654.  See Natalie Zemon Davis’ Women on the 
Margins for a thorough and even-handed discussion of several of these differences; see also Mahoney’s 
edited translation of de l’Incarnation’s Selected Writings 150, note 11. 
 
 
87 “They do not relate adventures, but the difficult daily life of the first settlers” (Translation mine). 
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much contemporary sociology and anthropology, not to mention psychoanalysis.  All of 
the human sciences, as we now term them, take the family (and, more broadly, kin 
relations) as the ur-institution which grounds all other cultural institutions—as Stephen 
Greenblatt hints when he states that “kinship arrangements … are crucial indices of the 
prevailing codes governing human mobility and constraint” (229-30)—if not explaining 
the very emergence of culture itself.  By invoking parents as social models, Bradstreet 
and de l’Incarnation offer a model for those disciplines that follow in their wake.  That 
said, the power of this invocation, as Greenblatt himself implies, lies in these authors’ 
ability to use this figure to bridge the gap between the ideal and the actual.  While their 
texts give us a glimpse of an emergent conceptual opposition between nature and 
culture—poles that can only be bridged by the family, or at least the invocation thereof—
their method remains resolutely grounded in the logic of accoutumance (or 
“accustomization”) articulated by Montaigne, echoed by Shakespeare, and then again by 
Pascal.  Repeat something often enough and it will become a second nature. 
 
 
“A TRUE INSTRUCTER TO HER FAMILY” 
 
In “DissemiNation,” Homi Bhabha identifies two opposing modes of signification at 
work in the articulation of national identity—the pedagogical and the performative.  The 
pedagogical, Bhabha states, is characterized by its “continuist, accumulative 
temporality,” while the performative is “repetitious” and “recursive” (297).  Bhabha 
further suggests that the role of the performative, in his practice, is to “open up … a space 
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of cultural signification” that makes it possible to represent “those residual and emergent 
meanings and practices that [Raymond] Williams locates in the margins of the 
contemporary experience of society” (299).  The power of the performative, in other 
words, is that it interrupts the continuous narrative of pedagogical time, producing a 
disjunctive temporality that allows for the emergence, or preservation, of alternative 
representations of national identity. 
 
Bhabha’s opposition, though it comes from his analysis of the representation of the 
modern nation-state, is useful to us here because it clarifies the difference between 
Bacon’s conception of education and those of Bradstreet and de l’Incarnation, and 
thereby allows us to better understand the implications of their gendering and 
domesticating of custom.  Where Bacon emphasizes education as the product of a 
scientific method based on inductive logic—“I open and lay out a new and certain path 
for the mind to proceed in, starting directly from the simple sensuous perception” (New 
Organon 34)—Bradstreet and de l’Incarnation conceive of education as a process in 
which correct behavior is modeled and then imitated.  In a letter to her nephews, for 
example, de l’Incarnation instructs them that “[l]e vray moyen de vivre dans ce haut état 
[l’état de grâce] … c’est d’observer Ses commandemens, de frequenter souvent les 
Sacremens & de regler vos moeurs sur les exemples de JESUS-CHRIST” 
(Correspondance 129).88  Thus, while Bradstreet and de l’Incarnation hardly espouse the 
overt theatricality of Morton and Lescarbot, their writing is, in Bhabha’s terms, 
                                                
 
88 “The true way to live in this high state [the state of grace] … is to observe His commandments, to partake 
often of the Sacraments, and to measure your mores against the example of Jesus Christ” (Translation 
mine). 
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“performative,” inasmuch as it relies on the power of an iterative representational 
strategy to produce collective identity. 
 
Bradstreet and de l’Incarnation’s rhetorical performances may be more like those of 
Lescarbot and Morton than they initially seem, since both develop a new way of writing 
about identity in order to argue that they are in fact preserving an existing, traditional 
identity.  This similarity points to the larger blind spot at work in the critical reception of 
Bradstreet’s poetry in particular.  Adrienne Rich, in her foreword to Jeannine Hensley’s 
1967 edition of Bradstreet, posits a split between Bradstreet’s early, masculine and 
derivative, verse and her later, more successful, domestic poetry (xii-xiv).  This division, 
since supported by numerous critics, draws its rhetorical strength from an equation of the 
vitality of Bradstreet’s later, domestic poems with their putative originality and 
authenticity, what Rich calls her “personal history [of] marriage, childbearing, [and] 
death” (xiv).  Though Rich’s intent is to claim Bradstreet as a proto-feminist whose work 
helped to establish female experience as a fit subject for poetry, this reads like a rather 
more sexist formula: women should write about the private world they know—family and 
household—rather than the public realm of politics and history.   
 
The political tenor—sometimes explicit, sometimes implicit—of much of Bradstreet’s 
and de l’Incarnation’s writing puts the lie to this formula.  Still, their regendering of the 
discourse of colonial identity has significant effects.  Firstly, it shifts attention away from 
the hierarchical, even divisive, class identities that remain so central to Morton and 
Lescarbot by taking politics out of the sphere of male competition.  Then it positions a 
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particular religious orthodoxy as a means to secure communal integrity.  And, finally, it 
organizes the discursive connections between national politics, religion, and collective 
identity around the figure of the mother instructing her children in proper moral behavior.   
 
Of Bradstreet’s poems, “The Author to Her Book” is most frequently cited as the crucial 
poem that divides the early poetry from the later.  Wendy Martin holds it forth as proof 
that “she now views her daily experience as a valid subject for her art” (67).  Reading this 
poem alongside Alsop’s “Author to His Book,”, however, foregrounds its political 
resonances, making it possible to read this poem as part of Bradstreet’s ongoing concern 
about the relationship between Old and New England.  Bradstreet, like Alsop, 
characterizes her book as a child of unspecified gender and sex.  Further like Alsop, 
Bradstreet worries about her book’s public reception by the critics, all the more so since 
her poetry was first “expos’d to public view” without her consent, having been published 
in London from a manuscript copy secreted across the Atlantic by her brother-in-law, 
John Woodbridge (177).  Woodbridge even acknowledges, in his “Epistle to the Reader,” 
that Bradstreet “resolved [these poems] should never in such a manner see the sun” 
(Bradstreet 526).  While Woodbridge’s “such manner” implicitly refers to the act of 
publication, Bradstreet’s “Author to Her Work” exhumes another possible meaning by 
insisting on her attempts to “amend” her book-child’s “blemishes” before she returns it to 
public view and suggesting that her resolution is not against her poems’ publication, but 
rather against their appearing in public before they have been properly educated (178). 
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Where Woodbridge’s “Epistle” aims to depoliticize the publication of Bradstreet’s poetry 
by downplaying her authorial role, Bradstreet repoliticizes it on her own, domestic terms, 
offering us a crash course in what we might call “poetic pedagogy.”  Thus, while 
Bradstreet expresses much of the same shame as Alsop at her “ill form’d offspring,” she 
owns up to her maternity and takes the book-child in, rather than casting it out (177).  
Further, Bradstreet insists on the possibility of improving her book-child by “stretching 
[its] joynts to make [it] even feet” and “dress[ing]” it “in better trim” (178).  These puns 
provoke a series of reinforcing associations: the appropriate gait and attire of a 
respectable English person overlap with the appropriate meter and diction of English 
poetry, producing a figurative evocation of a text that knows how to behave itself.  
Bradstreet, in amending her poetry, teaches it its manners, but she also teaches us 
something about the role of education in governing the transatlantic relationship between 
the metropole and the colony: to be properly English, the colonists have to reproduce 
proper English customs, and in order to reproduce those customs, they have to model 
them for their children to imitate in their turn. 
 
To draw out the political and religious implications of this poem, we need to pay 
attention to its rhetorical constructedness—precisely the puns, metaphors, and other 
figures that are apt to be dissolved into the authentic, literal voice that Rich and others 
find in Bradstreet’s later verse.  Rather than reading this poem as a crux between two 
phases in Bradstreet’s career, I want to insist that it is typical of all her poetry—indeed, 
all of her writing—in its use of domestic tropes to address political purposes, and thus 
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focus our attention on the productive tension between literal and figurative levels of 
meaning that pervades Bradstreet’s work.   
 
This tension is underwritten by the recursive aspects of Bradstreet’s representational 
strategy.  As Bradstreet represents education taking place, she is also educating her 
readers, encouraging her readers to identify with the figures in her poem.  The impulse to 
identify, however, requires that readers first recognize a gap between themselves and the 
representation that can then be bridged through the learning process.  This recognition, 
then, by drawing our attention to the status of Bradstreet’s poetry as a representation, 
opens up that “space of cultural signification” that Williams and Bhabha foresee.  Yet 
where Williams and Bhabha implicitly oppose the emergent “meanings and practices” 
that performative discourse enables to the preservative or conservative ones, Bradstreet 
demonstrates that these two terms cannot be so readily opposed, since the emergent 
aspects of her writings operate, like those of Morton and Lescarbot, to help conserve an 
already existing identity that is conceived of as traditional in nature. 
 
Such a combination of emergence and conservation is in truth what predicates the 
recursivity of this discursive process.  If Bradstreet opens up a new representational space 
in her portrayal of families as the site of education, it is precisely in order to collapse the 
distance between representation and embodied reality so as to better preserve Puritan 
religious identity—a religious identity, it should be noted, upon which English national 
identity, in Bradstreet’s understanding, depends.  The religious aspect of Bradstreet’s 
writing should, in particular, signal to us the fraught representational dynamics at work 
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here.  As Jim Egan notes, “Bradstreet never presumes to overcome the absolute 
difference between spiritual and material states of being” (89).  And yet, Bradstreet uses 
writing to repeatedly stage that difference and its collapse, engaging in an iterative 
calculus by which the material is symbolically brought towards the divine without erasing 
the difference between them.  Textual representation becomes an intermediate space 
between the spiritual and the material, allowing for a metaphorical translation to take 
place between the two.  This translation follows a chiasmatic logic: the written word 
occupies the place of the material vis-à-vis the spiritual, while taking that of the spiritual 
in opposition to the material.  Writing, in other words, allows Bradstreet to clothe the 
invisible world of the spirit in the guise of the material; thus clothed, she can offer us a 
figuration of that world for us to model ourselves after.   
 
Taking Bradstreet’s poems to her husband as an example of how this dynamic plays out, 
we might, at first glance, note several passages that seem to argue for an embodied reality 
behind the text.  In “Before the Birth of one of her Children,” for example, Bradstreet 
closes with the lines “And kiss this paper for thy loves dear sake, | Who with salt tears 
this last Farewel did take” (179).  These words invite us to imagine Simon Bradstreet 
sitting at his writing desk, his eyes fixed upon a pair of small blotches on the paper that 
record the traces of this sentiment, adding to them himself as he mourns the death of his 
wife.  As Gary Schneider reminds us, however, these words are part of “a specialized 
epistolary rhetoric” that produces in its recipient an “imaginative sympathy so that 
epistolary contact maintains communicative and affective integrity and efficacy” (33); in 
other words, their focus is not on representing reality so much as producing it.  Further, 
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as Gina Bloom argues, the very composition of these poems is not simply “a display of 
affection” but, “in fact, a duty” (116), prescribed by such Puritan ministers as William 
Gouge.  Bradstreet’s poems, then, convey not only a personal meaning, but also a larger 
social and religious meaning.  Though certain lines in these poems evince a Donnian 
syntax—“If ever two were one, then surely we”—her depiction of the relationship 
between husband and wife primarily operates in dialogue with writings about love and 
marriage in genres that more explicitly intervene in contemporary political debates—
sermons, religious tracts, and conduct manuals.  As Bloom demonstrates, drawing most 
deeply on the writings of the Puritan minister William Gouge, who had a strong influence 
on the religious views of the New England Bradstreets, this dialogue is truly a two-way 
affair.  Bradstreet, she notes, often uses vocabulary that Puritan marriage doctrine 
suggests is inappropriate for wives to apply to their husbands, such as “dear” and “love,” 
since these terms imply equal status, rather than placing the man at the head of the family 
(123).  This reconfiguration of the marital hierarchy suggests some of the emergent 
aspects of Bradstreet’s rhetoric, particularly her feminization of political discourse, as 
seen in her “In honour of that High and Mighty Princess, Queen Elizabeth” and her 
“Dialogue between Old England and New.” 
 
Yet, for all Bradstreet tweaks the rhetoric of marital love here, the primary message these 
poems communicate remains a thoroughly conservative one.  At a mundane level, the 
poems insist on the need for a married couple to live together, something which the 
Puritans greatly encouraged as a means to “avoid fornication” (1 Corinthians 7:2, cited in 
Bloom 117).  Likewise, in “Before the Birth,” Bradstreet indicates that a major role of 
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husband and wife is to raise their children and protect them from harm, imprecating her 
husband to “Look to my little babes my dear remains” and “protect [them] from step 
Dames injury” (179).  Finally, the poems position marriage as a means for 
conceptualizing abstract religious issues; thus, in “To my Dear and loving Husband” and 
“A Letter to her Husband, absent on Publick employment,” Bradstreet repeatedly invokes 
the absent presence of her husband, obliquely figuring the absent presence of God 
Himself.   
 
As Bloom notes, “[m]atrimony, for the Puritans, was more than the sum of its parts.  It 
was the primary way in which humans could embrace the full grace of God, and it was 
the incarnation of the Holy Spirit” (116).  In this sense matrimony is like writing, since it 
serves as an intermediate term between the material world and the spiritual one, bringing 
the two into a metaphorical relationship, just as her husband becomes the “sweet Sol” 
who warms her “earth” in the “Letter to her Husband” (181).  And Bradstreet’s writing 
itself serves to reinforce the institution of marriage in two ways, as Bloom (again drawing 
upon Gouge) notes: firstly, by “manifesting” the “mutual concern” of Bradstreet and her 
husband for each other, and, secondly, by “effecting” that selfsame concern (Bloom 119, 
citing Gouge 135).  These two terms correspond to the two movements in the chiasmatic 
process of representation at work in Bradstreet’s writing: the integrity of their marriage is 
manifested in the transformation of the material into the spiritual, and effected by the 
movement from spiritual to material.  What Bradstreet teaches us, then, in these poems is 
that producing and maintaining the proper relationship between husband and wife helps 
to bridge the difference between the spiritual and material, a message further reinforced 
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by the rhetorical implication of “Before the Birth” that the speaker speaks from beyond 
the grave. 
 
As her marriage poems already begin to show us, the key figure of Bradstreet’s rhetoric 
of education is the integral nuclear family.  This figure is most explicitly delineated, 
however, in a series of poems written upon the death of her parents, children, and 
grandchildren.  Because these poems deal with death, which in Bradstreet’s conception 
quite literally represents the translation from the material world into the spiritual, they 
offer a perfect vehicle for her to convey the importance of education as a means of 
achieving a successful movement from earth to heaven, and maintaining the integrity of 
the family.  Though the general tenor of these poems is the acceptance of God’s will—so 
emphatically expressed that modern readers may be hard-pressed to see anything else in 
them—they are in fact quite prominently marked by emotive touches that evince her 
symbolic investment in her family.  Thus, in a poem dedicated to one of her 
grandchildren, she writes “[w]ith troubled heart & trembling hand” before coming at 
length to the conclusion that her “throbbing heart” should be cheered by the fact that the 
child is “with [its] Saviour … in endless bliss” (187).  With Schneider’s observations 
about the epistolary rhetoric of sympathy in mind, the purpose of these figures becomes 
clear: Bradstreet provides a model, here, for how one ought to behave as a member of a 
family, seeking to reproduce the appropriate attitudes in her audience, and thereby 
produce communal integrity through the symbolic reintegration of the family in heaven.  
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Taking these “epitaph” poems as a group, however, we find that Bradstreet hardly takes 
the ease of moving from one realm to the other for granted, particularly when the 
“translation” of an entire family is at stake.  In them she often struggles to account for 
God’s actions in a rhetorically effective fashion.  In the end, Bradstreet is often left with 
the mere blandishment that all her dead relations must be in heaven, reunited for eternity, 
though a note of doubt slips into the poem for her son when she says that her daughter-in-
law is “[a]ll freed from grief (I trust) among the blest” (189).  At one level this line can 
certainly be read as a doctrinally appropriate indication of the limits of embodied human 
knowledge; at another, however, it speaks to the potential, and problematic, divide 
between God’s will and the continued unity of the family. 
 
The question of whether saving grace could be transmitted from parent to child was one 
of the most hotly contested in Puritan New England in the seventeenth century.  The 
material effects of this theological debate appeared in a series of controversies over the 
main sacraments of the Puritan church: baptism, communion, and, most particularly, the 
recounting of a religious conversion experience.  In authorized Puritan practice before 
1662, only the children of full members of the church could be baptized, receiving the 
grace transmitted thereby, and full church membership was extended only to those who 
could account for their spiritual regeneration sufficiently well to receive the approval of 
other church members.  At the Cambridge Synod of 1662, however, the Puritan 
community in New England accepted what was known as the Half-way Covenant, which 
allowed for the baptism of children of covenanted church members—those, that is, who 
had received baptism themselves, but not produced a conversion narrative.  The “half-
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way” of the Half-way Covenant refers to the fact that baptism was understood by the 
Puritans as offering merely the “conditional promise” of God’s grace, so that baptized 
children were only “half saved” (Morgan 91).  Despite the acceptance of the Half-way 
Covenant at the Synod, the issue remained contentious throughout the remainder of the 
century.  Thus Solomon Stoddard argued for further liberalization at the Reforming 
Synod of 1679; meanwhile, Cotton Mather was still lobbying conservative members of 
the Second Church to accept the Half-way covenant in 1692 (David Levin 194-5).  
 
Against this discursive background, the symbolic difficulty Bradstreet has negotiating 
between her relationship to her family and her relationship to God in her “epitaphs” 
comes as little surprise.  These poems evince her ongoing anxiety about the relationship 
between the material and the spiritual, raising the question of how best to move from one 
realm to the other when the absolute difference between them, however symbolically 
reduced, remains intact.  If death alone is for Bradstreet hardly a sufficient means for 
moving properly from one state to the other, then birth, too, is no guarantor of heaven, a 
point most clearly expressed in one of Bradstreet’s “Meditations Divine and Morall,” in 
which she points out that “good parents have had bad children, and … bad parents have 
had pious children” (206).  Thus, while many of Bradstreet’s poems downplay the 
significance of experience, she repeatedly insists upon the role of education as a means 
for securing grace. 
 
Bradstreet’s epitaphs to her parents offer the most compelling evidence in this regard.  In 
“To the Memory of my dear and ever honoured Father” Bradstreet calls him “my Father, 
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Guide, Instructor too” (165), language echoed in “An EPITAPH on my dear and ever 
honoured Mother,” where the latter is called “A true Instructer of her Family” (167).  
Both poems go on to list the good behaviors and deeds of Bradstreet’s parents, and the 
poem to her father ends by rhetorically closing the gap between the embodied world of 
the family and the spiritual one, “[h]is pious Footsteps, followed by his race, | At last will 
bring us to that happy place” (166).  Ultimately, then, education—or at least the 
rhetorical invocation of education—plays the role that experience does for Bacon: the 
role of parents as instructors to their children is to provide examples that they can follow 
into heaven. 
 
If I insist here on the possibility of reading these poems as though they were only 
invoking education rather than actively educating, it is at least in part because of the 
tentative, even self-effacing, qualities of Bradstreet’s own instructive writings to her 
children.  In the introduction to her manuscript “Meditations Divine and Morall,” she 
explicitly “avoyd[s] incroaching upon others conceptions because [she] would rather 
leave [her children] nothing but [her] owne, though in value they fall short of all in this 
kinde” (195).  Bradstreet, then, would seem to be disavowing the practical effectiveness 
of her instruction: her children, she says, could find better elsewhere.  Yet she quickly 
flips this logic on its head by pointing out that, as she is their mother, her teachings are 
likely to “be better pris’d by [her children,] for the Authors sake” (195).  With these 
words, Bradstreet positions herself at the center of her children’s education, asserting that 
sentimental attachment supersedes any consideration of value or merit.  Indeed, given the 
understanding of education expressed in her epitaphs upon her parents, we might better 
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say that this sentimental attachment is of the highest value to a successful religious and 
moral education, since the salvation of the children depends upon the model provided by 
their parents. 
 
The meditations themselves rely heavily on the common symbolic strategies of proverbs 
and parables, particularly on analogy and extended metaphor.  Thus, in the fourth 
meditation, Bradstreet portrays the danger of having great intellectual capacities but little 
grace as that of a speeding sailboat with little ballast: both are at risk of foundering.  
Taking the meditations as a whole, however, a rather different message appears than can 
be found by examining any individual maxim.  Meditations 10, 20, 39, 41, and 63 all cite, 
in some form, the need to tailor children’s “nurture” to their “nature,” with God, the 
spiritual father, and human parents invoked by turns as the source of this education.  The 
meditations thus insist upon the figure of the family as both a means of moral and 
religious instruction, and as instruction’s symbolic seat, bearing out the familial logic of 
the introduction.  To use the old-fashioned poetic terminology, the vehicle of these 
maxims overtakes the tenor: the lesson here—that the family is the key institution in the 
instruction of children, and thus the means by which an orthodox religious and national 
identity are reproduced—is contained not in what is taught, but in how it is being taught.   
 
This lesson offers a novel way around the discursive impasse at work in the debates over 
the Half-way Covenant.  Bradstreet insists upon the instructional role of parents in 
producing religiously observant children who can follow them to heaven, thereby 
dodging the suspect claim, associated with Catholicism, that the grace transferred from 
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parent to child at birth was wholly secured by infant baptism.  At the same time, 
Bradstreet’s writing hollows out the content of that instruction, reducing the emphasis on 
the particular religious customs at work in securing identity and leaving us with the 
image of the extended nuclear family reunited in heaven.  The religious egalitarianism 
inherent in this vision jars with our conventional notion of the Puritans as an exclusive 
community of fire and brimstone-breathing bigots, though it fits with the associations 
made by Weber, and echoed by Armstrong and Tennenhouse among others, between 
Puritan ideology and the rise and expansion of a bourgeois middle class.  Viewed against 
the rank-based distinctions at work in Morton’s dismissal of the Puritans as unenglish, the 
social organization imagined by Bradstreet is distinctly flat in character, with uniformity 
of religious and national identity taken almost for granted, leaving the gendered and 
generational distinctions between family members as the sole means to differentiate 
between people.  
 
Even these distinctions are only loosely grounded, since the entire purpose of 
Bradstreet’s discourse is for each generation to hew to the model offered by the previous 
one, and thereby remove whatever distinction existed between them.  Perhaps by calling 
upon the conventional distinction between gender and sex I can further illuminate my 
reasoning here.  Compared with many of her contemporaries, both Puritan and otherwise, 
Bradstreet’s poetry is relatively ungendered, as Bloom’s assessment of her vocabulary 
would indicate.  In a sense, her regendering of politics enables a kind of ungendering, 
inasmuch as it flattens the distinctions between male and female discourse.  I would 
ultimately suggest, however, that Bradstreet’s writing is not so much ungendered as 
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unsexed—which might well explain what Egan calls the “antiseptic quality of 
[Bradstreet’s] secular love poems” (88).  In other words, while her writing draws upon 
convenient categorical distinctions such as gender, her purpose in doing so is to produce 
an embodied reality in which those distinctions no longer exist. 
 
Thus there is a modicum of gendering that slips into Bradstreet’s particular accounts of 
the qualities fathers and mothers are supposed to inculcate in their offspring—she 
emphasizes her mother’s ordering of the household in opposition to her father’s role in 
founding the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, for example, though she also draws 
attention to her mother’s public speaking—but in her poetry these gender differences do 
not necessarily attach to sexed bodies as such, since they operate first and foremost as 
rhetorical figures.  The titular sisters of the poem “The Flesh and the Spirit,” for example, 
could easily be made into brothers without any harm being done to the sense.  
Ungendered, however, is not unengendered, as Spirit clarifies at the crux of this poem, 
indicating that she and Flesh are the children of different fathers: one “old Adam” and 
one “above” (176).  With this rhetorical gesture, Bradstreet reverses our conventional 
arrangement of the real/fictive, literal/figurative poles: she gives us, on the one hand, a 
literal father, Adam, who is effectively fictive, and, on the other, a figurative father, God, 
who is the very epitome and apex of being.  The key here is her use of an intuitive 
alignment of embodiment with reality in order to portray the spiritual as a higher reality, 
which transforms the family into a mere metaphor for the true, spiritual family.  And yet, 
as we have seen above, in becoming a metaphorical model for actual families, the 
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educational family of Bradstreet’s poetry helps to elevate them to the level of the spiritual 
family.  
 
The rhetoricity of Bradstreet’s gendering is perhaps most apparent in her early poetry, 
especially “The Quarternions,” a cycle of poems grouped by fours according to their 
subjects: the four elements and the four humours, for example, each of which is gendered 
in the course of the poems.  The gendered status of elements such as fire and water is, of 
course, transparently rhetorical.  The genderings that interest me most in these poems, 
however, are those that could more convincingly be linked with sexed bodies.  In her 
verses on the four seasons, for example, Bradstreet portrays “cleanly huswives” with their 
shelves “fill’d for winter time” (48), and Mowers and Carters toiling in the summer sun 
(50).  While these images clearly evoke a gendered division of labor, they also draw quite 
consciously upon a tradition of georgic and pastoral poetry extending backwards through 
Drayton and Spenser to Virgil and Theocritus, as signaled by the “whistling voyce” of the 
Carter celebrating the end of his work-day, a voice that echoes those of Virgil’s musical 
shepherds in the Eclogues.  Bradstreet, in other words, is carefully following her models 
in these poems, concerning herself with reproducing an image of an orderly world. 
  
These early poems are also more explicitly political in character, situating Bradstreet’s 
figure of the integral nuclear family as the site of education in a national context.  What 
these poems show us is the disintegration of the family as emblematic of the 
disintegration of the nation, with Bradstreet borrowing from Virgil yet again in her 
depiction of war and famine, and the chaos that follow upon them.  Late in the first book 
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of the Georgics, Virgil offers a glimpse of the effects of the intrusion of war upon the 
husbandry of the land:  
 
Here the good and evil have changed places: so many  
wars in the world, so many forms of wickedness, no honor  
for the plow, farmers conscripted, the mournful fields untilled,  
and curved pruning hooks are beaten into unbending swords.  
Here Euphrates, there Germany goes to war; neighboring  
cities, flouting the laws they’ve both agreed on, take up arms;  
(1.505-510 19-20). 
 
Aside from reversing our conventional image of swords being beaten into ploughshares, 
Virgil’s poem suggests a fundamental opposition between agricultural production and 
war.  Bradstreet, in the persona of “Earth,” refigures this civil disintegration, imagining 
“The Corne, and Hay, both fall[ing] before they’r mowne, | And buds from fruitfull trees, 
before they’r blowne” leading to such dearth that “The husband knowes no wife, nor 
father sons” (13).  Bradstreet’s imagery differs from Virgil’s, then, in giving the 
destruction of the family a central place in this sequence of events.  Yet, while Bradstreet 
is certainly thinking about gender here, the authority for these figures of speech comes 
from their place in literary history, not from their connection to some kind of embodied 
experience. 
 
Inasmuch as Bradstreet does depart from Virgil here, her work slightly reconfigures the 
symbolic continuum Patricia Seed has shown existed between sexual reproduction and 
agriculture in English thought at the time of colonization (33-35).  Rather than 
concentrate on sex, Bradstreet underlines the gender roles, showing us the connections 
between being a husband and husbandry, as it were.  Bradstreet’s cursory invocation of 
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rape at several points in her poetry reinforces this unsexing.  As Barbara J. Baines notes, 
the representation of rape in English writing of this period is “always political” since 
“[s]exual incontinence … is the mark of misrule” (160); in Bradstreet’s case, we might 
say that rape is in fact only political, since it operates as a symbol of political unrest, 
rather than being represented as an attack on an individualized, psychologized, and 
embodied person.  Thus, when Bradstreet picks up on the destruction of family as the 
symbolic destruction of state later in the “Quarternions,” it becomes clear that her 
attention is focused on the disappearance of the distinctions between different family 
members, as when the incestuous and fratricidal rapist King Cambyses of Persia is called 
a “hellish Husband, Brother, Unckle, Sire” (72).  This looks like the same fear that the 
collapse of the categories of identity will lead to political anarchy that we found 
expressed in Alsop, but given Bradstreet’s flattening of social distinctions elsewhere in 
her writings, it would be more accurate to read it as the improper reproduction of those 
categories, though it clearly leads to the very same anarchy. 
 
What are we to make, then, of this strange rhetorical method that elaborates differences 
only in order to collapse them?  Bradstreet’s writings, I have insisted, rely upon a series 
of figures of speech centered on the symbol of the family.  These figures may not be 
grounded in reality, but they are supposed to help create a reality, to produce the 
embodiment of a disembodied ideal.  By placing the family at the nexus of a network of 
identity categories, Bradstreet suggests that it is the key to protecting those identities.  
Further, by portraying the family as the seat of education, Bradstreet suggests that it is the 
vehicle for reproducing those identities.  All of these threads come together in her 
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ultimate reconfiguration of the symbolic relationship between colony and mother country 
in “A Dialogue between Old England and New” in such a fashion as to show us the 
arbitrary nature of the hierarchical distinctions between this and that family member, 
even as the poem demonstrates the role that family bonds play in opening up the 
possibility of education as a means to producing an orthodox identity. 
 
In this poem, written at the outset of the English Civil War, Bradstreet deploys many of 
the same figures that we have already located in her other writings—she represents 
Germany, in the wake of the Thirty Years War, for example, as a “barren heath” where 
“people [are] famish’d … Wives forc’d [and] babes toss’d” (144)—but the poem in 
which she deploys them offers a radical break in the representation of the relationship 
between colony and metropole.  The poem portrays Old England as wounded and weak, 
and New England as her help-meet, offering advice on how to improve her state.  Old 
England tries to put New in her place by characterizing her as a limb, a symbolic gesture 
whose significance would not have been lost on Thomas Hobbes and his readers. New 
England insists, however, that Old has not paid attention to her family duties by allowing 
Catholicism to spread unabated throughout the continent and paid the price by becoming 
infected herself.  As both Pender and Egan note, this situation reverses the traditional 
paradigm of mother/daughter relations.  Egan puts it best when he asks: “parents are 
supposed to observe their children, are they not, and when observed, present those 
children with an example to emulate?” (93)   
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And yet, while Bradstreet’s poem is a departure in this way, it manages to recuperate this 
transformation by placing it within the rhetoric developed across the course of her poems.  
New England can provide Old with an example to emulate only because she herself is 
emulating the example Old England once offered.  Thus, the preservation of identity 
relies on its being reproduced in an appropriate fashion.  That the child teaches the 
mother in this poem reinforces Bradstreet’s point: English political order has been 
overturned.  Rather than the Maryland imagined in Alsop’s poem, where men give birth 
to strange halflings of indeterminate sex, New England provides exactly the sort of 
colony England needs, one destined to offer an example to the mother country precisely 
because New England’s mothers have raised their children well, according to example. 
The copy, in other words, helps to guarantee the perfection of the original. 
 
 
“BUILDING A HOUSE FOR JESUS AND MARY” 
 
Juxtaposing the writings of a married Englishwoman with eight children to those of a 
cloistered French nun might seem counterintuitive, yet de l’Incarnation takes part in 
precisely the same mutation of the discourse of custom into the discourse of familial 
education that I have identified in Bradstreet.  The irony of this juxtaposition is that de 
l’Incarnation’s writing is often more concerned with the quotidian details of daily 
existence than Bradstreet’s, giving it a more recognizably domestic character.  Further, de 
l’Incarnation’s relationship with her son, who edited and published her works after her 
death, takes on greater contour in her writing, especially her correspondence, than 
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Bradstreet’s with her children, even in the manuscript book of advice she prepared for 
them.  This difference can perhaps be explained by their different situations; against the 
backdrop of a Puritan society focused on “Family Government” (Cotton Mather 
Decenium Luctuousum 212), Bradstreet can take her audience’s awareness of daily 
domestic life for granted, while de l’Incarnation gives us such quotidian details in order 
to convince us of her domesticity.  In the end, however, it may stem from a difference in 
purpose: unlike Bradstreet, who focuses on the integrity of the family as a symbol for the 
continued integrity of an already existing country, de l’Incarnation symbolically expands 
the conception of family in order to justify the literal expansion of nation and religion 
through the colonial assimilation of native populations. 
 
Those scholars who have studied de l’Incarnation’s life and writings most closely would 
certainly be surprised by my putting her alongside Bradstreet, since they tend to view the 
central event in her life—her departure for Canada—as an abandonment of her son, and 
thus of her role as a mother, as much as a departure for a “New World.”  Her two most 
recent biographer-critics, Marie Florine-Bruneau and Natalie Zemon Davis, have 
positioned her struggle with the decisions to become a nun and then to travel to Canada 
following her husband’s death as the key to understanding her psyche.  Yet, de 
l’Incarnation’s writings evince much of the same concern about the division between the 
secular and divine worlds as Bradstreet’s poetry. Thus, in her Relation, de l’Incarnation 
recounts her struggle with how to respond to her calling in great detail: 
 
In a word, I was besieged on all sides and my natural love pressed upon 
me so sharply that it was as though my soul were being wrenched from my 
body.  Nothing about my obligations concerned me except my love for my 
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son.  Furthermore, I never stopped hearing an inner voice which pursued 
me everywhere, saying, ‘Hurry! It’s time.  It’s not good for you to be in 
the world any longer.’  These words made their point.  (Selected Writings 
95) 
 
The total exclusivity of her religious calling and her secular life expressed in this 
passage—“Nothing … concerned me except love for my son”; “It’s not good for you to 
be in the world any longer”—are further reinforced by the words that convey her state of 
mind at the very moment of her leaving to become a nun: “Watching [my son cry], it 
seemed to me that I was being cut in two” (95).  De l’Incarnation, then, faces much the 
same dilemma as Bradstreet, trying to maintain an integral identity while being pulled 
between the mundane, embodied world and that of the spirit.  And yet, even at this most 
intense moment, she insists that she “did not let [her] emotions show” and focused on the 
fact that she was “[p]utting [her] son into the hands of God and the Blessed Virgin” (95), 
suggesting the rhetorical devices that will enable her to symbolically bridge the gap 
between these disparate worlds. 
 
Hewing first to her suppressed emotional response, we must recognize that the logic of 
modeling is at work here, too, since her justification for keeping her feelings hidden is 
precisely to prevent them from provoking a more intense response.  Indeed, she indirectly 
admits to Martin, in her Relation of 1654, that she consciously withheld her caresses from 
him when he was a child because she knew that she was destined to be a nun and wanted 
to minimize the emotional bond between them (Selected Writings 97).  While both her 
and her son’s initial response to their separation demonstrate that this tactic was 
insufficient in and of itself, when coupled with de l’Incarnation’s characterization of God, 
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Jesus, and Mary as members of a holy family—and thus, by extension, her and her son’s 
true family—it accounts for her actions in a convincing manner and thereby produces the 
effect she desires: her son’s own entry into religious orders.  
 
The answer to the problem represented by her “abandonment” of her son, in other words, 
is de l’Incarnation’s insistence on the literality of her familial relationship with God, 
Jesus, and Mary.  In a letter to her son written shortly after her arrival in Canada, for 
example, de l’Incarnation asks him: “Cet abandon ne vous a-il pas esté utille?”, pointing 
out that God promised her “qu’il auroit soin de vous” and that Mary, “la Mère de la 
bonté,” also “prendroit soin de vous,” particularly since Martin himself has taken her and 
her son, Jesus, “pour Mère & pour Espouse, lorsque vous entrastes dans vos études” 
(Correspondance 130-31).89  According to de l’Incarnation’s symbolic logic, this has 
indeed been to her son’s advantage because Jesus and Mary are the true models for the 
“secular” family that she and her son constitute, and so, in taking them for “Mother” and 
“Spouse” in place of de l’Incarnation, he has brought himself closer to salvation.  He has 
also, we should note, brought himself closer to his mother, since in joining the 
Benedictines Martin conforms to his mother’s desire and to her example.   
 
In this letter—and elsewhere in her writing—de l’Incarnation positions herself as the 
intermediary between Mary and Jesus and her son, since it is she who sends Martin the 
message that they will take care of him.  Bruneau identifies this mediation as evidence of 
                                                
 
89 “Hasn’t this abandonment been to your advantage?”; “that He will take care of you”; “the Mother of 
goodness”; “will take care of you”; “for Mother and for Spouse once you began your studies” (Translations 
mine). 
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her “clerical rather than maternal authority in relation to” Martin (Women Mystics 75), 
but I would argue that it is in fact evidence of her integration of those roles, as her 
particular insistence on the language of family relationships to characterize religious ones 
further indicates.  Examining the meanings at work in de l’Incarnation’s own name 
exposes how thoroughly she had bound the world of the spirit and the world of the flesh 
together through the medium of the family as a justification for her role as an educator.   
 
As Davis notes, de l’Incarnation chose her religious name “since it was as the Word 
Incarnate that she had most often thought of Christ” (75), and thereby positioned herself 
as a privileged apostle of the Word of God.  The further resonances of “incarnation,” 
which evokes the central Christian mysteries of the conception of Christ and his birth as 
the embodiment of the spirit, draw our attention to the same dynamic of translation 
between spiritual and physical worlds that we saw at work in Bradstreet’s poetry.  Tying 
these associations together with those of de l’Incarnation’s Christian name, Marie, her 
role as apostle overlaps completely with her role as mother; though she would never have 
presumed to take the (blasphemous) position of mother vis-à-vis Christ, she clearly took 
Mary as a model.  It was Mary herself who, in a dream vision, had told de l’Incarnation 
of her apostolic mission (Relation 86-88; Selected Writings 108-10), with God later 
confirming for her that “[c]’est le Canada que je t’ai fait voir; il faut que tu y ailles faire 
une maison à Jesus et à Marie” (Relation 93).90 
  
                                                
90 “It is Canada that I have shown you; you must go there to build a house for Jesus and Mary” (Selected 
Writings 116). 
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Through this identification with Mary, de l’Incarnation genders the educational process 
much more definitively than Bradstreet, though both authors clearly overturn the 
conventional tropes of genius upon which Alsop played in his “Author to His Book.”  
Thus, Martin, in a discussion on the Song of Songs based on his mother’s own notes, 
interprets women’s breasts as a symbol of the capacity to teach, citing the metaphorical 
invocation of  “le lait d’une sainte doctrine” (Retraites 243).  We find the same figure 
elsewhere in her extant writings, such as a letter she wrote to him in 1644, in which she 
tells him of some “damoiselles qui ont sucé la vertu avec le laict de leur bonne mère” 
(Correspondance 240).91  In the place of male sexual conquest as the symbol of 
education, then, Bradstreet offers us a dialogue between mother and daughter, and de 
l’Incarnation—remotivating a conventional early modern trope—a mother suckling her 
child.  De l’Incarnation’s figure thus bring us ever closer to the modern conception of the 
family as the bridge between nature and culture, with the mother in particular singled out 
as the vehicle that translates us from one to the other, though we must remind ourselves 
that this is not the symbolic chasm that she intends to bridge with her writing and her 
instruction. 
 
As if to prove the success of her methods, and disprove those of her subsequent editors 
who would doubt his faithfulness to her words and intent, Martin provides an elaboration 
of her method in his introduction to her Retraites: 
 
Ainsi je ne sçay point de livre en ce genre, qui soit d’un plus facile usage; 
car ceux qui s’en voudront servir, n’auront qu’à suivre celle qui la 
composé: ils pourront penser ce qu’elle a pensé, produire les affectations 
qu’elle a produites, faire les resolutions qu’elle a faites, parler à Dieu 
                                                
91 “young women who have imbibed virtue with their mother’s milk” (Word from New France 232). 
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comme elle luy a parlé, se remplir de son esprit & de ses sentimens; de la 
sorte ils feront les mémes oraisons qu’elle a faites, & il sera difficile d’en 
faire de plus saintes & de plus pures. (a iii)92 
 
In this passage, Martin effectively reproduces the rhetoric modeled for him by his 
mother, and thereby produces an even stronger sense of the recursivity of this educational 
method: in following de l’Incarnation’s words, after all, her readers will be doing what 
Martin has already done.  Martin’s style raises this imitative logic to a new level, with the 
syntax of this passage mimicking, and thus reinforcing, the very process of mirroring that 
it represents.  
 
In his own account of how he treats his mother’s writings, Martin openly addresses the 
changes he makes to her work, stating in his preface to La vie that “[i]l y a plus d’un 
Autheur; il y en a deux, & l’un & l’autre étoient necessaires pour achever l’Ouvrage” 
(a2v).  Martin further insists that “il n’y parle que comme un écho [de Marie de 
l’Incarnation].”93  While we may doubt how completely or accurately Martin echoes his 
mother, we must still acknowledge his choice of words is an interesting one, especially in 
light of de l’Incarnation’s own insistence, in her letters and elsewhere, on the value of 
imitation as a means to moral improvement.  Even an echo, we should note, follows a 
                                                
 
92 “Thus I know of no other book in this genre that is easier to use.  Those who wish to make something of 
it have but to follow she who wrote it: they can think what she thought, produce the effects that she 
produced, make the resolutions that she made, speak to God as she spoke, to fill themselves with her spirit 
and her sentiments.  In the end they will make the same prayers that she made, and it would be difficult to 
make any more sacred and pure than those” (Translation mine). 
 
93 “There is not one Author to this work; there are two … [b]oth … necessary to its completion” 
(Translation from Davis 104); “He [the second author—i.e., Martin] speaks but as an echo [of the first, 
Marie de l’Incarnation]” (translation mine). 
 
  132 
principle of selection, since only the loudest, most clearly articulated phrases are 
reproduced.   
 
De l’Incarnation’s account of her religious development demonstrates how such 
selectivity is in fact a key aspect of an educational method based on modeling.  
Recounting her youthful faith, she notes how God gave her “une grande inclination à la 
fréquentation des sacrements”—that is, those religious ritual practices imbued with the 
greatest symbolic significance, such as baptism, communion, and confession (Relation 
22).94  The initial attraction of these practices comes from their striking sensual 
elements—as de l’Incarnation notes, she “[les] trouvai[t] si beau et si saint que je ne 
voyais rien de semblable” (25)—and this attraction draws her into an accumulating and 
intensifying cycle of repetition: “tant plus j’approchais des sacraments, plus j’avais désir 
de m’en approcher” (23).95  Furthermore, this attraction is, for de l’Incarnation, at least 
initially distinct from any intellectual appreciation of the meaning of the sacraments, 
since, as she states quite explicitly, it is only when she had “devenue plus grande” that 
she was “capable de recevoir leur signification” (25).96 
 
The dynamics of this progress into deeper faith through ritual practice are well illumined 
by de l’Incarnation’s observation that she “used to watch the posture of people who were 
praying” in Church and “feel urged by an interior spirit to withdraw to pray without even 
                                                
94 “a profound desire for the reception of the sacraments” (Selected Writings 44) 
 
95 “found them incomparably beautiful and holy” (47); “The more I approached the sacraments, the more I 
desired them” (44-5). 
 
96 When she “grew up” she was “able to understand their meaning” (47). 
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knowing what the interior spirit was or being acquainted with the words, ‘interior spirit,’ 
as I have already said” (Selected Writings 42).97  Though de l’Incarnation identifies the 
source of her impulse to pray as an internal one, it is the act of observing a behavioral 
model that, in fact, sets the process in motion; the interiority belatedly follows upon the 
action itself, a fact which de l’Incarnation’s distinction between “knowing” and “being 
acquainted with the words” suggests that she understands.  Imitation, in other words—
and of words we should note—produces the understanding requisite to the proper 
performance of religious identity.  And when understanding follows it helps to reinforce 
the cumulative process of accoutumance (“accustomization”) already well under way: 
“Plus j’avançais en connaissance, plus j’avais de touches et d’amour pour ces saintes 
ceremonies de l’Église” (25).98  It even helps propel de l’Incarnation towards her 
apostolic mission, since, feeling the love the sacraments inspire in her, she “want[s] 
everyone whom Our Lord let[s] me encounter to experience this love” (45). 
 
Yet, while de l’Incarnation’s primary focus is the reproduction of a religious identity, 
rather than a national one, we must recognize that the two identities were closely linked 
for her.  While her figure of a mother suckling her child may call forth the beatific vision 
of Leonardo da Vinci’s Madonna Litta, it has as much to do with the assimilationist 
colonial impulse as any of Sir Walter Raleigh’s or Thomas Morton’s sexual puns.  From 
the very beginning of their colonization of the New World, as Vincent Grégoire notes, the 
                                                
97 This passage appears in English because the only French edition of de l’Incarnation’s Relation that I have 
been able to locate is a redaction edited by Jamet; Mahoney’s translation is based on the complete French 
manuscript but includes different selections than Jamet’s. 
 
98 “The more I understood them, the more I was filled with love for these holy ceremonies of the Church” 
(47). 
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French had held out two complementary goals for the New World “Savage”: “sauver ce 
barbare de la perdition [et] en faire un Français d’adoption” (214), a position we saw very 
clearly articulated by Marc Lescarbot in his Histoire de la Nouvelle-France (3.370).99   
 
In a letter to her son, de l’Incarnation affirms this dual mission, telling him that the 
French have selected several Huron girls who, having already converted to Christianity, 
are to be raised “à la Françoise” and “francisées tant de langage que de mœurs,” with the 
ultimate goal being their complete incorporation into French society through marriage 
(Correspondance 545-6).100  When compared with the English colonial practice of 
discouraging intermarriage between Native Americans and colonists, except where it 
served a strategic purpose, the French policy of actively encouraging such intermarriage 
may seem truly enlightened.  Still, de l’Incarnation’s letter exposes the preconditions of 
such intermarriage: religious conversion and national assimilation. 
 
The basic mechanism of de l’Incarnation’s educational rhetoric reduces all the Native 
Americans, not only the young girls who were educated at the Ursuline mission, to 
children.  In a letter the Mother Superior of the Ursulines in Tours, de l’Incarnation 
writes that the Native American converts are neither “si subtils ny si rafinez” as 
Christians in France, but that they make up for it with “une candeur d’enfant” 
(Correspondance 139).101  In her rhetoric here de l’Incarnation firmly abides by the 
savage/civilized opposition that Grégoire identifies as characteristic of early French 
                                                
99 “to save this barbarian from perdition [and] make of him an adopted Frenchman” (translation mine). 
 
100 “in the French manner”; “Frenchified in language but also in custom” (Selected Writings 252-3) 
 
101 “as subtle or as refined”; “the candour of a child” (translation mine) 
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missionaries in Canada, reinforcing the subordinate position of Native Americans in 
relation to the European colonists even as she praises them for their childlike candor. 
 
Yet, de l’Incarnation’s rhetoric of familial education opens her up to a reciprocity that 
begins to flatten such distinctions.  If the Native Americans are reduced to children in the 
logic of the passage above, she is reduced to still less when she commands her son to 
notice that “nôtre propre amour [de Dieu] nous rend esclaves & nous reduit à rien” (184).  
In this same letter to her son, she tells him how happy she would be “si un jour on me 
venoit dire que mon Fils fût une victime immolée à Dieu!”102  Several years later, De 
l’Incarnation relates to her son the martyrdom of an Algonquian man, calling him “mon 
fils spirituel,” pointing out that he “m’aimoit autant ou plus que sa Mère” and that in 
heaven he will act as “mon Père et mon Avocat auprès de Dieu” (Correspondance 
399).103  In this way de l’Incarnation’s spiritual son serves not only as a model for the 
physical son, but also becomes a father to his spiritual mother because of his translation 
from this world to the next. 
 
The substitutional logic evinced in this letter thus lends credence to Bruneau’s 
observation that de l’Incarnation’s relationship with God is structurally identical to her 
relationship with her Native American students, which Bruneau characterizes in the 
binary terms of “same” and “other” (“Anthropologie mystique” 189).  In her relationship 
                                                
 
102 “Our proper love [of God] renders us slaves and reduces us to nothing”; “How happy would I be if one 
day if someone came to tell me that my son had been immolated as a victim to God” (translations mine). 
 
103 “my spiritual son”; “loved me as much or more than his own mother”; “my father and my advocate with 
God” (Selected Writings 246). 
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with God, it is Marie herself who occupies the position of “other,” striving to make 
herself worthy of, and thereby recognizable to, God; in her relationship with her students, 
however, the students take the place of the other, and she expects them to strive to be like 
her, devoting themselves completely to the service of God and the spread of Christianity 
among their people.  As Bruneau notes, this binary logic depends on assimilation and 
annihilation, whereby the difference of the other comes to be dissolved in the sameness 
of the same.  Thus, de l’Incarnation insists in her Retraites: “I have no other desire than 
to be totally annihilated in God” (82; translation mine); similarly, she conceives of the 
religious conversion of the Native American girls as a loss of self, noting of Marie 
Negabamat, one of her earliest pupils, that “[e]lle ne sembloit plus être elle-même” when 
she finally turned to “la prière et aux practiques de la piété Chrétienne” (Correspondance 
95).104  Expressed in these terms, Marie de l’Incarnation’s interaction with her native 
pupils entirely conforms to Grégoire’s worst suspicions about the ethnocentrism of 
French missionary practice.   
 
Nevertheless, de l’Incarnation’s shifting position within these parallel binaries 
destabilizes them: inasmuch as she herself occupies the position of other vis-à-vis God, 
she becomes capable of relating to her students as equals on a symbolic level, and of 
identifying with them.  Thus, over the course of her life in Québec, de l’Incarnation 
becomes a more sensitive observer of Native American customs.  At the outset, she 
emphasizes their “salleté insupportable,” noting “la vermine causée par l’abondance … 
                                                
104 “[s]he seemed no longer to be herself”; “prayer and the practices of Christian piety” (Word from New 
France 71) 
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de la graisse dont leurs parens les oignent par tout le corps” (Correspondance 97),105 but 
she also undertakes to learn their languages—first Algonquian, then later Huron, 
Montagnais, and Iroquois.  While learning their languages, she absorbed their cultural 
practices, learning not only how to make sagamité, a porridge of corn flavored with bear 
grease, but also to make extra for when guests arrive unannounced, since they will expect 
to receive hospitality (Correspondance 97; Word from New France 74).  In the process, 
however, de l’Incarnation’s attachment to French modes of life lessens somewhat, and, as 
Bruneau notes, she becomes more capable of resisting European conceptions of 
femininity. 
 
Indeed, de l’Incarnation’s identification with her pupils was further fueled by a 
transethnic solidarity of sex.  Bruneau singles out a particular incident that speaks directly 
to this solidarity, when a young native woman was publicly whipped by her converted 
family members as punishment for a presumed meeting with an illicit suitor.  While the 
Jesuit Father de Quen acceded to the family’s desire to punish the girl, and then refused 
to baptize her because he assumed she was guilty, de l’Incarnation believed the girl and, 
as Bruneau notes, “accuse[d] [Father de Quen] of having acted without giving the matter 
due consideration and without having enquired into the facts” (Women Mystics 97).  She 
then spread her version of the story, which contradicted the one recorded in the Jesuit 
Relations.  This identification with her fellow women also leads de l’Incarnation to 
oppose the sexually violent behavior of European men to the civility of their Native 
American counterparts.  Thus, in one letter to her son, she notes that she need not fear 
                                                
105 “unbearable filth”; “the vermin caused by th[e] abundance of grease [that] their parents rub all over their 
bodies” (Word from New France 75) 
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any sort of violation at the hands of Iroquois warriors, as she might from French soldiers 
(cited in Bruneau Women Mystics 107-8), and, in another, she emphasizes the importance 
of the Ursuline cloister as a safe-house for young girls who, “quelqu’âge qu’elles ayent, 
…sont dans un danger évident” from the sexual aggression of the excess men in the 
colony (Correspondance 802).106 
 
While Grégoire insists that the Christianization of the natives goes hand-in-hand with 
their civilization and Frenchification—terms which Cardinal Richelieu had laid out in 
1627, and which were explicitly part of de l’Incarnation’s religious vow—this shift on 
Marie’s part speaks to a troubling of her straightforward identification with her own 
nation. Perhaps this is what Clifford Geertz has in mind when he suggests that part of 
why we teach materials that are foreign to us is because we need “to wound our 
complacency” and arrive at a “difficult awareness” through cultural juxtaposition (33, 
32).  It is certainly what Carla Zecher has in mind when she suggests that de 
l’Incarnation’s religious mission “decentered some of the nationalistic impetus of the 
colonizing enterprise,” and served, in part, to help produce “a new kind of French cultural 
identity” (39).   
 
Ultimately, however, de l’Incarnation’s acceptance of Native American customs is 
limited.  A letter she wrote in 1668, nearly 30 years into her mission and only four before 
her death, speaks to this duality.  In it de l’Incarnation returns to the subject of removing 
grease from the native children when they enter the cloister, stating that “ilz se graissent 
                                                
 
106 “would be in clear danger no matter what their age” (Selected Writings 271) 
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tous à cause qu’ilz ne portent point du linge” (Correspondance 852);107 where, in her 
early letters, the grease had been conceived of in opposition to European under-clothes—
encouraging vermin, rather than inhibiting them—they are now seen as parallel—
something that can be “worn” in the place of underwear.  Lest we be tempted to overstate 
the importance of this shift in attitude, however, de l’Incarnation ends her letter by 
emphasizing the difficulty of converting the Native Americans because of the 
incommensurability of their belief systems, noting that “ce sont gens très susperticieux 
qui font leur créance en leurs songes” (Correspondance 855).108 
 
Given our knowledge of the faith de l’Incarnation put in her own dreams, it is perhaps 
unnecessary to point out how blatantly contradictory this judgment seems.  How could a 
woman who openly acknowledges that a dream drove her to abandon her family and then 
her nation in a quest to “build a house for Mary and Jesus” reject another’s belief in 
dreams?   
 
At one level the answer is obvious: it is because she sees her dream as a vision sent to her 
by God, where the dreams of the Native Americans are mere dreams.  At another, 
perhaps slightly less obvious level, however, de l’Incarnation rejects the native 
acceptance of dreams precisely because it could be seen as equivalent to her own, which 
would mean that their religious beliefs were as valid as hers.109  Putting these two levels 
                                                
 
107 “since they do not wear any underwear they grease themselves instead” (Selected Writings 273) 
 
108 “they are a very superstitious people who put belief in their dreams” (Selected Writings 274) 
109 Stephen Greenblatt makes a similar point with regard to European reactions to Native American beliefs 
in his analysis of Thomas Harriot’s A briefe and true report of the new found land of Virginia in “Invisible 
Bullets.” 
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together, we see that de l’Incarnation may have been willing to cede aspects of her 
national identity as a result of her intercultural encounter, but remained steadfast in her 
religious beliefs, placing them above and beyond any criticism from, or even any 
engagement with, their counterparts in Native American culture: “[i]lz ont … créances 
aux sorciers et devins,” she writes, but “ce n’est pas qu’ilz soient, mais ce sont des 
jongleurs … comme sont les lataleurs en l’Europe” (Correspondance 855).110 
 
 
“L’APPEL DES BOIS” 
 
Thus far I have suggested a fundamental opposition between Bradstreet’s insistence on 
education as the means to ensure the corporate integrity of the family (and by extension 
the nation and religion) and de l’Incarnation’s on the possibilities of education as a means 
of expanding the family in order to expand the empire.  In fact, this opposition is more a 
question of differing emphases than differing ends.  De l’Incarnation’s religious practice 
leads to an ongoing intellectual and spiritual engagement with her son, thereby 
maintaining the integrity of her biological family despite the geographical space between 
them.  Meanwhile, Bradstreet, in the conclusion to “Dialogue between Old England and 
New,” envisions the resolution of England’s “intestine war” as the precursor to militant 
English expansion through the renewal of the religious crusades.  Seen thus, Bradstreet 
and de l’Incarnation are on the recto and verso of the same page, as it were. 
 
                                                
 
110 they believe in sorcerers and diviners”; “they are not really sorcerers; they are jugglers [i.e., con artists] 
like the buffoons in Europe” (Selected Writings 275) 
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Reading Bradstreet and de l’Incarnation together in this fashion exposes Bradstreet’s 
egalitarianism as the obverse of the monoculturalism that undergirds assimilationist 
colonial expansion.  It also draws our attention to how the subordination of national 
identity to religious identity requires precisely the hollowing out of those identities that 
Bradstreet performs in her poetry.  De l’Incarnation, by contrast, remains too rooted in 
the ebb and flow of particular customs to ignore the possibility that such identities may 
remain incommensurate, and thus she finds the links between her religious and national 
identities beginning to come undone.  This undoing, in its turn, points out the problematic 
symbolic possibilities inherent in Bradstreet and de l’Incarnation’s rhetorical linking of 
sexual and cultural reproduction. 
 
What both of these authors intend is for the literal, embodied family to be raised to the 
level of the metaphorical, spiritual one; what their writings enable is precisely the 
opposite.  All of the certainty of religious faith begins to devolve upon the biological 
family, such that it becomes the “nature” of culture.  Thus, by insisting on the 
reproduction of traditional models Bradstreet and de l’Incarnation may have neutralized 
some of the radically transformational novelty of Bacon’s concept of education, yet the 
recursive symbolic process they engage in allows for the literalization and naturalization 
of what they understood as rhetorical in a fashion that Bradstreet does not seem to have 
foreseen.  De l’Incarnation, on the other hand, seems to recognize the threat inherent in 
their rhetoric of familial education: 
 
Nos filles Sauvages externs venant à nos classes, nous leur avons fait voir 
le mal où elles se precipitant en suivant l’exemple de leur parens, elles 
n’ont pas remis depuis le pied chez-nous.  Le naturel des Sauvages est 
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comme cela : ils font tout ce qu’ils voient faire à ceux de leur Nation en 
matière de moeurs, à moins qu’ils ne soient bien affermis dans la morale 
Chrétienne. (Correspondance 681)111 
 
The purpose behind Bradstreet’s and de l’Incarnation’s rhetoric is thus challenged; if 
education, as they have argued, produces identity, then what is to stop the children of 
French and English colonists from consorting with Native American families and 
succumbing to “l’appel des bois” (Bruneau “Anthropologie mystique” 181)?112 
 
It is precisely this fear of “Indianization” (Mather 211), present to a much more limited 
extent in earlier writing about the dangers of American colonization, that comes to 
dominate North American writing (and European writing about the Americas, as 
witnessed by texts like Aphra Behn’s The Widdow Ranter) in the years following the 
publication of The Tenth Muse.  In the wake of King Philip’s War, in particular, we find 
the captivity narrative emerging as a means of symbolically confronting this threat by 
demonstrating the resilience of Anglo-American national identity.113  Meanwhile, in New 
France, we find various officials criminalizing the fur trading missions of the coureurs de 
bois as much because of the perceived moral degeneration of French colonists as because 
of the commercial threat it poses to the colonial government.114  And, at the very same 
                                                
111 “When our Indian day pupils came to our classes we tried to get them to see the trouble they would be in 
if they followed the example of their relatives; since then they have not set foot in our place.  This is the 
nature of the savages.  They do everything they see the people of their nation doing where morals are 
concerned unless they have been solidly strengthened in Christian morality” (Selected Writings 262). 
 
112 “The call of the woods” (translation mine). 
 
113 See, for example, Teresa Toulouse’s “The Sovereignty and Goodness of God in 1682: Royal Authority, 
Female Captivity, and ‘Creole’ Male Identity.” 
 
114 Canadian historian W. J. Eccles notes the deleterious effects that the colonial authorities believed were 
produced by their strong ties with Native Americans: “The missionaries … were aghast at their adoption 
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time, we find the persecuted coureur de bois, Pierre Esprit-Radisson, producing an 
English language manuscript account of his fur trading voyages that focuses on the potent 
symbolic connections between commercial, familial, and national identities.115  Only by 
examining how Bradstreet’s poetry and de l’Incarnation’s correspondence and religious 
writing place family-based education at the center of identity formation, however, can we 
begin to understand the terms on which these later writers approach this troubled terrain. 
                                                                                                                                            
alike of Indian virtues and vices, and some of the royal officials expressed alarm at the effect they had on 
colonial society” (The Canadian Frontier 8). 
 
115 For the most complete account of the production of Radisson’s manuscript see Germaine Warkentin’s 
“Who Was the Scribe of the Radisson Manuscript?” 
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ALL MY FRIENDS AND (INTERNATIONAL) RELATIONS: CUSTOM, KINSHIP, 
AND THE STATE OF NATURE IN THE CAPTIVITY NARRATIVES OF MARY 
ROWLANDSON AND PIERRE-ESPRIT RADISSON 
 
 [O]ne of these Women, took up a Resolution, to Imitate the Action of Jael 
upon Sisera; and being where she had not her own Life secured by any 
Law unto her, she thought she was not Forbidden by any Law, to take 
away the Life of the Murderers, by whom her Child had been butchered.  
–– Cotton Mather, Decennium luctuosum (142) 
 
Thus writes Cotton Mather at the climactic moment of his account of the captivity of 
Hannah Dustan, justifying her decision to kill and scalp her Native American captors.  
Reading this passage so soon after Anne Bradstreet’s poetic evocation of the mother-
daughter relations of England and New England we may be tempted to understand it in 
metaphorical terms: to see Dustan and her murdered infant as symbolic embodiments of a 
threat to the continued life of the colony that, at least in Bradstreet’s poetry, gave new life 
to a mother country in danger of disintegration.  And yet, while Mather obliquely calls 
upon Bradstreet’s figure elsewhere in his vast literary output, the symbolic logic of this 
passage is strictly metonymic.  Dustan represents New England synecdochally—she is a 
member of a larger body, not an embodiment of the entire colony.116
                                                
 
116 My understanding of synecdoche here is that, in replacing the whole with a part, it constitutes a variety 
of metonymy, which consists of substituting something’s name with the name of one of its attributes or 
something else directly associated with it, where a metaphor consists of a substitution of one thing for 
another that shares some attribute with it. 
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The significance of her actions, however, is not limited to her role as a colonist and a 
mother.  Mather’s citation of the biblical precedent of Jael provides a second frame of 
reference for Dustan’s violent response to her daughter’s murder.  In the story of Jael and 
Sisera (Judges 4.17-24), it is Jael’s entire people, the Israelites, who are captives, not 
merely Jael herself.  Her murder of Sisera, the captain of the Canaanite army, is presented 
not as revenge for a child’s death, but as part of the fulfillment of God’s promise to the 
children of Abraham.  Mather’s citation of this precedent places the Native Americans in 
the role of the Canaanites, with Dustan’s violent escape part of a pattern of providences 
that proves God’s larger plan for the New England colonies.  Dustan herself, then, 
becomes both a mother avenging a child’s death and an agent of God’s will acting on 
behalf of her larger community.   
 
This metonymic displacement, which enables Mather to imply the political and religious 
import of Dustan’s captivity more indirectly than Bradstreet’s metaphors would allow, is 
characteristic of a further shift in the developing relation between the discourse of custom 
and the figure of the family.  By collapsing these two identities—mother and member of 
God’s chosen people—into one, Mather suggests that they are inseparable: Dustan’s role 
as a mother is to guarantee the continuation of her community.  Put into Bradstreet’s 
terms, the nation is the child of the family.  Bradstreet’s terms no longer quite work, 
however, since part of the larger discursive shift we see in this text is that the family is no 
longer simply the metaphorical site for identity reproduction, as in Marie de 
l’Incarnation’s writings, but has literally become the mechanism of that reproduction.  
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Thus we find ourselves one step further on the road towards the biological essentialism 
that underpins the modern conception of family outlined in Nancy Armstrong and 
Leonard Tennenhouse’s The Imaginary Puritan.  And yet, as Armstrong and 
Tennenhouse have shown, this rhetoric thrives precisely on the aura of established 
necessity that obscures its very rhetoricity, an aura that is bolstered by the shift from 
metaphor to metonymy.  In the writings of Mather, and his contemporary, Mary 
Rowlandson, whose Sovereignty and Goodness of God remains the paradigmatic Anglo-
American captivity narrative, the family can no longer be conceived as a metaphoric 
representation of nationhood.  For them the nation is quite literally a collection of 
families bound by blood and marriage and reproduced through birth, a conception of 
nation that remotivates the genealogical focus of the Old Testament. 
 
The shift here from family as metaphor for nation to family as synecdochal linchpin of 
nation is not without its problems, perhaps the greatest of which is that it plants the seeds 
for the eventual erosion of the significance of custom as a discursive ground for 
collective identity.  This shift takes place in large part as a means of reducing the threat 
opened up by the transition, examined in my previous chapter, from custom as performed 
identity to custom as education.  De l’Incarnation’s writings provide the most helpful 
touchstone here: though her educational mission among the Native Americans is never as 
successful as she once hoped it would be, it offers a model for how education can 
transform identity through the inculcation of appropriate customs.  De l’Incarnation 
understands her role in metaphorical terms—she is Jesus’ bride and a symbolic mother to 
the Native American children she teaches—but the promise of identity transformation is 
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that these family roles will be literalized.  De l’Incarnation’s success, in other words, 
would mean that the Native Americans become French Catholics.117 
 
If such a transformation is possible, however, the reverse can likewise be conceived.   
While the discourse of custom developed as a means to rhetorically secure the 
Englishness and Frenchness of the colonists, that development was driven by a fear that 
these identities would be lost in a new land.  By detaching national and religious 
identities from the soil and rooting them in custom instead, these authors opened up, 
alongside the more desirable conversion of Native Americans to Christianity, the 
conceptual possibility of Indianization.118  The captivity of white settlers among the 
Native Americans, particularly female settlers such as Dustan and Rowlandson—or their 
later counterpart, Eunice Williams, who married a Native American and refused to return 
to New England119—was thus viewed as a dangerous predicament emblematic of the 
larger threat Native American society.  The possibility of such a transformation is 
precisely what Mather fears, and what drives him to flip the paradigm on its head, 
insisting on the literal family as the guarantor of national identity.  In so doing, he hardly 
closes off the possibility of Indianization—nor does he want to, since it offers a 
                                                
117 As implausible as it seems to us now, this transformation was envisaged as a very real possibility by the 
French well into the seventeenth century.   The intermarriage of French settlers and Native Americans 
continued to be promoted into the 1680s by Jean-Baptiste Colbert, Louis XIV’s Minister of Finance and 
administrator of France’s colonial holdings (Brodhead and O’Callaghan 9.59). 
 
118 As their metropolitan counterparts were more and more frequently pointing out, living in the Americas 
had produced just such a shift.  Thus the discourse of custom, which, for earlier colonists, had provided an 
effective means of rhetorically deflecting the threat of identity change, was now used precisely as a means 
of insisting upon it.  Aphra Behn’s The Widdow Ranter provides a perfect example of this in the title 
character, a morally questionable Virginian woman who drinks, smokes, and swears a blue streak across 
the pages of this play. 
 
119 Eunice’s father, John, is well known for his 1707 Redeemed Captive Returning to Zion, but since the 
appearance of John Demos’ The Unredeemed Captive in 1994 Eunice’s story has become progressively 
better known. 
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convenient rhetorical brickbat with which to bludgeon his congregation and the larger 
New England Puritan community (as he does later in Decennium luctuosum: see 
211ff.)—but he does undermine the status of those Native Americans who attempt to 
convert to an English, Christian way-of-life. 
 
What we ultimately find is that Mather’s text—and, as we shall see, Rowlandson’s too—
partake of an exclusionary binary logic based upon a definition of the family that is 
simultaneously restrictive (emphasizing the primacy of the nuclear unit) and expansive 
(capable of containing an entire nation in its compass).  These poles (family and nation) 
are negotiated through the intermediate terms of kinship (friends and relations) which 
blur the distinction between blood relationships and political associations.  Thus the poles 
become part of a larger continuum—family, kin, nation—rather than existing on distinct 
conceptual planes.   
 
In order to neaten up the edges of this blurred distinction so as to keep the Native 
Americans apart, Mather insists on a radical lack of family and social institutions among 
their communities, an insistence manifest in his assertion that Dustan is unbound by any 
law in her relations with her captors.  His language here appeals to Hugo Grotius’ 
conceptions of the “just war” and the “state of nature,” which he would have encountered 
in his reading of Grotius’ De jure belli ac pacis [The Law of War and Peace].120  In this 
                                                
 
120 A copy of Grotius’ book is listed in a catalog of Mather’s library made by his son, Samuel, sometime 
after his death in 1728.  A copy, made by Isaiah Thomas, of this original catalog now resides at the 
American Antiquarian Society in Worcester, MA, though the book itself no longer remains part of the 
Mather Family Library housed there. 
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landmark text, Grotius provides a thorough analysis of the principles of divine, natural, 
and civil law that justify both war and the killing of another human being, as well as 
providing a germinal notion of a concept that would prove central to the later political 
thought of Thomas Hobbes and John Locke: the state of nature.   
 
One of the key elements of Grotius’ argument is that political states do not have a 
monopoly on legitimate violence: private individuals or organizations can, in his 
assessment, also legally (and justly) wage war under certain conditions.  This is most 
notably the case in situations “where judicial procedure ceases to be available,” such as 
“if one finds himself in places without inhabitants, as on the sea, in a wilderness, or on 
vacant lands, or in any other places where there is no state” (92); another important 
justification for such violence is “the mutual tie of kinship among men, which of itself 
affords sufficient ground for rendering assistance” in instances where a member of one’s 
kin group is threatened or hurt (582).  Grotius likewise determines that it is perfectly in 
accordance “with moral justice (iusticia interna)” to kill someone when “we are able in 
no other way to protect our life and property” (723).  These are, effectively, the three 
reasons that Mather gives to justify Dustan’s actions; they also imply a core principle 
underpinning the concept of the state of nature: namely, that in the absence of a clear 
political and legal authority, human beings are bound only by the laws of nature, which 
guarantee the right of self-preservation.  In Mather’s text (explicitly) and in 
Rowlandson’s (implicitly) this concept serves not merely as a flipside to kinship, but as a 
justification for a refusal of all relations with the Native Americans and a minimization of 
the significance of any past relations with them. 
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Yet, as Julie Stone Peters has demonstrated, Grotius’ framework for international law is 
complicated by a foundational dualism that Mather tries to suppress (as we will see 
below, this suppression brings Mather closer to a Hobbesian concept of the state of nature 
than a Grotian one).  On the one hand, Grotius regards international space as a lawless 
chaos of violence; on the other, it is a space “where there is an absolute right to free 
commerce[, which, it turns out, is one of the basic laws of nature [because i]t is essential 
to a human sociability founded in the fundamental law of collective self-protection” 
(Peters 285; see also Grotius 199-200).121  Seen in this light, Dustan’s actions may well 
be just, but they are hardly to be regarded (as they are by Mather) as normative, let alone 
ideal.  Indeed, in the introduction to The Law of War and Peace, Grotius states that the 
object of his work is to provide a “remedy” for the unfortunately prevalent view that 
“either … nothing is allowable, or that everything is” (20).  This “remedy” depends, 
however, on the mutual recognition of shared humanity, something which neither Mather 
nor Rowlandson proves willing to grant the Native Americans. 
 
Strikingly, however, family and kin turn out to be equally central to the commercial 
vision of international relations, as I show in my examination of Mather and 
Rowlandson’s New French counterpart, Pierre-Esprit Radisson.  Radisson was held 
captive by the Iroquois for upwards of a year during his youth, but where Rowlandson 
refuses relations with her captors, Radisson accepts them.  In Radisson’s account of this 
captivity, and those of his later trading expeditions, we see the consequences of this 
                                                
121 Peters’ article, “A ‘Bridge over Chaos,’” provides an excellent account of Grotius’ position vis-à-vis his 
contemporaries, particularly John Milton, and his role in formulating many of the basic tenets of modern 
political theory. 
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acceptance: a concept of kinship radically extended to include transnational relations, 
even as this extension forces a painful and often violent reckoning with the limits that 
distinct customs place on the possibility for such associations.  This extension is based 
not merely on the metaphorical, or “fictive,” kinship that enabled earlier settler-explorers 
such as Samuel de Champlain and John Smith to negotiate their relationships with 
various native groups; instead, it draws upon Radisson’s quite literal acceptance of his 
role in his adoptive families.122  Indeed, Radisson, by using his ability to adopt different 
ritual practices to successful international commercial alliances, makes the fact that 
“custom” can also refer to “business patronage or support” seem like something more 
than a mere etymological accident (Oxford English Dictionary Online, definition 5). 
 
Ultimately, Radisson shows the Hobbesian state of nature to be the intellectual construct 
that it is, rather than the historical truth it sometimes purports to be, and develops an 
international ethics based upon the recognition and negotiation of distinct cultural 
practices.  Radisson, then, is a living embodiment of all that his Anglo-Puritan 
counterparts fear, and yet he, too, participates in the shift to a literal conception of the 
family, abstracting basic principles from his frankly commercial understanding of family 




                                                
 
122 The notion of “fictive kinship” as a basis for intercultural economic exchange is fundamental to 
contemporary ethnographic accounts of pre-capitalist societies.  As David Gaunt notes, however, such 
kinship is better understood as “voluntary” rather than “fictive,” since “[w]hat one culture experiences as 
artificial can be experienced as totally natural in another” (283). 
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“ISOLATED FROM THE REST OF HUMANKIND” 
 
Most conceptions of kinship, as David Gaunt notes, “stress … inequality” by “mark[ing] 
out a small group of persons [as] isolated from the rest of humankind” and 
“emphasiz[ing] the uniqueness and single origin of the[se] groups” (272).  This collective 
identification goes hand-in-hand with a system of shared social obligations, the 
performance of which serves to ratify one’s position within a given kin group.  As such, 
kinship would seem to be naturally and fundamentally opposed to the state of nature, 
which Hobbes—who likewise drew upon Grotius’ work in his development of this 
concept—tells us is a condition “consequent to a time of Warre, where every man is 
Enemy to every man” and thus “there is no place for Industry; … no Culture of the Earth; 
… no account of Time; no Arts; no Letters; no Society” (89).  Captivity, Edward Griffin 
implies, is a perfect example of such a state, since “in captivity there is no security 
because the captor is bound by no law, no agreed upon principle of behavior” (46).  By 
portraying the captivity of a European-American as the subjection of a member of a 
modern state to the state of nature Mather and Rowlandson are able to present Puritan 
society as a bulwark of order against the irrational and unchristian Native Americans, 
thereby obscuring the reciprocal threat their society presented to Native American ones. 
 
Yet, Mather himself posits a radically different relationship between family and the state 
of nature than does Hobbes—unsurprisingly, given his radically differing aims.123  For 
his part, Hobbes admits that, while “[i]t may peradventure be [that] there was never such 
                                                
 
123 Hobbes’ project is a fundamentally secular one, producing, as Angelo Campodonico notes, “a 
‘lowering’ of man’s position in the cosmos” that would be totally unacceptable to Mather (115). 
  153 
a time, nor condition of warre as [in the state of nature,] there are many places, where 
they live so now.  For the savage people in many places of America, except the 
government of small Families, the concord whereof dependeth on naturall lust, have no 
government at all” (89).  He thus distinguishes between “the government of small 
Families,” which is part of the state of nature, and all other forms of socio-political 
association.  This directly opposes Mather’s insistence on “Family Government” as the 
key to resisting a rising tide of “Indianization” (Decennium luctuousum 212).  As Teresa 
Toulouse notes, it is from “Family Government” that “[a]ll other [Puritan] social 
institutions follow” (“Sovereignty” 936), a conception that flips Hobbes’ notion of family 
on its head.   
 
Hobbes’ statement might seem to allow for such a reformulation, however, since he 
himself equivocates about whether or not the state of nature is an actual state in which 
people live or merely a theoretical construct.  Such equivocation appears strange given 
Hobbes’ insistence elsewhere in Leviathan on the relationship between lucid writing and 
lucid thought (25-6), but it makes sense if we consider the spatial and temporal confusion 
produced by his description of the state of nature.124  Given that one of Hobbes’ principal 
points is that a political state is not so much a location as a system for organizing 
relations between people, it is unsurprising that he would produce such a vague 
description, which places the state of nature everywhere and nowhere all at once.  Even 
his apparent precision in naming America as the location of the state of nature furthers 
                                                
 
124 Machiel Karskens’ reading of Hobbes suggests that contradiction is in fact a characteristic attribute of 
the state of nature, and a key element of its unattractiveness, inasmuch as “Hobbes assumes that nobody 
will want to tolerate the contradictions arising from the state of nature” (51). 
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such a reading since the lack of precise information about America available to Hobbes 
and his contemporaries made it fertile ground for their utopian imaginings.  The temporal 
confusion of his statement is still more problematic: there “peradventure … was never” 
any state of nature, but there is “now”?  Such a phrasing effectively precludes any 
possibility for a continuous historical narrative of the development of human political 
institutions, casting the state of nature as a timeless anti-ideal, capable of disrupting civil 
order at any given moment.  But why would one want to conceive such an ahistorical, 
decontextualized state? 
 
Precisely because of the fear of custom itself.  Hobbes is well aware of custom’s power: 
much like Michel de Montaigne, he grants that custom operates in a fashion that 
overtakes reason, stating that “Ignorance of the causes, and originall constitution of 
Right, Equity, Law, and Justice, disposeth a man to make Custome and Example the rule 
of his actions; in such manner, as to think that Unjust which it hath been the custome to 
punish” (73).  As this statement makes clear, however, Hobbes, unlike Montaigne, 
believes it possible to distinguish reason-based laws from customs.  The concept of the 
state of nature is, for him, part of the project of reforming European political theory by 
using logic and reason to counteract the pernicious effects of historical example and legal 
precedent; it effectively wipes the slate clean so that Hobbes can work his way back up 
from the basic principles of natural law to a rationalist theory of political association 
centered around the contract between a sovereign and his subjects. 
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For Mather, too, the state of nature serves as a means of evading precedent, albeit for 
rather different ends than Hobbes’.  Mather’s account of Dustan’s captivity was 
published three times during his lifetime: in 1697, as part of Humiliations follow’d by 
Deliverances, which casts New England’s recent “humiliations” as “an hopeful symptom 
of our deliverance from calamity” ([a1]); in 1699, as part of his Decennium luctuosum, or 
“sorrowful decade,” an account of the years, 1688-1698, that encompassed King 
William’s War, during which New England was frequently raided by Native Americans; 
and finally, in 1702, as part of Magnalia Christi Americana, his theological history of the 
Puritan colonies of New England.  What these three works share is an erasure of any 
history of positive intercultural relations between the Puritans and the Native Americans 
and an insistence on the typological significance of the events related by Mather.  Indeed, 
one might say that Mather doesn’t merely erase this shared history, but refuses it, much 
as he refuses any possibility for relations with the Native Americans.125 
 
By grounding his defense of Dustan’s actions in a simultaneous appeal to the concept of 
the state of nature and to the biblical authority provided by the precedent of Jael, Mather 
carries out the doubly-articulated rhetorical maneuver that fuels this refusal of relations.  
The first step is to deny any shared history with the natives by insisting upon the absence 
of laws regulating the interaction of these two groups, thereby removing any possible 
ground for the Native American raid on Dustan’s home.  The second is to reinscribe that 
                                                
 
125 The title of his Epistle to the Christian Indians, giving them a short account, of what the English desire 
them to know and to do in order to their happiness, published in 1700, might seem to suggest that Mather 
was capable of a more conciliatory approach to the Native Americans.  However, the condescending, even 
demeaning tone of this work—Mather goes so far as to compare the natives to snakes in their relation to the 
English—quickly removes any such illusion. 
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emptied out space by calling upon another order of precedent to explain and justify her 
actions.  Nicholas Noyes’s introductory poem to Mather’s Magnalia relies on a similar 
logic, asserting that the history of the Native Americans “smother’d in everlasting silence 
lies” (1.19), while it lauds Mather’s role as the scribe of the New Englanders.  To 
remotivate one of Montaigne’s linguistic metaphors in light of Noyes’ praise, we might 
say that Mather scrapes clean the parchment of history with one hand, while filling in the 
blanks with the other.   
 
Mather’s usage, then, breaks with Hobbes’ intent, since he merely replaces historical and 
legal precedent with biblical precedent, or one kind of custom with another.  Despite 
Hobbes’ qualms about custom, however, Mather’s use of precedent is hardly mechanical 
and unthinking.  It is striking how in Mather’s writing—and in Puritan writing in 
general—biblical precedent operates like English Common Law, in which the 
interpretation of textualized accounts of earlier incidents serves as the central mechanism 
of legal reasoning.126  Ultimately, the reading of contemporary events through a 
typological frame serves a similar function to Common Law, offering set principles to 
guide one’s understanding while allowing a modicum of flexibility in responding to a 
changing world. 
 
This last commonality helps to explain the insistent metonymy of Mather’s writings.  
Mather’s metonymic play depends upon this constant shifting between seemingly 
                                                
 
126 As Lisa Gordis notes in Opening Scripture, Richard Hooker, the preeminent Elizabethan jurist, took 
issue with both the literalism and the textualism of the Puritans, particularly “their insistence that man was 
‘bound … to deduce all his actions out of scripture’” (115, citing Hooker Laws of Ecclesiasticall Politie 
2.97). 
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opposed frames of reference, a phenomenon that Sacvan Bercovitch identifies, in The 
American Jeremiad, as the “rhetoric of ambiguity” (82).  One of the key features of this 
rhetoric, as Teresa Toulouse notes, is that it “keep[s] believers insecure about what [i]s 
demanded of them … on interlinked personal/social levels” (“Rhetoric” 25).  Thus, the 
rhetoric of ambiguity serves as a form of ethical compulsion similar to legal discourse.  In 
other words, Mather shifts between this series of frames—spiritual/temporal, 
biblical/secular, familial/national, etc.—precisely because it enables him to establish the 
global importance of seemingly local events, and to thereby establish the proper 
behavioral boundaries for members of his community.   
 
As Toulouse further notes, Bercovitch’s understanding of the rhetoric of ambiguity 
emphasizes its “capacity … to hold apparent differences together” (“Rhetoric” 47).  
Mather’s account of Dustan’s captivity certainly accomplishes this, bridging the gap 
between family and nation—one version of the personal/social split—through the middle 
term of kinship.  However, this rhetoric needs to be carefully managed since the free play 
between these frames of reference could produce unintended, and undesirable, 
interpretations.  For instance, when Mather makes kinship the crucial site of socio-
political identification, the state of nature lurks in the background as a sort of anti-
identification produced by moving from one kin group—and thus one community—to 
another.  Read from a different angle, Mather is acceding here to the notion that 
international relations are, at some vital level, a function of kinship relations.  This set of 
associations opens up the possibility that political relations with Native Americans 
presage future kin relations between the two groups.  Ultimately, then, Mather’s refusal 
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of relations must be understood as a refusal to see the Native Americans as a potential 
part of his kin group: “We aren’t related to them, so we can’t relate to them.”  Thus, 
while this rhetoric of ambiguity may bridge certain differences, it also requires an 
insistence on certain others. 
 
 
“THERE IS A FRIEND WHICH STICKETH CLOSER THAN A BROTHER” 
 
While Mather provides us with the most explicit invocation of the state of nature, the 
Puritan conception of kinship as the cornerstone of national identity finds its fullest 
elaboration in Rowlandson’s account of her own captivity, during King Philip’s (or 
Metacom’s) War, some twenty years prior to Dustan’s.  In Rowlandson’s narrative the 
link between reuniting the family and preserving the nation is a dominant motif, serving 
as a catalyst for the aggressive rejection of any association with the Native Americans, 
including the so-called Praying Indians—those who adopted, to varying degrees, English 
religion, dress, and culture.  Paradoxically, Rowlandson resists any awareness of distinct 
cultural institutions among the Native Americans by casting their society as a demonic 
doubling of the Anglo-Puritan one. 
 
Several critics have emphasized how Rowlandson’s cultural awareness increases over the 
course of her captivity, either because of her sudden and intense immersion in Native 
American ways of life (Michelle Burnham 66-7), or because her survival requires it 
(Deborah J. Dietrich 432-3).   For feminist critics such as Dietrich and Lisa Logan this 
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increasing awareness goes hand-in-hand with a decreasing investment in the patriarchal 
power structures of Puritan society (Dietrich 428, Logan 270-4).  I would argue, 
however, that her narrative is in fact wholly devoted to preserving Puritan society and its 
patriarchal power structures.  Placing Rowlandson’s captivity narrative alongside 
Mather’s and Radisson’s allows us to see how completely she rejects any real 
engagement with Native American customs and society.  Observing the discursive 
consequences of Mather’s invocation of the state of nature we can now see how 
Rowlandson herself promulgates a discursive link between the supposedly duplicitous 
nature of the Indians and the commensurate disruption, if not destruction, of New 
England families—and thus New England society itself.  Further, where Mather takes the 
duplicity of the Native Americans, and the ultimate victory of the New Englanders, 
almost for granted, Rowlandson’s text displays a greater vitriol commensurate with the 
novelty of her rhetoric.  
 
While other critics have noted Rowlandson’s affirmation of the conventional, typological 
understanding of the Native Americans as God’s scourge to the community of the chosen, 
they have missed how she places the integrity of the nuclear family at the center of that 
larger community.  Perhaps this oversight occurs because of the fundamental tension 
within Puritan ideology itself regarding the family; while the Puritans, much like other 
Calvinists, emphasized the symbolic importance of the family as a hierarchical system,127 
                                                
 
127 Karen Newman, in Fashioning Femininity, remarks that Ephesians 6.22-25, which compares a husband 
at the head of a family to Christ at the head of the church, was one of the Biblical texts most frequently 
cited by Protestants writing about marital relations.  While this passage evinces the same metonymic logic 
as Mather’s, Newman wisely cautions us against seeing these figures based on analogy as strictly literal, 
noting that the patriarchal conception of the family “was a construct, not a given” (17).  Put in slightly 
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they also believed that grace could not be passed from one family member to another.  
An extreme example of this can be found in Michael Wigglesworth’s popular poem, “The 
Day of Doom,” in which “The godly wife conceives no grief, / nor can she shed a tear / 
For the sad state of her dear Mate, / when she his doom doth hear” (60, ll. 1573-1576). 
 
Though Rowlandson ends her narrative with a phrase that could well have been drawn 
from Wigglesworth’s poem—that “outward things … are but a shadow, a blast, a bubble, 
and things of no continuance” (112)—throughout her narrative she insists upon the 
centrality of her family to her sense of identity.  The very structure of her narrative 
reinforces this point, framed by its “Commend[ation] … to her dear Children and 
Relations” (Frontispiece), beginning with her violent separation from two of her children, 
and ending not with the end of her captivity, but with the ransom and return of those very 
children.  Her story is complete, in other words, when her family is reunited.128  Even 
between these endpoints, Rowlandson’s narrative is punctuated by a series of pivotal 
encounters with her son (74, 81, 84, etc.), and instances when her captors refuse to let her 
see her daughter (75, 102).  Reading the concluding line of her text in this light suggests 
not the radically affectless “Mate” of Wigglesworth’s poem, but someone genuinely 
disturbed by the possibility that her family will be dismembered again in the future. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
different terms, we might say that Mather’s writings are no less figurative than Bradstreet’s, even if they 
are no longer metaphorical. 
 
128 Thus, as Lisa Logan argues, “[t]he work of the text, title, and preface is to recuperate and restore the 
position(s) of Mary Rowlandson, to restore her to her home” (266).  Or, if one accepts Mitchell 
Breitwieser’s interpretation of Rowlandson's text as a sign of incomplete mourning, we could say that her 
narrative is incomplete inasmuch as her family remains incomplete because of the death of her youngest 
daughter during their captivity. 
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Rowlandson’s focus on her nuclear family might be taken to indicate that she does not 
share in Mather’s use of the concept of kinship as a means of demonstrating the 
continuity between the family and the state.  Indeed, it would certainly be possible to read 
Rowlandson’s narrative as bolstering Lawrence Stone’s argument that the cultural 
significance of kinship in England declined after 1630, giving way to the nuclear family 
on one hand and the nation-state on the other (124; cited in Gaunt 280).  This is 
especially true given that her ongoing concern for the welfare of her children and her 
husband is paralleled by her lament at being removed from an English world—one where 
even cattle, fields, and paths can be identified as English (81).  And yet, if we look more 
closely at her laments, we can see that kinship occupies a place of central importance in 
her thinking.  Thus, in her first remove, she says: 
 
All was gone, my Husband gone (at least separated from me . . . ) my 
Children gone, my Relations and Friends gone, our House and home and 
all our comforts within door, and without, all was gone, (except my life) 
and I knew not but the next moment that might go too. (71) 
 
This passage provides a striking glimpse into how Rowlandson has mentally arranged her 
world into a series of concentric rings: husband, children, relations and friends.  As this 
arrangement suggests, the nuclear family takes precedence in her narration, but it is never 
far removed from a consideration of a larger community of kin, itself implicitly 
constituted of other nuclear families like Rowlandson’s own.   
 
Despite this implicitly biological ground for a linking of family and nation through 
kinship relations, Rowlandson uses the words “friends” and “relations” several times over 
the course of her narrative to apply to people who are not her kin in any clear biological 
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sense (70, 71, 73, 81, 84, 87, etc.).  The people who help her and her husband after their 
reunion are called both “passionate Friends” and “compassionate Christians,” and they 
offer “their love” to the Rowlandsons as well as their material support, an indication that 
this larger kin community is defined more by its social relations than its biological ones 
(108, 110-1).  This sense is reinforced by Rowlandson’s quotation of Proverbs 18.24: 
“There is a friend which sticketh closer than a brother” (111).  This proverbial phrase 
reads like Wigglesworth flipped on his head: rather than the affectless family we find a 
larger community based upon mutual affection. 
 
Rowlandson’s identification of “friends” with “Christians” is all the more suggestive 
given that she likewise uses the word “English” almost interchangeably with “Christian.”  
The overlap between these three terms points to the larger continuity between the distinct 
circles of Rowlandson’s world, making explicit the link between family and nation that 
remains submerged in Mather’s own set of metonymies.  While friends and family seem, 
from one perspective, to belong to different spheres—as Rowlandson puts it, “within 
door” and “without”—the reciprocal nature of kin relations, emblematized by Christian 
charity, binds them together under an aegis of Englishness (71).  In other words, where 
Stone sees kin splitting off into the nuclear family and the nation-state, Rowlandson 
shows it to be the conceptual bridge between those two institutions. 
 
This overlapping series of identity markers—Friend, Christian, English—also serves, as 
it later will for Mather, to ward off any possibility that Native Americans could somehow 
become kin.  Thus, Rowlandson often performs her metonymic slight of hand—
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”English” used for “Christian” and vice versa—when she wants to insist on the 
“Heathen” nature of all “Indians,” including “Praying Indians” (98).  By the time Mather 
writes Decennium luctuosum, this metonymy is all but automatic, but in Rowlandson’s 
text it occupies a contested position as part of an ongoing debate in the New England 
community about the larger significance of King Philip’s War vis-à-vis Anglo-Puritan 
relations with Native American peoples. 
 
Indeed, part of the initial justification for the colonial project had been to proselytize and 
convert the native population of the Americas—thus the seal of the Massachusetts Bay 
colony depicts a Native American man appealing to the English to “come over and help 
us.”  Though Philip Round has shown that proselytization of the natives was not always 
foremost in the minds of the settlers, he also notes that the Puritans initially “interacted 
with the native people not as reified ‘others’ but as social agents of considerable 
importance” (205).  Furthermore, Puritans like John Eliot, who produced a translation of 
the Bible into Algonquian, took a particular interest in converting the Native Americans 
and encouraged them to settle in “praying towns,” where they could adopt an English 
way of life (Salisbury 14-5).  Eliot’s zeal was rare, but relations between Native 
Americans and English colonists were generally peaceful; during the Pequot War, the 
only major New England conflict prior to King Philip’s War, the English even fought 
alongside the Narragansett and other groups they would later fight against.  Thus, in Neal 
Salisbury’s succinct turn of phrase, King Philip’s War “was not a war between strangers 
but rather one between neighbors … one in which people who had long coexisted rather 
abruptly concluded that they could no longer do so peacefully” (2).   
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Paradoxically, the success of Eliot’s praying towns may have helped lead to this violent 
conclusion.  In his account of the events leading up to King Philip’s War, Salisbury 
makes a strong case for such an interpretation—examining such documentary evidence as 
an account of a meeting between the Wampanoag sachem, Metacom, known by the 
English as King Philip, and John Easton, the Governor of Rhode Island—to demonstrate 
how the pressures of converting to Christianity worked alongside those of imported 
alcohol and the sale of traditional lands to destabilize Native American communities and 
undermine their relationship with their English neighbors (18-9; see also John Easton’s 
“A Relacion of the Indyan Warre” in Lincoln 8-12).  The proximate cause for the war 
may well have been the death of John Sassamon, a Native American convert who, in 
Salisbury’s words, “had struggled to reconcile the growing chasm between the Indians 
and the English” (21).  Sassamon had served as an interpreter for Metacom for over a 
decade when, in March of 1675, he informed the Plymouth Governor Josiah Winslow 
that Metacom was preparing for war against the colony.  Soon afterwards, he was found 
dead in a pond.  The subsequent trial pitted the English colonists against unconverted 
Native Americans, with the Praying Indians placed squarely in the middle.  War broke 
out less than a month after the trail’s conclusion. 
 
In one sense, the cause of King Philip’s War was the problem of conversion itself.  As we 
saw in Marie de l’Incarnation’s writings, religious conversion is often tantamount to a 
total conversion of identity.  Much as her mission to educate the Native American 
children required bringing them into the cloister and teaching them an entirely new way 
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of life, the Puritan mission insisted on settling the natives in segregated farming 
communities based around a church.  But while both French and English settlers 
demanded religious and political faithfulness from Native Americans, the Puritan strategy 
hints at a deeper ambivalence about the desirability of completely incorporating them into 
the body of the church and the body politic.  Thus, while Sassamon’s fate speaks to the 
difficulty and danger of living between two cultures, what Rowlandson’s narrative 
reveals is how this same danger fuels the Puritan refusal of relations with the Native 
Americans, driving them to misread, or reject outright, evidence of distinct Native 
American ways of life.   
 
The interactions between Rowlandson and her “mistress,” the Squaw-Sachem Weetamoo, 
are an illuminating case of this forcible misprision.  Notably, Rowlandson names 
Weetamoo only once in her text, generally referring to her instead simply as her 
“mistress,” or as “King Philip’s wife’s sister.”  As Laura Arnold has noted, the effect of 
this is to redefine Weetamoo’s social status in Anglo-American terms, making her title 
wholly dependent on her male relations (11-12).  Rowlandson’s repeated insistence upon 
this “redefinition,” which results from both a noncomprehension of and a refusal to 
accept Algonquian cultural practices, leads to a series of violent confrontations between 
her and her “mistress.”  Rather than seeing that these conflicts result from her perceived 
misbehavior, however, Rowlandson blames the inconstant behavior of her captors, saying 
“Sometimes I met with favour, and sometimes with nothing but frowns” (85). 
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Rowlandson is hardly the only European, of course, to accuse Native Americans of 
inconstancy or, as she does later in her narrative, duplicitiousness.  In Rowlandson’s text, 
however, this assumption of duplicity operates as an implicit evocation of the state of 
nature.  Her refusal to relate to or with her captors is grounded in their supposed inability 
to relate to her because of their lack of stable social institutions.  In other words, 
Rowlandson’s problem with the Native Americans is that they have no customs, or at 
least none that she can discern.  Furthermore, the few custom-like activities they engage 
in are, in her assessment, simply demonic corruptions of Christian, English practices. 
 
Rowlandson’s obsession with this demonic doubling produces some of the most 
fascinating passages in her narrative.  At these moments her writing often slips into a 
proto-ethnographic mode.  Thus, she exhaustively lists native foodstuffs, from “Harty-
choaks” to “the very Bark of Trees” (105-6), and provides a detailed account of a 
ceremony performed by a “Powaw” (100-1).  And yet, Rowlandson frames these 
passages in a way that dehumanizes the Native Americans, insisting that “many times 
they eat would that, that a Hog or a Dog would hardly touch” (105), and that emphasizes 
their lack of an independent culture, recasting the ceremony as a devilish reworking of 
Christian ritual practices organized by a Praying Indian and carried out on the Sabbath 
(99-101).  The discourse of custom thus serves Rowlandson the ironic purpose of 
demonstrating that Native Americans lack a coherent body of customs. 
 
As the last example suggests, the Praying Indians make a convenient target for 
Rowlandson, since their position between two cultures leaves them especially open to the 
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charge of duplicity.  Fittingly, then, much of Rowlandson’s vitriol is reserved for those 
passages where she provides lists of the unchristian behavior engaged in by Praying 
Indians, such as betraying their own family members, or wearing the fingers of other—
English—Christians around their necks (98-99).  These lists reinforce the kin-based logic 
of Rowlandson’s narrative, illustrating how she places those natives who seek to convert 
in an impossible double bind: in becoming Christian, they are cast as unfaithful to their 
families, which is unchristian; in being faithful to their families, they are pitted against 
other Christians, which is also unchristian.   
 
Ultimately, Rowlandson’s text presents the continuum of family-kin-nation as a closed 
circle.  Relations within that circle are characterized by a together-feeling—a “com-
passion”—that is undergirded by a set of social institutions and practices, such as living 
in houses, raising cattle, and marking the Sabbath in Christian worship.  Those who try to 
breach that circle by adopting these institutions and practices, however, only serve to 
reinforce its integrity; thus the true identity of a “company of Indians … on horseback … 
dressed in English Apparel” is given away by their “foul looks,” so unlike the “lovely 
faces of Christians” (94).  For Rowlandson, then, custom is a vital part of identity, but it 
is not in itself a sufficient ground for identity; to be Christian, or English, or a Friend, one 
must be all three at once.   
 
 
“WITHOUT THINKING FROM WHENCE I CAME” 
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Where Rowlandson’s narrative insists on the fixity and certainty of a Christian, English 
identity grounded in the integrity of the nuclear family, it also portrays the society that 
this identity underpins as under attack.  Rowlandson’s implicit distinction between a 
strong communal identity and a threatened community performs much the same function 
as Mather’s toggling between personal and social frames of reference, goading the 
Puritan colonists to hew to orthodox social practices, yet this very function indicates that 
their communal identity is more fragile than Rowlandson is willing to admit.  As with 
Mather’s unacknowledged acceptance that kin relations and international relations are 
inextricably linked, seeing Rowlandson’s uncertainty and doubt requires us not so much 
to read against the grain of the text as to attend to possibilities that it opens and then 
closes off.   
 
At one particularly charged moment in her narrative the certainty of her communal 
identity seems to break down, leaving Rowlandson momentarily open to the possibility of 
conversion to a Native American way of life: 
 
And here I cannot but remember how many times sitting in their 
Wigwams, and musing on things past, I should suddenly leap up and out, 
as if I had been at home, forgetting where I was, and what my condition 
was: But when I was without, and saw nothing but Wilderness, and 
Woods, and a company of barbarous heathens: my mind quickly returned 
to me. (88) 
 
The complex temporal layering of this passage provokes as many questions as it answers.  
In the narrated moment, Rowlandson seems to move from remembering her Puritan life, 
to forgetting that she is not among her Puritan “Friends and Relations” but rather sitting 
in a “Wigwam,” to finally remembering that she is in the “Wilderness.”  At the moment of 
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her narrating, these rememberings and forgettings are collapsed into a single act of 
remembering that evades part of the significance of Rowlandson’s temporary confusion, 
translating a momentary loss of mind into the continuous possession of a Christian 
English identity.  And yet, these three movements do not quite line up with the logico-
temporal shifts marked in the passage by the two colons, which remind us that 
Rowlandson’s remembering of her Puritan life is simultaneous with her forgetting that 
she is not in her Puritan life. 
 
The moment of uncertainty is brief, and yet for that moment the wigwam is 
Rowlandson’s home.  This passage thus suggests that Rowlandson’s abiding fear of 
social disintegration—embodied by the dismemberment of her family—is based as much 
on her half-acknowledged understanding that she could be “home” somewhere else, and 
so responsible herself for that disintegration, as it is based on her conviction that the 
Native Americans will attack again.  The implication of this moment, then, is that the 
Christian, English identity Rowlandson constructs in her narrative is a far more fragile 
thing than she is willing to say explicitly.  More than that, however, it illuminates why 
she and Mather seek to build such elaborate discursive barriers around it and, most 
particularly, to suggest that it is so entirely natural that cannot be acquired, even through 
the kind of religious and social conversion undertaken by the Praying Indians.  This core 
of fragility is precisely what leads Rowlandson, as it later will Mather, to circle their 
symbolic wagons and produce a conception of Anglo-Puritan identity that fuses nation 
(underwritten by family and kin) and religion.  By reconfiguring (and re-figuring) their 
identity on these grounds, and insisting on its exclusivity, Mather and Rowlandson hope 
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to make it appear ontologically necessary and self-evident next to the increasingly 
slippery terrain of custom. 
 
Pierre-Espirit Radisson’s captivity narrative illustrates, like Rowlandson’s, the truth of 
Ernest Renan’s observation that a nation is created as much by forgetting as it is by 
remembering (“Qu’est-ce qu’une nation?” 174, 194; “What is a Nation?” 11, 19).  In 
Radisson’s narrative, however, remembering and forgetting are much more sudden and 
personal things than they are in Renan’s conception, and much less stable and containable 
than they are in Rowlandson’s.  From moment to moment in his captivity narrative 
Radisson’s sense of self shifts as different factors come to the fore in his thoughts, and 
the way in which these factors influence his decisions remains incompletely intelligible 
even to himself as he narrates these events more than fifteen years after they occurred.  
Yet, for all the reversals of Radisson’s text, there is one constant that holds not only in 
this early narrative, but also in those he would later write.  While Radisson’s national 
allegiance is often in flux, the primary factor in determining that allegiance remains his 
understanding at that given moment of who his family is.  Indeed, Radisson’s closest 
bond in the course of his life was to his brother-in-law, Médard Chouart des 
Groseilliers—brother-in-law, of course, being a form of adopted family relation based on 
alliance.  Their bond was so close that one of the voyages which Radisson narrates in his 
first manuscript from a first person—and frequently first person plural—perspective, was 
in fact undertaken by his brother-in-law alone (see Germaine Warkentin “Styles” 24). 
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Radisson had been born in Paris in 1636, but during his peripatetic lifetime he bore 
allegiance to at least three different nations—France, England, and Iroquoia.  This 
strange path was possible because, in 1651, Radisson made the voyage to New France, to 
settle with his step-mother and his half-sister in Trois-Rivières.  Scarcely a year after his 
arrival, Radisson was captured by Iroquois warriors and adopted into a Mohawk family; 
he would live with them for almost two years before escaping to Fort Orange and 
eventually returning to New France.  After his return, Radisson and his brother-in-law 
made a series of illegal trading missions that ultimately attracted the attention of the 
Governor of New France and resulted in their move to Halifax, where a primarily French 
population lived under English rule.  From Halifax the brothers traveled to New England 
and then to England where, from the mid-1660s until 1674 they played a vital role in the 
establishment of the Hudson’s Bay Company, making business connections with such 
prominent Londoners as Samuel Pepys.  In the 1680s, Radisson briefly returned to France 
to try and further his career, but he ended up back in England by 1686 and remained there 
until his death in 1710. 
 
During the course of his life, Radisson produced several manuscript accounts of his 
voyages—in both French and English.  His first four voyages are recorded in a single, 
English-language manuscript in the Bodleian Library; two later voyages survive in 
multiple editions, including a special presentation copy that had been made for James II 
and which is housed in Windsor Castle.  While all of these voyages speak to the dynamic 
transformations of Radisson’s identity, his captivity narrative, the first “voyage” recorded 
in the Bodleian manuscript, gives special insight into the fragility of national identity, 
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showing us the difficulties encountered by someone who crosses from one nation into 
another, becoming, as Mather would have put it, “Indianized,” or, as we might, 
cosmopolitan.  Rather than suppressing the dynamics of this crossing over, however, 
Radisson grants them a central place in his narrative, giving an explicit, if sometimes 
opaque, account of his shifting sense of self.  That said, Radisson’s narrative, like 
Rowlandson’s, evinces the persistence of kinship as a means for understanding relations 
between nations.  But Radisson struggles much more actively with how to define kinship 
for himself, grappling with the social, political, and even the commercial consequences of 
his various redefinitions of who counts as kin.  
 
Radisson’s narrative begins much like Rowlandson’s, with the violent interruption of 
normal daily life.  Radisson sets off with his friends one morning on a hunting excursion 
outside Trois Rivières.  Briefly separated from his fellow hunters, he stumbles upon their 
mutilated bodies.  Realizing they have been slain by Iroquois warriors, he tries to evade 
detection, but ends up being surrounded and captured by the Iroquois men, whom he 
describes—in words that could easily be Rowlandson’s or Mather’s—as “dogs, or rather 
devils” (3).  After his initial capture, though, Radisson’s trajectory begins to differ from 
Rowlandson’s.  Rather than being enslaved, he is adopted into a Mohawk family, taking 
the name of their deceased son, Ovinha.  This adoption is hardly a singular event.  As 
Roland Viau explains, captive war “était partie intégrante du rituel de deuil dans les 
sociétés iroquoiennes” (18), the aim of such wars being to take prisoners who could serve 
as suitable replacements for members of the community who had been lost.129  This 
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practice would seem to be fundamentally at odds with the Hobbesian state of nature, 
invoked by Mather and evoked by Rowlandson’s narrative as well.  War, for the Iroquois, 
becomes not a breakdown of relations, but rather a strategy for producing new ones.  Yet, 
the tension between kinship and the state of nature drives Radisson’s captivity narrative 
as well.  Since, as Gaunt recognizes, kinship relations emphasize the uniqueness and 
distinctness of particular groups of people, integration into a new kin group threatens to 
undermine one’s previous identity.  Indeed, Radisson’s formal adoption ceremony 
actually seems to be an attempt to assuage the confusion produced by his captivity.   
 
In the scene which leads to this adoption, Radisson begins by noting that he has a 
“troubled … mind” because he has “lived five weeks without thinking from whence I 
came.”  The Mohawk woman who will become Radisson’s mother notices his distress 
and asks him “whether [he is] Asserony, a French.”  Radisson insists that he is not 
French, but rather “Ganugaga, that is, of their nation” (11).  Thus, in Radisson’s 
narrative, as in Rowlandson’s, kinship seems to function exclusively, demanding that one 
identify as a member of this group or that.  Moreover, Radisson likewise presents kin 
relations as part of a continuum that extends from the nuclear family to the nation.  
Where the two authors differ is in Rowlandson’s refusal of relations with her captors, and 
Radisson’s acceptance of them.  Following his adoption, however, Radisson discovers 
that becoming a Mohawk is not as simple as stating that he is of their nation.   
 
                                                                                                                                            
129 “War was an integral part of the ritual of mourning in Iroquois societies” (translation mine).  Radisson’s 
narrative reminds us of the significant role played by the distinct practices of various Native American 
communities: Rowlandson was captured by Algonquians and her treatment as a slave, albeit one with a 
particular political importance, was in keeping with Algonquian customs. 
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Thus, Radisson’s integration into Mohawk society proceeds in stages as he slowly 
acquires familiarity with their customs, enabling him to behave in a fashion that 
convinces his new family and his new nation of his successful conversion.  Unlike 
Champlain and other earlier French explorers, Radisson’s status in the Mohawk 
community does not rely on the mechanisms of “fictive kinship” as it is generally 
understood by anthropologists and sociologists.  Where Champlain distributed gifts to the 
Native Americans he met, casting himself as a symbolic father, his relation of these 
encounters indicates that he focused on the utility of his gift-giving as a social convention 
that could be used to loosen tongues, encourage trade, or even form a political alliance 
(see, for example, Champlain Works 3.43-5, 96-101).130  For Radisson, his Mohawk 
family is his family.  Champlain treats kinship as a tactic, a tool that has its uses, but 
requires little by way of future commitment; for Radisson, kinship means that he has to 
transform his identity completely, taking a new set of customs as his own, and with them 
a new set of social obligations.  
 
Ultimately these obligations prove more difficult to negotiate than Radisson can handle.  
He strives to become an exemplary member of Mohawk society, proudly insisting that he 
be allowed to join a war party with his adoptive brother and several other young Mohawk 
men, but this expedition ends up forcing Radisson to confront a deep-seated ambivalence 
about his identification with the Mohawks.  While the group is hunting for beavers, they 
                                                
 
130 I should note that Garrad reads these encounters as evidence that Champlain did not in fact understand 
the symbolic importance of the gift exchanges and feasts he engaged in (“Champlain and the Odawa” 59-
65).  I find it difficult to accept, however, that Champlain did not grasp something of the symbolism of 
these interactions given his extensive and effective use of such customary practices as a means of garnering 
information and aid from his Native American allies. 
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meet an Algonquian man who claims to be an ally.  He later takes Radisson aside and 
reveals his desire to return to New France.  Radisson tells the Algonquian that he, too, 
wants to return, though he notes for his readers that he “did not intend it” (13).  Radisson 
then asks the Algonquian whether he loves his own nation; when the man says that he 
does, Radisson replies that he too loves his own nation–although he does not specify 
what nation he means.  At this point in his narrative it may seem that he in fact means the 
Mohawks, but when the man reveals his plan to kill the Mohawks and flee to New 
France, Radisson “[a]t last … consent[s], considering [that] they were mortal enemies to 
[his] country, [and] that [they] had cut the throats of so many of [his] relations.”  At the 
very moment, though, when they are to carry out their plan, Radisson tells the reader that 
he “was loathsome to do them mischief that never did [him] any,” but then “for the above 
said reasons” he takes a hatchet and murders the Mohawks anyway (13). 
 
It would be tempting to attribute these reversals to a simple survival instinct, and thus to 
argue that kin relations are in fact less important for Radisson than for Rowlandson, were 
it not for his repeated insistence upon the terms of kinship as a way to make sense of his 
experience.  This passage shows Radisson trying to balance his social debts to two 
different kin groups, calculating whether the blood of his (French) relations demands that 
he spill the blood of his (Mohawk) relations, a situation that captures perfectly the 
intractability of kinship and exposes the instability of identity itself.  What it reveals, in 
other words, is the threat of social disintegration lurking in the heart of social order.  This 
is the threat that caused Rowlandson and Mather to close off any possibility of relations 
between the Anglo-American colonists and their Native American counterparts as well as 
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their reciprocal insistence upon the fundamental link between family, kin, and nation.  
What Radisson’s captivity shows us, however, is his continued commitment to thinking 
through kinship as a means of relating to the Mohawks, and thus the possibility for 




“FILIATIVE STOCK AND CIRCULATING CAPITAL” 
 
Radisson’s willingness to accommodate to a Native American way-of-life proves a 
source of greater conflict than that which Rowlandson experiences, yet it provides the 
basis for his successful career as an international merchant.  Of course, such an ability to 
work with members of other national communities is not without its costs: throughout his 
life Radisson was cast under a veil of suspicion, falling out of favor with the Governor of 
New France; then with the colonial authorities in Halifax, Nova Scotia; and, later, being 
forced to shuttle between England and France during the building tensions before the 
outbreak of King William’s War.  In the end, however, Radisson’s success as a merchant 
relies precisely upon his ability to cast himself as kin to people from a wide range of 
nations, both European and Native American, and to negotiate the conflicting demands 
that those relations produce. 
 
Radisson’s “Fifth Voyage,” the account of a trading mission to Hudson’s Bay that he 
undertook on behalf of France in 1682, gives us a good sense of how the responsibility to 
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commercial and royal patrons complicates the negotiation of social debts with which 
Radisson so visibly struggled during his captivity.  Yet, this narrative also shows us a 
more mature Radisson, capable of rising to the challenge posed by his ever-changing 
circumstances.  This maturity comes across most clearly in the formal and stylistic 
qualities of the “Fifth Voyage.”  Where the captivity narrative offers us an 
impressionistic series of events with a minimum of obvious authorial intrusion, the “Fifth 
Voyage” is an insistently self-conscious text, marked by a careful use of prolepsis to 
control the disclosure of information to his readers, creating a sense of suspense, and by 
its more argumentative tone, indicative of the more active role that Radisson takes in 
shaping the events of this narrative. 
 
Before Radisson even comes to his récit de voyage as such, he gives us a polemical 
prologue that frames his narrative as a defense of his actions against charges against him 
in the French courts by Lord Preston, Charles II’s “envoy extraordinary” (204): 
 
In the first place, I think myself obliged to vindicate myself from the 
imputation of inconstancy for acting in this voyage against the English 
interest, and in the year 1683 against the French interests, for which, if I 
could not give a very good account, I might justly lie under the sentence of 
capriciousness and inconstancy. … I have no cause to believe that I in the 
least deserve to be taxed with lightness or inconstancy for the 
employments wherein I … engaged, although they were against the 
interests of the [Hudson’s Bay] Company, for it is sufficiently known that 
my brother and myself … did all that was possible for persons of courage 
and honor to perform for the advantage and profit of the said Company [in 
the past].  (161) 
 
In this passage, Radisson expresses his sense of obligation to demonstrate a constancy of 
allegiance, a sentiment based on the conflation of royal and national identity that 
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remained important to many North American colonists during the seventeenth century.  
The problem of shifting and dubious allegiance to “king and country” was hardly a new 
one, but in Radisson’s case it is complicated by a sense of corporate allegiance to the 
Hudson’s Bay Company.131  Yet a further wrinkle is Radisson’s insistence that he and his 
brother-in-law both worked as an extension of the company, a co-identification that 
seems wholly in keeping with his earlier use of the first person plural to narrate a voyage 
that only his brother took.  This intermingling of family, corporate, royal, and national 
interests occasionally becomes a problem for Radisson, as when the French Minister 
Colbert delays Radisson’s employment because his (English) wife remains in England 
(163).  But it also works to his benefit, since he, by employing members of his family—
like his nephew, John Baptiste des Groselliers—can expect a greater degree of loyalty, 
and further their careers at the same time (167).   Where Martin Fournier claims that 
“Radisson … appears … as a wholly ‘modern’ man, mobile and preoccupied with his 
own self interest” (108), I find Germaine Warkentin’s assessment, that Radisson 
“speak[s] to us from the centre of a set of verbal stratagems designed to maintain the 
place of [a rhetorical] ‘I’ within … competing [interest] groups” (“Language” 312), more 
convincing.  Indeed, I would go further than Warkentin and claim that Radisson’s “I” is 
profoundly determined by his relations to other people. 
 
Of course Radisson’s baldly commercial language here—”advantage,” profit,” and, 
perhaps most tellingly, “interest”—suggests an impersonal calculation is at work in this 
                                                
 
131  As A. J. B. Johnston notes, many of the customs designed to cope with the problem of shifting 
allegiance, such as loyalty oaths, had their roots in Feudal Europe.  These practices remained common in 
the New World into the seventeenth and even eighteenth century, particularly in areas, like Acadia/Nova 
Scotia, which changed hands several times over the course of the colonial period. 
  179 
narrative, yet the account that Radisson gives of his actions demonstrates that this appeal 
to “interest” serves as a principle of identification rather than a mechanism for distancing 
himself from personal responsibility to others.  It would certainly be possible to see his 
use of “interest” as the result of a poverty of vocabulary; to say, that is, that Radisson, if 
not the English and French languages themselves, lacked a way of addressing these 
complicated issues of identity politics more directly.132  However, the critical re-
evaluation of structuralist anthropology by Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari opens up 
another possible avenue of interpretation that allows us to see how Radisson’s word 
choice in fact illuminates a deep relationship between family and commerce.   
 
As Deleuze and Guattari observe, kinship systems are traditionally understood as having 
a vertical axis, based on lineage, and a horizontal axis, based on alliance (171/146).  In 
many kin systems, the lineal axis is conceptually dominant, with marriage alliances 
resulting merely in the incorporation of a new member into an existing family tree; 
however, in more mercantile societies, alliance is conceptually dominant, serving as the 
basis of extended consortial arrangements that play a central role in the economic 
organization of the larger community (see Gaunt 265-7).  Deleuze and Guattari go further 
than their anthropologist counterparts in the economic characterization of the interplay of 
                                                
 
132 The discourse of cosmopolitan sophistication that Radisson would need to explain his international 
profile was not yet open to him, though it would be to later authors such as the Baron Louis de Lahontan 
who moved between French, Native American, English, and other European communities.  The notion of a 
sensus communis had yet to be articulated by Lord Shaftesbury, and any appeal to disinterest would have 
been compromised by the competing contemporary senses of that word—the object of disinterest being 
both something in which one has no interest and something which is contrary to one’s interest.  The entry 
for “disinterest” in the OED lists examples of this first meaning from the 1682 edition of Joseph 
Glanville’'s Lux orientalis and the 1699 edition of John Norris’ A Collection of Miscellanies and an early 
example of the second meaning from James Webb’s 1658 translation of the eighth part of La Calprenède’s 
Hymen's Praeludia or Cléopâtre. 
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these axes, suggesting that “[f]iliation et alliance sont comme les deux formes d’un 
capital primitif, capital fixe ou stock filiatif, capital circulant ou blocs mobiles de dettes” 
(172).133  Working from this analogy, Deleuze and Guattari insist on the importance of 
alliance as a means of keeping a society politically and economically open (175/148).  
Radisson’s own circulation between national communities—French, English, Mohawk, 
Algonquian, etc.—and the mercantile success he derives from it speak to the deep 
explanatory power of this analogy.  Radisson’s openness to the possibility of kin relations 
with Native Americans thus translates not only into a form of international relations that 
would be anathema to his Puritan counterparts, but also into profitable economic 
relations.  If anything, the concept of “interest” serves Radisson as an ethical injunction 
to avoid harming others, since it encourages him to remain ever-open to the possibility of 
a strategic alliance: anyone, in theory, might become his kin.   
 
Superficially, Radisson’s use of kin relations to negotiate political and commercial 
relationships may appear indistinguishable from Champlain’s gift-giving.  But we can 
isolate two features of Radisson’s practice that set it apart from Champlain’s, both of 
which speak to the lasting influence of Radisson’s captivity.  The first is Radisson’s 
openness to native customs, which goes beyond mere accommodation: while Champlain 
would meet with his native counterparts and feast with them, he did not absorb their 
customs in the same way that Radisson did.  The second is Radisson’s reluctance to 
engage in violence, even in those instances where kin relations would seem to demand it.  
Champlain happily gave military aid to his native allies, as part of a reciprocal 
                                                
133 “[F]iliation and alliance are like the two forms of primitive capital: fixed capital or filiative stock, and 
circulating capital or blocks of debts” (146). 
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expectation that the French would enjoy the protection of these allies.  Radisson, on the 
other hand, perhaps affected by the violent outcome of his youthful identity confusion, 
resists such engagements, preferring to resolve conflict diplomatically. 
 
Following the interplay between these two features of Radisson’s mode of operation 
through the course of the “Fifth Voyage,” we can see how these two traits ultimately 
reinforce each other.  The political environment surrounding this voyage was particularly 
heated, with England and France gearing up for King William’s War.  The status of their 
North American colonies and territories, including Hudson’s Bay, played an important 
role in the burgeoning mutual hostility.  During Radisson’s voyage for the French, he had 
to deal not only with local Native American groups, but also with a group of New 
Englanders engaged in illegal trading, and with a group from England that included the 
father of the New Englanders’ captain as well as several other men Radisson knew from 
his first stint with the Hudson’s Bay Company.  The situation was volatile, but Radisson 
managed to negotiate things so as to avoid a violent outcome, while simultaneously 
guaranteeing the success of his mission to trade for as many furs as possible. 
 
Near the beginning of his narrative, however, when Radisson first encounters Native 
Americans in the vicinity of his trading camp, his hewing to Native American practices 
and his steadfast desire to avoid bloodshed seem to be firmly at odds: 
 
I asked them who was their chief commander, speaking unto him 
unknownst to me.  He bowed the head, and another told me it was he that I 
talked unto.  Then I took him by the hand and, making him sit down, I 
spoke unto him according to the genius of the Indians, unto whom, if one 
will be esteemed, it is necessary to brag of one’s valor, of one’s strength 
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and ableness to succor and protect them from their enemies.  They must 
also be made to believe that one is wholly for their interest and have a 
great complaisance for them, especially in making them presents; this 
amongst them is the greatest band of friendship.… I said to him in his 
language, “I know all the earth.  Your friends shall be my friends, and I 
am come hither to bring you arms to destroy your enemies.  You nor your 
wife nor children shall not die of hunger, for I have brought merchandise.  
Be of good cheer.  I will be thy son, and I have brought thee a father.  He 
is yonder below, building a fort where I have 2 great ships.” (170) 
 
Radisson makes his understanding of the native way-of-life and way-of-thinking—the 
“genius of the Indians”—a point of boastful pride here, but in speaking according to that 
genius he emphasizes that he is empowering them to “destroy their enemies,” indicating 
his accession to the potentially violent demands of kinship.  The words he directs at his 
reader, however, do not quite line up with those he uses for his Native American 
audience, emphasizing the importance of “strength” in providing “succor” and 
“protect[ion] . . .  from their enemies.”  Further, Radisson’s bald statement that “they 
must be made to believe that one is wholly for their interest” implies that he is engaged in 
a duplicitous performance, rather than offering an earnest statement of his true intentions, 
in his dealings with the natives.  The overall effect of this passage, then, is to place 
Radisson’s engagement with Native American customs and his commitment to non-
violence in tension; the reader cannot finally decide whether Radisson’s negotiations are 
merely an act, or whether he indeed means to help these people destroy their enemies.   
 
Perhaps our first indication that such an either/or reading is not the best way to make 
sense of this passage comes two pages later, when Radisson first encounters a group of 
New Englanders who have come to trade for furs.  Radisson sees their ship before they 
see his, and he then hears them “pronouncing some words in the Indian tongue, which 
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they read in a book.”  Slyly testing their abilities, Radisson “sp[ea]k[s] to them in the 
Indian tongue and in French” (172), but they do not understand him, revealing their lack 
of practical knowledge.  Following so closely upon his own successful negotiations with 
the Native Americans, this failure to understand suggests that the New Englanders are, in 
truth, the ones engaged in an empty display, though Radisson’s understanding of their 
language hardly guarantees his truthfulness.  Still, Radisson’s repeated generosity to the 
New Englanders and the English, providing them with biscuits, other food, and even 
gunpowder, suggests that he is dealing in good faith (177, 183, 189, 194). 
 
In the end, Radisson’s dealings with the English and the New Englanders cast the 
interaction between Radisson’s ethos of non-violence and his reliance on the “Indian 
genius” for negotiating relations in a yet more complex light, making that relationship 
somewhat more clear, though still difficult to parse.  While Radisson deals favorably with 
his English and Anglo-American counterparts, he also takes stock of their resources 
while carefully cultivating in them a mistaken notion of his own by withholding 
information.  Ultimately, he plans to seize the New Englanders’ ship, “which,” he notes, 
“was a lawful prize, having no commission from England nor France to trade” (173).  
However, he insists that he will “not attempt anything rashly, for fear of missing [his] 
aim,” stressing his particular conviction to “avoid spilling blood” (173).   
 
Part of Radisson’s rationale for avoiding violence is that he lacks “men sufficient to resist 
with open force” (175), but later in the narrative, when he has an opportunity to overtake 
the English through direct and violent confrontation, Radisson prefers to put off the 
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confrontation—a decision which his brother-in-law criticizes (188).  In disagreeing with 
his brother-in-law, Radisson places a stress on their relationship, since his refusal implies 
that the bonds of kinship are less important than his duty to an Englishman who has been 
acting contrary to his interests and those of his kin.  Radisson’s Native American allies 
give voice to this logic after he complains to them about their dealings with the English: 
“Thou hast made us presents to make thine enemies become ours, and ours to be thine.  
We will not be found liars” (191).  And yet, Radisson’s own application of this logic is 
precisely what leads him to disagree with his brother.  
 
By providing the English and the New Englanders with the assistance they need, 
Radisson places them in his debt.  By incurring this debt, these groups voluntarily enter 
into relations with Radisson.  Even though he has no proof that they will reciprocate his 
gifts as such, the gifts establish an ongoing dialogue between the parties, one that enables 
Radisson’s later success.  In fact, many of the New Englanders and the English men, 
seeing Radisson’s beneficence, decide to join with him rather than remain with their own 
leaders, who prove incapable of providing the “succor” and “protection” that Radisson 
can offer (170).  Thus, while Radisson’s generosity does not guarantee full reciprocity, he 
acts as though it does in order to ensure that it might actually do so in the end.  Radisson 
thereby operates according to the “Indian genius” inasmuch as he extends his circle of 
friends and relations to potentially include anyone, and so he cannot allow himself to 
destroy his enemies since they may yet prove friends.  He, too, “will not be found a liar.”  
As he insists at the end of his narrative, he “endeavored in all [his] proceedings to 
discharge the part of an honest man and . . . thinks [that he] did no other” (205). 
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Of course, the paradox is that in order to not be a liar Radisson must be one, opposing his 
closest kin when it comes to the destruction of their enemies, and lying to his supposed 
enemies while he keeps them from starving to death.  Still, if Radisson, in his various 
negotiations, evinces something less than good faith, then it must also be said that he is 
hardly dealing in bad faith, either, since he still adheres to a principle of allegiance that 
exceeds the limited interests of those he is serving at a given moment.134   This principle 
of allegiance extends downwards as well as up, since Radisson accepts his responsibility 
for the welfare of those who serve him, and even, to a more limited degree, for those who 
might potentially serve him. 
 
Radisson’s radical extension of kinship eventually threatens the exclusive nature of 
kinship itself.  Further, it exposes the nuclear family as a product of custom rather than a 
natural state.  Thus, while Radisson’s international relationships radically destabilize the 
notion of a coherent and stable national identity, they also undermine the idea that 
animates Rowlandson’s text: that the state of nature is a necessary adjunct to kin 
relations.  Radisson’s respect for—and adoption of—different national customs and his 
adherence to a principle of non-violence serve as the cornerstones of an inclusive model 
of kinship that provides an alternative to the militant closure of Puritan society after King 
Philip’s War. 
                                                
 
134 Though I am using the notion of allegiance here in an expansive sense, Radisson is powerfully held by 
the claims of royal allegiance, too.  Thus, when one of the New Englanders, “discoursing of the privileges 
of New England, . . .  ha[s] the confidence to speak slightly of the best of kings [that is, King James II],” 
Radisson responds by “call[ing] him [a] pitiful dog for talking after that manner and t[ells] him that for 
[his] part, having had the honor to have been in His Majesty’s service, [he] would pray for His Majesty as 
long as [he] lived” (184). 
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As if to underline this alternative, Radisson’s narrative offers an example of what 
happens when relations fail, showing us the fate of those who fail to acknowledge their 
social debts.  After Radisson’s successful capture of the New Englander’s ship and fort, 
and his subsequent capture of several of the English men, Radisson returns to the English 
fort to find the leader of their trading mission, Mr. Bridgar, “in a sad condition, having 
drank to excess” (189).  Bridgar, who would later press charges against Radisson, had 
apparently been trying to kill one of his fellow Englishmen, who “desired to stay with” 
Radisson (189).  Seeing Radisson, Bridgar “speaks a thousand things against” him, and 
even threatens to kill him (189).  Radisson, rather than retaliating in kind, takes pity on 
Mr. Bridgar, and ensures that he will be able to return safely to England.  Murder, in 
Radisson’s ethical universe, is not the guarantor of national identity, but the last resort of 
someone who has been isolated from his own community. 
 
For Radisson to forbear killing his rivals is perhaps a politically expedient act, since it 
would likely have proven an obstacle to his eventual return to England—and thus to his 
wife—yet it also highlights the distance between his conception of kin relations and that 
of his Puritan counterparts, who condone killing in the name of family, nation, and God.  
Where Rowlandson and Mather insist on the family’s status as the symbolic lynchpin of 
nation, underwriting that synechdochal link with a carefully managed play of metonyms, 
Radisson pulls that lynchpin free and lets metonymy run wild, forming whatever 
alliances—political, commercial, and familial—that he can.  Radisson thereby reveals 
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family to be a product of custom, not merely, as the Puritans would like it to be, the seat 
of its reproduction. 
 
It is tempting to read the opposition between these two ways of understanding kin 
relations into two abstract principles that can potentially provide a meta-discourse of 
social relations.  Radisson’s emphasis on economic exchange invites the invocation of 
Adam Smith’s famous “invisible hand” of enlightened self-interest, working to guide 
human interactions on an ever upward course, while the Puritan insistence on war as the 
form of international relations explicitly calls upon Hobbes cynical assessment of human 
nature to justify a rhetorical embruting of their Native American neighbors.  This reading 
would seem to jibe with the anthropological opposition between the lineal and alliance-
based axes of kin relations and even to find support in Deleuze and Guattari’s 
characterization of these two axes as commercial and mythical (inasmuch as the Bible 
serves as a foundational mythology for Puritan society).   
 
There is evidence in both texts to support such a reading, in particular in the characteristic 
grammatical oddities of each text.  Rowlandson, for her part, shifts verb tenses in a 
dramatic fashion at various points in her narration, most notably in the description of “the 
amazing time” of the Native American assault on her house, when she abruptly switches 
from the past tense, saying, “Now is that dreadfull hour come, that I have often heard of 
(in time of War, as it was the case of others) but now mine eyes see it” (69).  Thus 
Rowlandson draws attention to the diachronic organization of her experience in the text, 
thereby reinforcing the association with a lineal mode of kin relations.  Radisson, on the 
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other hand, produces all manner of grammatical error in his captivity narrative, 
particularly in his misconjugation of verbs and his misuse of pronouns; these errors may 
simply speak to his limited familiarity with English, but they also suggest his fluid sense 
of identity, as well as emphasizing the synchronic dimensions of his narrative (since the 
appropriate use of pronouns and verb conjugations depends on the relational context at a 
given moment).  Ultimately, however, Deleuze and Guattari insist that the two axes of 
social relations operate in a complementary fashion, even if they are at odds with one 
another (as are Radisson’s respect of different customs and his commitment to non-
violence) and this insight is borne out by both texts.   
 
After all, the Puritan prowess for commercial activity has been proverbial at least since 
Max Weber’s Protestant Work Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism first appeared in 1930.  
Furthermore, Rowlandson’s own arrangement of family, kin relations, and nation is 
fundamentally based on a metonymic principle of alliance, whatever her attempts to 
ground that arrangement in the hierarchical authority of nuclear family.  Radisson, 
meanwhile, is hardly trying to develop some transcendent concept of international 
relations.  His adoption of a policy of non-violent, culturally-aware interaction is formed 
by his role as an international merchant.  Radisson’s captivity certainly makes him ideally 
suited for this role, yet it remains vital to note that he trades in custom because it furthers 
his trade in furs. 
 
What Radisson’s and Rowlandson’s texts offer us is not a formula for understanding the 
essence of kin relations, but rather a glimpse of two of the broad lines that would be taken 
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in the rethinking of kinship identities over the course of the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries.  The first of these is an identification of “relations” with nation, an 
identification that, while it is not based on the same principles as biological race theory, 
operates in a similar fashion, dividing people into “us” and “them” and removing any 
symbolic middle ground; the second is an identification of “relation” with interest, which 
opens the door to a more cosmopolitan sense of identity.  Custom plays a key role in the 
development of these definitions of kinship relations, contrary to what most literary 
criticism or structuralist anthropology might tell us, because it provides a precedent 
against which those relations can be judged.  In this fashion, it serves as a check, albeit a 
partial one, upon the transformative powers of language, as represented by the “slate-
cleaning” tactics of Hobbes and Mather.  As Radisson recognized, and Montaigne before 
him, even the refusal to recognize another’s custom is a custom.   




WRITING A NEW NEW WORLD – DIVIDING HISTORY FROM  
ETHNOGRAPHY IN COTTON MATHER AND JOSEPH-FRANÇOIS LAFITAU 
 
The Indians of Virginia are almost wasted, but such Towns, or People as 
retain their Names, are hereunder set down; All which together can’t raise 
five hundred fighting men.  They live poorly, and much in fear of the 
Neighbouring Indians. … Thus I have given a succinct account of the 
Indians; happy, I think, in their simple State of Nature, and in their 
enjoyment of Plenty, without the Curse of Labour. … The English have 
taken away great part of their Country, and consequently made every thing 
less plenty amongst them. 
— Robert Beverly, The History and Present State of  
 Virginia, 1705 (232-233). 
 
The open-ended inclusiveness of the United States was directly 
proportionate to America’s capacity to incorporate and exclude, and more 
precisely to incorporate by exclusion.  The culture seemed indefinite, 
infinitely processual, because as America it closed everything else out, as 
being Old World and/or not-yet-America.  And vice versa: the process by 
which it closed out everything un-American was also the spur toward an 
ideal of liberal inclusiveness, a vision of representative openness that 
eroded traditional barriers of nationality, territory, language, and ethnicity, 
and eventually, perhaps, would erode even the barriers of race and 
gender—which is to say, would open the prospects of liberalism to women 
and blacks as it had to the Irish, the Jews, and the far-flung regions of 
Alaska and Hawaii. 
— Sacvan Bercovitch, Rites of Assent, 1993 (14). 
 
Both these epigraphs focus on the horizon where the Native “American” disappears and 
is replaced by the universal and endlessly copious concept of “America.”  This transition 
occupies a central place in my analysis of the ongoing development of the figure of 
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custom because it signals—if not necessitates—a radical change in the meaning and 
relative importance of custom.  Where custom had responded to the discursive needs of
 the early colonists by allowing them to argue that by preserving a body of customs they 
had preserved their religious and national identities, the concrete particularity that such 
an argument requires does not lend itself to the abstract universalism that Bercovitch 
identifies as the hallmark of “America” and that was certainly a major component in the 
writings of North American colonists (and, I would add, their European counterparts) in 
the eighteenth century.  This is not to say that custom no longer has a place in writing 
about identity by North American colonists after the close of the seventeenth century, but 
rather that its place becomes a subordinate one in relation to nature and culture.  As the 
Baconian vision of an empirical science was progressively realized, custom, once viewed 
as a cause, would now be read as an effect of a larger struggle between opposing 
principles of nature and culture—read, in other words, as a symptom of pervasive 
physical (or natural) and ideological (or cultural) processes whose understanding required 
both close, careful observation and a desire to penetrate to the deeper principles 
underlying the myriad of observable facts.   
   
And so Robert Beverly, having begun his History and Present State of Virginia with the 
emphatic assertion, “I am an Indian” (9), concludes his copious and systematic discussion 
of the “Religion, Laws, and Customs” of the native inhabitants of the Chesapeake on a 
valedictory note before moving on to a discussion of the state of the Euro-American 
colonies there.  His text proclaims the imminent demise of the Native American 
communities of Virginia, and thus of the very customs he is recording.  Beverly can 
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hardly be credited with creating the trope of the “Vanishing Indian”— Thomas Morton, 
for one, uses it to help justify English colonization in his New English Canaan (22-24)—
but the invocation of it here works in a markedly different fashion as Beverly 
painstakingly enumerates the diminished ranks of Virginia natives town by town, noting 
how some are “much decreased of late” and that in others there are “a small number yet 
living.”  As perhaps the ultimate proof of the veracity of his close observation, Beverly 
faithfully notes a pair of exceptions to this general trend: the Nottawayes, “which number 
about a hundred Bow men, of late a thriving and increasing People” and the town of 
Nansamond, who have also “increased much of late” (232).  Yet, despite all his careful 
attention to detail, Beverly quickly reduces the Native Americans to an abstract principle 
by using the same generalizing terms as Thomas Hobbes and Cotton Mather, albeit with a 
somewhat more idyllic tenor: they are in a “simple State of Nature,” a state of “plenty … 
without … Labour” (232).  Or at least they were, until the English arrived and took 
“away great part of their Country, and consequently made every thing less plenty 
amongst them” (233).   
 
Taken together, these gestures—close observation of the diminishing native population, 
that is, coupled with a rapid leap to radically decontextualized generalizations that make 
Native Americans sound like prelapsarian holdovers—firmly relegate the Native 
Americans to the pre-history of America, since it is their disappearance that marks the 
beginning of American history as such.  Where Marc Lescarbot and Thomas Morton 
wrote about Native American customs in order to “rehearse” them and thereby perform a 
stronger, more coherent European identity, Beverly writes about these customs in order to 
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show that they no longer exist.   Beverly’s text thus clears the ground for Bercovitch’s, by 
effecting an erasure of America’s native inhabitants and their practices in order to make 
room for Anglo-American expansion.  The difference between these two texts is that 
Beverly makes explicit the role of colonization in the destruction of Native American 
communities that Bercovitch, even though he does not condone it, virtually ignores.135   
 
One place where Bercovitch does pay attention to Native Americans is in his assessment 
of Cotton Mather’s Magnalia Christi Americana, which Bercovitch hails as a “New 
England Epic” and singles out as the precursor of a string of American epics, from Joel 
Barlow’s Columbiad to Walt Whitman’s Leaves of Grass (“New England Epic” 350).136  
Bercovitch rightly identifies Mather’s belief that “the American church-state 
[represented] the climax of the ‘histories of all ages’” (339); he then goes on to note that 
the Native Americans in fact had a central role to play in that history, inasmuch as “their 
destruction would more clearly demonstrate that the Puritan mission stood at the verge of 
completion” (348).  Interestingly, Bercovitch emphasizes that this role was possible 
precisely because the Native Americans “were an integral part of America” and so helped 
Mather make a case for the exceptional place of New England in world history (348). 
                                                
 
135 Considering how Bercovitch has repeatedly returned to the same texts and themes over the course of his 
career in order to refine and elaborate his central argument about the continuities and singularities of 
American collective identity, it is striking how Native Americans in America have taken up less and less 
space in his account of the development of American identity.  Whereas they are a central feature of his 
essay “New England Epic,” by the time he comes to write Rites of Assent they are virtually absent, 
appearing a couple of times  in a list of afflictions faced by the Puritans in the New World (79, 108, 114), 
and having only a single paragraph allotted to their place in the Magnalia (143-44).  Moreover, Native 
Americans are notably absent from his list of groups who have come to be incorporated into the nation 
(Rites 14). 
 
136 In an updated version of this list, offered in Rites of Assent, Bercovitch identifies everything from 
Jonathan Edwards’ Thoughts Concerning the Present Revival of Religion (1742) through Barlow (1807), 
Herman Melville’s Moby Dick (1851), and Whitman’s Democratic Vistas (1871) to Henry James’ The 
American Scene (1907) as descended from Mather’s ur-text (Rites 115). 
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It is well worth pausing a moment, then, over Bercovitch’s own investment in this 
interpretation of Mather’s work, work which occupies a pivotal position in his narrative 
of America’s capacity for universal assimilation.  In Bercovitch’s assessment it is the 
writings of Mather that create the fundamental link between the theological rhetoric of 
the Puritan jeremiad and its secularized, though still theologically informed, descendents 
in later American literature.  The culmination of this process is the production of a myth 
of America—meaning exclusively the United States—as the only “symbol of identity [to] 
ha[ve] united nationality and universality, civic and spiritual selfhood, secular and 
redemptive history, the country’s past and paradise to be, in a single synthetic ideal.” 
(Rites 176).  As Bercovitch elaborates, these exceptional characteristics make America 
able to take dissent against the status quo and recast it as assent to the idealized promise 
of America—in other words, the United States of America is, in Bercovitch’s assessment, 
the only nation capable of containing all radicalism within its compass and transforming 
it into a kind of conservatism.  While Bercovitch is openly ambivalent about the relative 
value of this myth—and takes pains to point out that many of the authors whose work he 
analyzes were likewise ambivalent about the myth (see Rites 346-352, esp. 350)—he 
nonetheless grants it a special power by affirming that it is the myth of America, to the 
exclusion of any other. 
 
Bercovitch’s dependence on Mather reveals a blind spot in his own theory of American 
identity.  Like Mather, he writes Native Americans out of the history of America because 
to include them would be to expose the limit conditions of its purported copiousness; if 
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Bercovitch insists on America’s ever-increasing ability to include as a function of its 
ability to exclude, it is the ongoing exclusion of Native Americans that enables his 
insistence, because to include them would be to say that there was an America before 
America.  One might say that Bercovitch’s definition of America makes Native 
Americans “universally” excluded.  America thus becomes a name given by a European 
to a vast territory and its people only to be reappropriated by other Europeans as part of 
the process of colonization.  And so these first “Americans” remain eternally qualified by 
their status as “natives,” living on “reservations” or “reserves,” never completely 
assimilated into the myth even as they mark off its (historical and imaginary) frontier.137 
 
If Bercovitch is correct inasmuch as he acknowledges the pushing aside of Native 
Americans as a necessary part of the construction of a myth of America, however, his 
framing of this myth solely in terms of the United States, and, still more narrowly, New 
England obscures the larger importance of the rest of Europe—not to mention the 
importance of the rest of the Americas, both North and South—which have their own 
conflicted relationships with the mismatch between their Native American heritage and 
their respective national myths.138  In other words, Bercovitch sees a myth of America as 
                                                
 
137 Given the work of any number of scholars in the fields of Native American Studies, New Indian History, 
and ethnohistory, such an absolute claim may well seem hyperbolic, yet, as Mick Gidley notes in his 
assessment of the “Vanishing Indian” trope, “despite frequent and sometimes celebrated ‘returns’, the 
Native American has yet to receive representation as an autonomous being in white American cultural 
artifacts” (“Repeated Return” 205). 
 
138 Bercovitch does, in fact, make a passing acknowledgement of a Canadian version of the American myth 
in the introduction to Rites of Assent, but he quickly dismisses it as being merely a “colonial” variant of the 
American one (7).  And yet, the work of Canadian scholars like Dana Culhane has shown that the Canadian 
variant of this myth is more complicated, in large part because the continued presence of native peoples is 
more strongly felt and thus the contradictions between universalist rhetoric and exclusionary reality are 
more apparent.  As to Spanish America, Jorge Cañizares-Esguerra has argued, in his Puritan 
Conquistadores, that many of the tropes central to Puritan millenarian writings, including the notion of the 
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the myth of America.  By doing so, he thus loses sight of the epistemological problem the 
Americas and their native inhabitants represented to all Europeans (and Euro-Americans) 
in the seventeenth century: if Columbus and those Europeans who followed him had truly 
found a “New World,” then that “‘New World’ had now to be incorporated into their 
cosmographical, geographical and, ultimately, anthropological understanding” (Anthony 
Pagden 5). 
 
As has been suggested by Peter Burke, among others, the “newness” of the “New World” 
had a delayed impact upon European thought—Burke characterizes it as “creep[ing] into” 
European awareness over the course of the seventeenth century and gradually forcing the 
production of a new paradigm for world history (37, 40-47).  Indeed, as my previous 
chapters have made clear, the entire project of American colonization, especially for the 
French and English, was marked by belatedness.  Individual authors like Montaigne may 
have struggled with the question of whether the Americas were accounted for in the Bible 
or the writings of the Ancients, but, with the possible exception of the debate between 
Hugo Grotius and Joannes de Laet, it was not until the latter half of the seventeenth 
century that this question had a pervasive impact on European intellectual writing.  The 
publication, in particular, of Isaac de la Peyrère’s Systema theologicum, ex prae-
                                                                                                                                            
Native Americans as minions of Satan, are directly prefigured in the criollo writings of authors like Alonso 
de Ovalle and that these continue to exert an influence on contemporary Spanish American society.  Brazil 
is another story still, as Joseph Smith notes in his History of Brazil, with its “concept of [itself] as a ‘racial 
democracy’ … los[ing] … credibility” in the face of ongoing social and economic inequalities among 
indigenous peoples, those of primarily African descent, and those of European descent (231; see also 
Gilberto Kujawski’s Idéia do Brasil for a nuanced and challenging examination of notions of Brazilian 
identity).  And one could further add that each of these monolithic mythologies is itself divisible into 
various sub-national myths—the Quebecois notion of pur lainité, for example, which is the polar opposite 
of the voluntary métissage that characterizes Francophone populations in many other parts of the Americas, 
including neighboring New Brunswick with its flourishing bilingual population (some 34.2% according to 
the Canadian Census of 2001, up from 29.5% in 1991)—and yet all of them are still focused around the 
problematic position of Native Americans in putatively post-colonial societies. 
  197 
Adamitarum hypothesi in 1655 brought this question to the forefront of contemporary 
cosmological and theological debate.  Peyrère posited that God had created “men before 
Adam”—the phrase being part of the subtitle for an English translation of his work 
published the very next year—and he thereby gave birth to polygenetic theories of human 
origins that would be used as the basis for many prominent racial theories of the 
eighteenth century, including those of Voltaire (see Essais sur les moeurs 6ff.), and 
opened the door to the scientific racism of such nineteenth century figures as Samuel 
George Morton, Louis Agassiz, and Arthur de Gobineau.  
 
The paradox of Peyrère’s influence, however, is that by making America the center of 
attention it also paved the way for the discursive disappearance of the Native Americans 
themselves.  And it would be two “American” authors—Cotton Mather and Joseph-
François Lafitau—who perfected this erasure.  Beverly’s text follows the conventional 
practice of European histories of the Americas as far back as José Acosta, dividing his 
work into sections on flora and fauna, on native customs, and on the recent history of the 
European exploration and settlement.  Mather and Lafitau, on the other hand, utterly 
transform the genre.  Mather, in his Magnalia Christi Americana (first published in 
1702), only concerns himself with the history of America after the arrival of the Puritan 
settlers, while Lafitau, in his Mœurs des sauvages américains comparées aux mœurs des 
premiers temps (first published in 1724), strives to recreate the pre-historical record of 
human activity through his careful and systematic analysis of Native American customs, 
or mœurs.  With this simple and seemingly straightforward divvying up of their subject 
matter, Mather and Lafitau instantiate a fundamental division between history and 
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ethnology that would relegate Native American peoples to the timeless realm of pre-
history once and (almost) for all.139 
 
 
“L’ORIGINE SUPPOSÉE COMMUNE” 
 
Perhaps no-one will be more surprised than Mather and Lafitau would themselves have 
been to see these two early Enlightenment authors placed cheek-by-jowl as the objects of 
a comparative analysis.  Mather, after all, was not merely a New England Puritan, but one 
of the staunchest defenders of the traditional values of the first generation of Puritan 
colonists.  From his birth in 1663 to his death in 1728, he never left the New England 
colonies.  As David Levin notes, Mather’s father taught him and his brothers and sisters 
“to believe that their own lives were exemplary” (Cotton Mather 11).  This message was 
further reinforced by Cotton’s own given name, taken from his maternal grandfather, 
John Cotton, one of the most prominent ministers in New England (see Cotton Mather 
55), and finally confirmed by an angelic visitation, recorded in his diaries, wherein he 
discovered his destiny: to have “[h]is books published not only in America but also in 
Europe” and to “perform great works against sinners and in behalf of Christ’s Church in 
the revolutions that were imminent” (Cotton Mather 107; see 106-108 for a full 
discussion of Mather’s visitation).  Mather identified himself wholly with the Puritan 
                                                
 
139 As any number of scholars, from historians to anthropologists, have noted, “[i]n both popular culture and 
the academy, Native Americans are people who either have no significant history or exist outside history” 
(Richard White “Using the Past” 218).  Were it not for the work of scholars such as White, James Clifford, 
and Hilary Wyss—among others—even my parenthetical qualification of this absolute erasure would be an 
exaggeration. 
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colonies, devoting his life to serving his community as a preacher and as a public 
intellectual, though Mather himself hardly distinguished between the two roles. 
 
Lafitau, by contrast, was an important member of the Society of Jesus, an institution 
created precisely to help counter the Reformation of which Mather placed himself at the 
forefront.  Born in Bordeaux in 1681, Lafitau joined the Jesuits at the age of fifteen; after 
several years as a student and then a teacher, he successfully petitioned to be sent to 
Canada to work among the Iroquois in 1711.  He spent six years there before returning to 
France, where he became famous for his discovery of a North American variety of 
ginseng, and was appointed procurator for the Canadian Missions of the Jesuits, an 
administrative position of great authority.140  He remained in that position until 1741, 
having returned once to Canada, and traveled twice to Rome, in the performance of his 
duties. 
  
While Mather and Lafitau belonged to diametrically opposed religious groups, and while 
Lafitau’s worldly experience far outstripped that of Mather, for whom Boston was the 
greatest metropolis he would ever see, the two had a great deal in common as well.  To 
begin with, an excellent education: Mather entered Harvard College at the age of twelve 
                                                
 
140 As William Fenton notes in his introduction to the translation of Lafitau’s Moeurs, Lafitau’s discovery 
of ginseng highlights his scientific and ethnological skills, particularly his ability to “combine theory and 
verification” (xxxiii).  That Lafitau knew of ginseng is itself a testament to the Jesuits’ global reach.  The 
plant’s existence had first been documented for Europeans by the Jesuit Father Pierre Jartoux, who had 
seen it during his travels in Mongolia in 1709; Jartoux’s travel relation made its way to France and thence 
to Québec, where Lafitau read it.  Noting the ecological similarities between the Montréal area and that 
described by Jartoux, Lafitau concluded that there must be a variety of ginseng in New France.  It turned 
out that the Iroquois had been using the plant as an herbal medicine for some time, but the global craze 
started by Lafitau’s publication of Mémoire … concernant la précieuse plante du gin-seng, découverte en 
Canada in 1718 led them to harvest it to the verge of extinction to supply Asian demand. 
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with an already complete knowledge of Latin, a solid foundation in Greek, and the 
beginnings of Hebrew as well; Lafitau, for his part, attended and taught at institutions in 
Pau, Limoges, Saintes, Poitiers, and Paris, receiving a thorough grounding in the 
traditional humanist subjects of grammar and rhetoric, as well as theology.  More 
particularly, the antagonism between Puritans and Jesuits forced each to become more 
than passingly familiar with the other’s literature: Mather’s family library held a number 
of volumes in English, French, and Latin concerning various Catholic orders, including 
the Jesuits, while Lafitau, though he generally prefers to cite Jesuit sources, shows a 
broad awareness of contemporary Protestant literature on the Americas and even cites the 
notorious Calvinist Pierre Bayle approvingly (1.5-6/1.29).141 
 
Given their positions at opposite extremes of the conventional binary divide between 
Catholicism and Protestantism, it seems wholly in keeping that Mather and Lafitau 
should be responsible for this disciplinary division between history and ethnology, itself 
so fundamental to a whole series of binary oppositions from savage/civilized to 
nature/culture.  In many ways Lafitau’s project is the polar opposite of Mather’s: he takes 
Native Americans as his primary subject, insisting on their pivotal place, as well as their 
pivotal importance to world history.  He also seems to hold a much more positive view of 
Native American society, following the lead of Marc Lescarbot and other Europeans who 
                                                
 
141 Throughout this chapter, I provide a double citation for any references to Lafitau’s Moeurs: the first of 
these is always to the first French edition of 1724 (not to be confused with the second edition, published the 
same year, which is in duodecimo rather than quarto) and the second to the authoritative English translation 
prepared by William Fenton and Elizabeth Moore for The Champlain Society.  Mather, for his part, owned 
several of Bayle’s works, including an English translation of his Dictionnaire universelle et critique (first 
published in French in 1697, Mather likely owned the English translation of 1710) and eight volumes of his 
periodical, Nouvelle République de la littérature (which began publication in 1684). 
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use accounts of Native American customs as a basis for the critique of European mores; 
for example, Lafitau notes that “[p]ar bonheur pour eux, ils ne connoissent ni Code, ni 
Digeste, ni Avocats” (1.485), a sentiment that Lescarbot surely would have seconded 
given his own legal troubles in France.142  Moreover, the entire purpose of Lafitau’s work 
is to refute Peyrère’s polygenetic theory by discovering the “origine supposée commune 
aux Amérindiens et aux Occidentaux dans les premiers temps,” as Andreas Motsch, 
perhaps the leading modern critic of Lafitau’s work, points out (Lafitau 9).143  That said, 
Lafitau’s text is, like Mather’s, a signal moment in the erasure of Native Americans from 
history.  It is, as Motsch is hardly the first to note, “le texte fondateur de l’ethnologie 
comparative … du point de vue méthodologique” (“Mémoire” 117).144  Yet it is precisely 
this method itself that proves to be responsible for relegating Native Americans to the 
blank and timeless void of pre-history. 
 
Lafitau begins his work by discounting previous scholarship on the subject of the origin 
of Native Americans as being based on “conjectures … si vagues et si incertaines, 
qu’elles font naître plus de doutes qu’elles n’en éclaircissent” (1.2).145  Foremost among 
these doubts, in Lafitau’s account, is “si les hommes qui l’habitoient, étoient de la race 
                                                
 
142 “By good fortune for them, they know neither code of law, nor digest, nor lawyers” (1.299) 
 
143 “The presupposed common origin of Amerindians and Occidentals at the dawn of time” (translation 
mine). 
 
144 “the foundational text for comparative ethnology, from a methodological point of view” (translation 
mine). 
 
145 “conjectures … so vague and uncertain that they rather give rise to more doubts than clarify the existing 
ones” (1.26) 
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d’Adam” (1.28),146 a doubt furthered by “la plûpart des Relations [qui] nous les ont peints 
comme gens qui n’avoient aucun sentiment de Religion” (1.5).147  Thus, Lafitau defines 
his project as a demonstration of the conformity between Native American practices and 
those of the “premiers temps,” or “first times,” in order to prove the common source for 
all human activity in “une Religion pure et sainte en elle-même et dans son principe : une 
Religion émanée de Dieu qui la donna à nos premiers Peres” (1.14).148  The essence of 
his demonstration lies in “la comparaison de ces Moeurs et de ces Coûtumes” in order to 
uncover “les premieres idées que les Peres des Peuples avoient transmis à leurs enfans, et 
qui s’étoient conservées chez la plûpart presque sans aucune alteration, ou du moins sans 
une alteration fort sensible malgré leur distance et leur peu de communication” (1.48).149  
Insofar as his project is focused on custom, then, it would seem inclined to privilege 
Native Americans as a source of knowledge about the true source of Christianity. 
 
And yet, Lafitau quickly qualifies his appreciation of contemporary native customs by 
noting that “[l]e Commerce des Européans a beaucoup fait perdre aux Sauvages de leurs 
anciennes Coûtumes, et alteré leurs Mœurs” such that he has to extrapolate about their 
pre-contact customs by referring to early written accounts by other Europeans (1.25).150  
                                                
146 “whether the men who lived there were of the race of Adam” (1.48) 
 
147 “travel narratives [that] depicted them to us as people without any sentiment of religion” (1.28) 
 
148 “a religion, pure and holy in itself and in its origin … emanating from God who gave it to our first 
fathers” (1.34) 
 
149 “comparison of the customs and folkways of the nations”; “universal patterns which, in spite of their 
distance from each other and slight means of communication, the fathers of the people had kept alive 
without alteration and transmitted to their children” (1.54) 
 
150 “The trade with European nations has made the Indians lose many of their ancient folkways and altered 
their ways of living” (1.41). 
 
  203 
At the same time, in a section with the apparently unironic marginal notation “Ce qu’on 
peut tirer des Sauvages touchant leur origine” (1.92-93),151 Lafitau discounts whatever 
evidence the Native Americans themselves might be able to offer about their origins, 
stating that their “[t]radition sacrée ... passant de bouche en bouche, reçoit dans toutes 
quelque alteration, et dégenere en fables si absurdes, qu’on ne peut avoir qu’une peine 
extrême à les rapporter” (1.93).152  In fact, Lafitau ultimately casts aside any attempt to 
create a complete and unbroken history of the migrations that led to the population of the 
Americas, preferring to simply amass a body of evidence supporting the general 
supposition of their origin in the “Old World.” 
 
As Motsch emphasizes, Lafitau’s “first times” are likewise an intellectual construct that 
“ne correspondent à aucune période historique connue” (Lafitau 61).153  Instead, they 
consist of Lafitau’s own conjectures based on the writings of antiquity about a wide range 
of peoples, from the Greeks and Romans to the Egyptians and Israelites.  Lafitau’s work 
thereby proves to be as much about writing as it is about using customs and ritual 
practices as a method of extending the reach of history beyond the written record to the 
furthest bounds of human existence.  In other words, Lafitau’s work consists of an 
elaborate fabric of comparisons—between contemporary Native Americans and ancient 
                                                
151 “What can be Learned from the Indians about their Origin” (1.81) 
 
152 “sacred tradition … passing from mouth to mouth, changes as it passes on, and degenerates into myths 
so absurd that one can only very reluctantly rely upon them” (1.81) 
 
153 “[They] do not correspond to any known historical period” (translation mine).  Interestingly, Mather 
uses the phrase “dernier temps” or “last times” in his Une grande voix du ciel à la France (A Great Voice 
from Heaven to France), a brief pamphlet he composed, published, and sought to have distributed in 
France.  Mather’s sense of this term balances well with Lafitau’s of “premier temps,” since the context (“Le 
Purgatoire est une erreur et un Abus inventé par des Esprits Abuseurs aux derniers temps”; “Purgatory is an 
error and an abuse invented by Abusive Souls of the last times”) implies that “derniers temps” refers to the 
time of humankind in its fallen state (17). 
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peoples as well as between contemporary Native Americans and what has been written 
about them—that supplement one another in order to produce an overwhelming sense of 
the unassailability of Lafitau’s thesis. 
 
Lafitau’s second chapter, in which he works his way through a variety of theories about 
the Old World origins of Native Americans, offers an excellent example of Lafitau’s 
method at work, highlighting the quasi-scientific aspects of his method, including his 
painstaking thoroughness and his reliance on probability in instances where documentary 
evidence is lacking or suspect.  In it he systematically works his way through the 
conjectures of various contemporary and antique authors, carefully weighing them one by 
one.  Thus he begins by insisting that while the ancients likely had some knowledge of 
America, it has nothing to do with the Atlantis mentioned in Plato’s Timeus or the 
Phyrgia of Aelian, or even the prophecy voiced in Seneca’s Medea, all of which he 
counts as fables that were recognized as such by their authors (1.29/1.43).  He spends a 
little more time on the opinion put forward by Diodorus Sicilus in his Bibliothecae 
Historicae that the Phoenicians had settled there and been followed by the Tyrrhenians, 
which he judges to be “plus positive et plus assurée” (1.30).154 
 
Lafitau then moves on to more contemporary theories, such as those of Hugo Grotius, 
Johanne de Laet, and Marc Lescarbot, which ultimately lead him to a general conclusion 
that “l’opinion la plus universellement suivie et la plus probable, est celle qui fait passer 
toutes ces Nations dans l’Amerique par les terres de l’Asie” (1.38), a statement that 
shows how Lafitau carefully measures his words to fit with probability and common 
                                                
154 “more positive and assured” (1.43) 
  205 
sense.155  He then goes on to point out that America may well be contiguous with Asia in 
the extreme northwest of the continent, though he does not want to “approfondir par de 
simples conjectures une chose qui ne peut être éclaircie que par la découverte même” 
(1.38), which further shows Lafitau’s preference for empirically verifiable conjectures.156  
Having exhausted the documentary sources that might serve to provide a direct lineage 
for the Native Americans from an “Old World” source, Lafitau summarily rejects Native 
American oral traditions in returning to his point that a comparison of customs is the best 
way to demonstrate the common origin of all peoples, since they have been “conservées 
chez la plûpart sans aucune alteration, ou du moins sans une alteration fort sensible 
malgré leur distance et leur peu de communication” (1.48).157  He further insists that we 
can distinguish groups of related peoples by isolating “traits distinctifs et 
Caracteristiques” (1.49).158  Leaving aside for the moment the apparent contradiction 
between his disparate valuation of oral and behavioral evidence, this gives us a clear 
picture of Lafitau’s method: reasoned conjecture based on documentary sources checked 
against empirically verifiable evidence. 
 
Where Lafitau carefully examines all manner of hypotheses before putting aside his 
consideration of the “Old World” origins of Native Americans, Mather sidesteps the 
                                                
 
155 “The view the most universally accepted and the most probable is that which makes all these nations 
come to America by way of Asia” (1.46). 
 
156 “I ought not to try to prove by simple conjecture a thing upon which light can be cast only by 
exploration” (1.46). 
 
157 “among these customs, there were universal patterns which, in spite of their distance from each other 
and slight means of communication, the fathers of the people had kept alive without alteration and 
transmitted to their children” (1.54) 
 
158 “distinctive and characteristic traits” (1.55) 
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question of lineage altogether, “contentedly allow[ing] that America … was altogether 
unknown to the penmen of the Holy Scriptures” (41).  This statement is wholly consonant 
with Mather’s express intent to “WRITE the WONDERS of the CHRISTIAN RELGION, 
flying from the depravations of Europe, to the American Strand” (25).  Mather’s entire 
project is predicated on the belief that writing is a divine activity that serves to prove 
one’s status as a member of the elect, as well as to guarantee the elect status of one’s own 
nation.  As I noted in the last chapter, Nicholas Noyes’ prefatory poem makes the 
contrast between the hyper-literate Mather and his unlettered Native American 
counterparts explicit.  But we might equally well cite any of the nine other introductory 
poems that accompanied Mather’s text, all of which reference Mather’s ability to make 
the dead live again in his writings, an ability implicitly akin to God’s to provide an 
eternal “second” life after a person’s physical death. 
 
Having cited copiously from Greek and Roman authorities on the virtues of historical 
writing in his introduction to the Magnalia, Mather singles out “Church History” as 
deserving of the “palm,” in particular because it provides unparalleled examples by 
which Christians can guide their lives and actions (28).  Mather then notes that “the great 
Moses” was the “the first-born of all historians” and shifts into an anaphoric chronicle of 
the historians of all ages: “Let any person of good sense peruse …Herodotus… Let him 
then peruse Thucydides… Let him next revolve Xenophon… Let him from thence 
proceed onto Diodorus Siculus… Let him hereupon consult Polybius… Let him from 
hence pass onto Livy… [etc.]” (28-29).  The continuous character of this list, emphasized 
by his use of anaphora, tells us a great deal about Mather’s vision of history as a coherent 
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textual fabric that can allow one to retrace the progress of human history—or rather, 
given Mather’s Puritan outlook, its decline. 
 
In fact, Mather quite explicitly indicates that his goal for the Magnalia is not merely to 
preserve the lives and actions of the New England Puritans, but to provide an example of 
a people who have managed to use their own learning and knowledge of history in order 
to maintain a more properly Christian way of life: “Thus, I do not say, that the Churches 
of New-England are the most regular that can be; yet I do say, and am sure, that they are 
very like unto those that were in the first ages of Christianity [and that] the first Age was 
the Golden Age: to return unto that, will make a man Protestant, and, I may add, a 
Puritan” (27).  Mather thus anticipates Lafitau’s belief that the people of America will 
provide the mechanism by which Europeans can rediscover the practices and rituals of 
“premier temps,” differing only in his identification of which American people is to be 
the source of this insight. 
 
However, despite the bald chauvinism of his conviction that Puritan New England is the 
focal point of ecclesiastical history, Mather shares Lafitau’s penchant for citing sources 
whose religious beliefs differ greatly from his own.  He cites not only a great number of 
ancient Greeks and Romans, but several Spanish Catholic authors as well.  This helps to 
support Mather’s insistence that he “ha[s] done the part of an impartial historian [and] 
endeavoured, with all good conscience, to decline this writing merely for a party” that has 
characterized much contemporary historical writing (29). Though he qualifies this 
statement of impartiality by noting that he is “not of the opinion that one cannot merit the 
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name of an impartial historian, except he write bare matters of fact without all reflection” 
(29), his methodology supports his claim of objectivity inasmuch as he devotes a great 
portion of his text to the reproduction of primary source documents ranging from legal 
statutes to personal correspondence. 
 
In fact, Mather explicitly indicates that he regarded his project as a kind of divine 
anthology, incorporating the sum of all human learning, not merely that of the New 
England Puritans: 
 
I considered that multitudes of particular texts had, especially of later 
years, been more notably illustrated in the scattered books of learned men, 
than in any of the ordinary [Biblical] commentators.  And I considered 
that the treasures of illustration for the Bible, dispersed in many hundred 
volumes, might be fetched all together by a labour that would resolve to 
conquer all things (33) 
 
As this passage clearly shows, Mather’s ambitions for his Magnalia, like those of 
Lafitau for his Mœurs, were nothing less than universal. 
 
 
“TOTALIZING AND RATIONALIZING OUR EXPERIENCE OF THE SOCIAL” 
 
Their extreme religious orthodoxy may seem to place Mather and Lafitau apart from the 
mainstream of early Enlightenment scientific thought, but neither is in the least 
dismissive of contemporary intellectual developments.  Lafitau was a skilled naturalist, as 
demonstrated by his work on ginseng, and Mather read widely in human anatomy and 
chemistry, as evidenced by his notes on the works of Robert Boyle and others in his 
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voluminous commonplace books, the Quotidiana, which run to five quarto volumes of 
roughly one hundred and thirty pages each.  While modern commentators have 
occasionally balked at the apparent contradiction between these religious and scientific 
pursuits, both of these authors were very much creatures of their times, and they saw their 
scientific pursuits as a necessary complement to their religious vocations.159  Thus 
Mather and Lafitau show a great deal of interest in the latest scientific discoveries in their 
writings, and feel compelled to respond to them as they defend their respective visions of 
orthodox Christianity precisely because they see scientific inquiry as the best means to a 
knowledge of God and His creation.  Not only the argument but the form of their work 
can be seen as rooted in this compulsion to make natural science serve theology. 
 
While Mather and Lafitau’s differing attitudes towards Native Americans would seem to 
be echoed in their respective choice of genre, their shared interest in the latest scientific 
developments causes them to appeal to the authority of a genre that supersedes both 
ethnography and history: the system.  As Clifford Siskin notes in an essay, “The Year of 
the System,” that has done much to recuperate this genre as worthy of literary analysis, 
we tend to think of the system today as an expression for “totalizing and rationalizing our 
experience of the social,” rather than a genre as such (9).  However, Siskin is right to 
insist that we must consider it as a genre, not only because of its importance in 
                                                
159 Mather’s scientific endeavors and interests have attracted a great deal of critical attention over the course 
of several decades, beginning some hundred years ago with the work of George Lyman Kittredge on 
Mather’s relations with the British Royal Society, running through Theodore Hornberger’s demonstration 
(in the 1930s) of Mather’s debts to his contemporaries Robert Boyle and John Ray (“The Date, the Source, 
and the Significance of Cotton Mather’s Interest in Science,” American Literature. 6.4 (Jan 1935): 413-
420), and culminating in work by Jeffrey Jeske (“Cotton Mather: Phyisco-Theologian,” Journal of the 
History of Ideas.  47.4 (1986): 583-594) and Winton Solberg (“Science and Religion in Early America: 
Cotton Mather’s Christian Philosopher,” Church History.  56.1 (1987): 73-92), who both emphasize the 
consonance of Mather’s scientific interests with his religious worldview. 
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intellectual history, but precisely in order to understand it “as an object that works in the 
world … to produce [meanings] … rather than … as an idea that accumulates” them (10).  
In the case of Mather and Lafitau, the system genre is precisely what enables them to 
bridge any gap between science and divinity—a goal, it must be noted, shared by their 
nemesis, Peyrère, as the Latin title of his work indicates—since the system is designed 
expressly to produce a coherent and limited set of abstract principles capable of 
accounting for the diversity of human experience and other observable phenomena. 
 
A system, according to the first dictionary of the Académie Française, published in 1694, 
is the “[s]upposition d'un ou de plusieurs principes, d'où l'on tire des consequences, & sur 
lesquels on establit une opinion, une doctrine, un dogme, &c.”  The examples given are, 
“Le systeme de Ptolomée, le systeme de Copernic. il a trouvé un nouveau systeme” 
(521).160  Among its many definitions of system, the Oxford English Dictionary provides 
the following, for which it offers several examples from the seventeenth and early 
eighteenth centuries: “A work or writing containing a comprehensive and regularly 
arranged exposition of some subject; a systematic treatise” (Oxford English Dictionary 
Online, definition II.8.d).  Thus the work of the system as a genre is precisely to “totalize 
and rationalize,” but, unlike our contemporary sense of “the system” as a nebulous and 
ill-defined object or force, the early modern and Enlightenment system is grounded in an 
exactly enumerated set of principles or axioms and the deductions that can be drawn from 
them.   
                                                
 
160 “supposition of one or several principles, from which one draws consequences, and on which one 
establishes an opinion, a doctrine, a dogma, etc.”; “The system of Ptolemy, the system of Copernicus, he 
has found a new system” (translation mine) 
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As Siskin aptly notes, “[w]hat systems want … is the highest ratio of parts to principles” 
(23).  The ideal system, then, would be the simplest yet have the greatest explanatory 
power.  For Mather and Lafitau this ideal system was Christianity itself, with the single 
principle of God underpinning the entirety of creation.  To simply accept the principle of 
God outright, however, would run counter to the thinking of many of their 
contemporaries, who insisted upon the need for empirical data.161  The Abbé Etienne 
Bonnot de Condillac, for example, in his Essai sur l’origine des connaissances humaines, 
insists “il n’y a point d’idées qui ne soient acquises ; les premières viennent 
immédiatement des sens” (13).162  Thus Mather and Lafitau turn to the realm of the 
human in search for manifestations of the Christian God. 
 
In Lafitau’s case, we find the systematic application of two basic axioms: that all human 
practices share a common origin, and that that original practice can be most accurately 
discerned through a comparison of the current practices of the “primitive” Native 
Americans with those of their ancient counterparts in Europe and elsewhere.  Motsch 
suggests that this pair of axioms gets Lafitau stuck in a tautological rut because “il 
manque un tiers terme : ce qu’il offre, c[e n]’est que des analogies” (62).163  I would 
counter, however, that there is a silent third term operating throughout the text: modern, 
                                                
161 Siskin, for his part, reproduces our modern bias towards the secular system in his privileging of systems 
like Newton’s that have become cornerstones of modern physics, and he thereby minimizes not only the 
pervasiveness of religious belief among early scientists but also the ready affinity between theology and 
systematic thought in general; even Albert Einstein, after all, remained convinced that God had established 
the laws of physics. 
 
162 “we have no ideas but what come from the senses” (Essay on the Origin of Human Knowledge 18) 
 
163 “he lacks a third term: what he offers is [nothing more than] analogies” (translation mine) 
 
  212 
civilized Europeans.  After all, the express purpose of Lafitau’s text is to illuminate the 
shared origins of all customs, and, thereby, all religion for his contemporary European 
audience; thus, the entirety of his analysis is framed with their concerns and modes of 
thought in mind. 
 
This quest for shared origins finds its most developed application, fittingly, in Lafitau’s 
chapter on religion, which takes up almost two-thirds of the first volume of the Mœurs.  
Lafitau uses a number of strategies to try and demonstrate the shared origins of all 
religions, addressing everything from the visual similarities between religious icons, to 
the conceptual similarities underlying their attitudes towards particular rituals (even 
where those rituals differ in appearance), to the etymological similarities between Native 
American and ancient Asian, Middle Eastern, or European religious vocabulary. 
 
Thus, quite early in the chapter Lafitau notes the widespread identification of God with 
the sun, calling it “le symbole Hieroglyphique de la Divinité chez toutes les Nations” 
(1.129), and then moves on to other common celestial identifications of God, including 
thunder and the moon.164  This gives way to a discussion of the Iroquois words for the 
sun, “Endi ou Enni”, and the moon, “Endit’ha ou Ennit’ha … ce t’ha final étant un 
diminutif dans leur Langue,” which Lafitau argues are derived from the word “Bendis, 
que les Auteurs anciens disent avoir été le nom de Diane dans la Langue des peuples de 
Thrace, dont les Orgies furent transportées dans la Grece, et particulierement à Athenes 
                                                
 
164 “the hieroglyphic symbol of divinity among all nations” (1.104) 
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sous le nom de Bendidia or Mendidia” (1.135).165  Lafitau backs up this claim with a 
sophisticated argument based on comparative phonology, noting that the Hurons and 
Iroquois do not have “B. M. V … et des autres Labiales” and thus “ne manquent presque 
jamais d’ajoûter un ou” at the beginning of words that would, in Europe, begin with a 
labial “à cause de l’Euphonie” (1.135).166  He then goes on to link this root to other words 
in other languages that serve to signify the moon or the sun or other religious figures.167 
 
While the majority of Lafitau’s Mœurs follows this pattern, leaving the third term of his 
comparison unspoken, it emerges explicitly from time to time when Lafitau wants to 
particularly emphasize the superiority of contemporary European ways of knowing over 
those of the Native Americans.  Motsch isolates a perfect illustration of this when he 
shows how Lafitau distinguishes between the American Indian method of counting time 
by simply enumerating the seasons and the European method, which uses mathematical 
calculations to establish a more perfect system for measuring time.  Lafitau states that the 
Native Americans “ont quelque conoissance de l’Astronomie,” yet “ils n’ont point une 
                                                
165 “endi or enni”; “Endit’ha or Ennit’ha … the terminal –t’ha being a diminutive in their language”; 
“Bendis … a word which the ancient authors say used to be the name of Diana in the language of the 
Thracians by whom the orgies were imported into Greece, particularly to Athens under the name of 
Bendidia or Mendidia” (1.108) 
 
166 “B. M, V … and other labials”; “never fail to join an ou”; “for the sake of euphony” (1.108) 
 
167 Lafitau’s arguments about the universal identification of the sun as a key god still later lead him into a 
comparison of the visual representation of gods in various religions to find significant similarities between 
them, with detailed engravings provided to support his claims.  A good example is Plate V on page 140 of 
the first volume, which, in his own words, portrays “Isis assise sur une fleur de Lotos” [“Isis seated on a 
lotus flower”], “Pussa ou Isis symbolique des Chinois, assise sur une plante en forme d’Heliotrope” [“Pussa 
[Pushan] or symbolic Isis of the Chinese, seated on a plant in the shape of a heliotrope”], “Figure 
symbolique du Soleil tirée d’un Antique trouvé à Rome dans la voye Appienne, expliqué par Tristan” 
[“Symbolic figure of the sun, taken from an ancient one found in Rome, on the Appian Way, explained by 
Tristan”], and  another “Image de Pusse ou de l’Isis des Chinois” [“Another picture of Pussa or the Isis of 
the Chinese”] about which he further notes that “ Kirker dit que c’est une figure du Dieu Amida des 
Japonois” [“Kircher .. says that it is a figure of the God of the Japanese who is parallel to Harpocartes”] 
(b2r-v [1.9-10]). 
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exactitude mathematique pour les intercalcations, et pour accorder les années heliaques 
avec les années lunaires” (2.225, 2.232).168  Lafitau thereby suggests a developmental 
hierarchy that places the exactness of European methods above those of the Native 
Americans because it appeals to an abstract, mathematical ideal derived through 
systematic reasoning.  As Motsch puts it, “[s]i le temps est initialement perçu à travers la 
succession d’événements naturels, sa standardisation et sa supputation suggèrent qu’il 
s’agit plutôt d’une entité abstraite qui existe en dehors de ces événements” (198).169  
 
It is hardly an accident that Lafitau here places the contemporary European power of 
reasoning above the purely iterative capacity of the Native Americans.  The distinction is, 
for Lafitau, commensurate with that between the European use of alphabetic writing and 
the hieroglyphic method deployed by Native Americans and ancient peoples, and thus it 
serves as the basis of his analysis; in fact, Lafitau’s discussion of Native American 
astronomy leads him into a discussion of the “hieroglyphic” writing of the Maya and the 
Aztecs.  The comparative aspect of Lafitau’s work—his placing of Indian customs 
alongside those of pre-Graeco-Roman peoples—is rooted precisely in the problem that 
both present to him because, lacking alphabetic writing, they do not belong to history as 
such.  As Duchet puts it, the “mouvement pendulaire” of comparison permits 
“l’instauration d’un sens [dans] les vides du discours et les silences des textes” (610).170 
                                                
168 “have ... some smattering of this science [astronomy]”; “they have no mathematical exactness in 
intercalcations to bring their heliac years into agreement with their lunar years” (2.130, 2.133) 
 
169 “If time is initially perceived across the succession of events, its standardization and computation 
suggests that it is more a matter of an abstract entity that exists outside these events” (translation mine). 
 
170 “the pendular movement”; “the instauration of a meaning [in] the blanks in the discourse and the 
silences of the texts” (translation mine) 
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The ethnocentrism of Lafitau’s equation of the distinction between alphabetic and 
hieroglyphic writing with that between reason and its absence can hardly go unnoticed by 
the modern reader, and yet it may well remain surprising to us that this very equation 
underlies the split between ethnography and history as systematic, and therefore 
scientific, disciplines.  Motsch is again helpful here, distinguishing between two notions 
of writing: the first, writing as simply the graphic technique for preserving knowledge; 
the second, a much broader sense of writing as “la production du sens” (“Mémoire” 
115).171  According to this latter notion, “[l’]écriture couvre … un vaste champ de 
production humaine, car le sens peut s’afficher sous de multiples formes : comme 
littérature, science, peinture, musique, chant, récit, etc., mais aussi comme comportement 
humain, sous forme de gestes et de rites sacrés ou profanes” (“Mémoire” 115).172  Such a 
notion of writing would of course extend even to custom itself. 
 
The problem, however, is that custom, for Lafitau, is the kind of writing people make 
when they are incapable of writing as such.  Thus when he considers the customary use 
of beaded wampum belts by North American natives as a means of recording treaties, 
contracts, and other public records, he notes that they do so “[c]ar les Sauvages n’ayant 
pas l’usage de l’écriture et des lettres, et se trouvant par là exposés à oublier bien-tôt les 
choses qui se passent parmi eux” (1.506).173  The wampum belts may, in his words, 
                                                
171 “the production of meaning” (translation mine) 
 
172 “writing covers a vast field of human productions, as meaning can present itself through any number of 
forms: as literature, science, painting, music, song, story, etc., but also as human behavior, through the form 
of gestures and rituals, both sacred and profane” (translation mine) 
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“suppléent à ce défaut,” but they do so only by providing “une mémoire locale par des 
paroles qu[e les Sauvages] attachent à ces Colliers” (1.506).174  This record itself is a 
tenuous one, since it requires the nobles and elders to be responsible for remembering the 
significance of each individual belt.  While Lafitau indicates that the pattern and quantity 
of beads may give some clue to the relative significance of the event or treaty they record 
(1.505/1.310), he makes it clear that they do not themselves disseminate their meaning; 
rather, they embody the meaning for the individual who is responsible for preserving it.  
As Motsch glosses, “[l]e collier de porcelaine ne re-présente alors pas un arrangement, 
mais il est lui-même l’arrangement”(130).175 
 
The distinction, then, between alphabetic writing and hieroglyphic writing such as the 
wampum belts is, like that between enumerating and calculating, based upon a distinction 
between a principle of iteration and a principle of abstraction: the hieroglyphic merely 
repeats what has been said or done at the level of the concrete while the alphabetic 
extracts some communicable essence from it.  So, while Lafitau, like Motsch, 
distinguishes between writing as a concrete practice and an abstract principle, he also 
collapses that distinction by identifying alphabetic writing as the concrete practice 
properly aligned with the abstract principle of generating meaning.  Hieroglyphic writing, 
in its turn, is collapsed back into such transitory and embodied practices as speech—as 
Lafitau remarks with interest, the word Gaïonni, which designates the wampum belts, 
                                                                                                                                            
173 “have not the use of writing and letters, and are thus given to forgetting the things which take place 
among them, so to speak, from one minute to the next” (1.310) 
 
174 “supply this lack”; “a local record by the words which [the natives] give these belts” (1.310) 
 
175 “the wampum does not thus re-present an arrangement, it is itself the arrangement” (translation mine) 
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gives rise to the word Gaouenda, which he translates as meaning “voix ou parole” 
(1.506).176  Inasmuch as this double translation—“voice or word”—admits a double 
meaning, it is because Lafitau’s systematic method permits him to extract meaning from 
custom.  As Michel de Certeau puts it, “[t]he ‘word’ (parole) which interests him is not 
voice (vox).  It is ‘teaching’ (documentum)” (42; parentheses Hovde’s).  In other words, 
writing enables Lafitau to read the unwritten. 
 
Which brings us back to Mather’s text: if Lafitau’s transhistorical comparisons enable 
him to produce his system, then their by-product is the distinction between pre-history 
and history, itself grounded in a distinction between writing and its lack, which 
corresponds to the distinction between civilized and savage.  Mather’s history 
demonstrates the force of these distinctions, even as it shows how the practice of writing 
history is itself altered by a systematic approach.  We see this in Mather’s own 
conception of his work as being a “fetch[ing] … together [of] multitudes of particular 
texts” in order to recover the “treasures of illustration for the Bible” (33).  As Jan 
Stievermann has shown in his “Writing ‘To Conquer All Things,’” Mather’s copious 
citation of other texts has been much maligned by critics over the centuries, but it is an 
integral part of Mather’s conception of the Magnalia.  More than producing a simple 
anthology, Mather recorded a great deal of himself in the text of the Magnalia as well, 
because, as Stievermann notes, he “required his literary project to capture and reproduce 
through language the unparalleled newness … of America,” which further required “an 
authoritative literary voice integrating and transcending all other voices in the text” (266).  
                                                
 
176 “voice or word” (1.310) 
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Thus, while Mather provides us with unedited versions of any number of source 
documents, he also drowns them in his own commentary: as Constance Post notes of one 
letter of his father’s that he cites in the Magnalia, “Mather proceeds to add notes that 
swell the one-and-a-half page letter to almost thirteen pages … [i]n a manner that 
strikingly anticipates modern scholarly practice” not to mention the practice of Lafitau 
(“Old World Order” 417).  
 
We likewise see the effects of the system in Mather’s organization of his work into 
rationalized categories rather than a chronological order.  While I stated above that 
Mather viewed history as a coherent textual fabric that allows one to move backward in 
time in order to revive an ancient, and ideal, mode of life, it is important to clarify that 
this vision is dependent on Mather’s typically Puritan ability to move back and forth 
between the chronological perspective of mundane history and the transcendental 
perspective of divine history, which provides an overarching framework of Biblical types 
that can be used to make sense out of mundane experiences.  As such, it seems fitting that 
Mather’s text is broken up into seven “books” each of which constitutes a distinct “type” 
of historical material, rather than a period of New England’s development.   
 
Book one of the Magnalia chronicles the discovery of the Americas and the settling of 
the New England colonies; book two consists of biographies of the governors and 
magistrates of New England; book three is biographies of sixty New England ministers; 
book four relates the history of Harvard, its laws, and several of its eminent graduates; 
book five includes the acts passed at the various New England synods; book six offers a 
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collection of “illustrious, wonderful providences” that occurred in New England; and, 
finally, book seven gives an account of the “wars of the lord,” as Mather calls King 
William’s War (1689-1697), the first of what are now known as the French and Indian 
wars.  Thus, while the book maintains a roughly chronological trajectory, we might well 
borrow Lafitau’s terms and say that their order is calculated rather than enumerated.  In 
point of fact, such mathematical terminology is not out of place here, given Mather’s own 
obsessive rationalizing of his schema by the significance of the number of books and the 
number of biographies in each book and so on (see 1.236-238, for example).  Again, 
while this feature of Mather’s work may seem arbitrary and strange to us today, it was as 
natural to him as the four stage theory to a Victorian anthropologist, or the tripartite class 
system to a Marxist.  In Mather’s time such an association between the ordained and the 
ordinated was the cardinal virtue of the system as a genre. 
 
We see the Enlightenment systematicity of Mather’s text perhaps most clearly, however, 
in his attitudes towards Native American symbolic practices, which closely echo those of 
Lafitau.  For Mather, as for Lafitau, Native American symbolic systems were to blame 
for their lack of history; thus, he disdains their language for its lack of the letter “r,” and 
for the extreme length of some of their words (Magnalia 561).  This disdain may seem 
strange to us because it focuses on the written aspect of a language that belonged to a 
people supposedly without letters.  Yet, for Mather, it is all the more telling: this 
resistance to effective literalization demonstrates an inherent incapacity for literacy 
among the Algonquians.  This incapacity for literacy, in its turn, demonstrates an 
incapacity for civilization and religion.  Thus, recounting the life of John Eliot, the 
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Puritan missionary, Mather focuses on the difficulty of Eliot’s task, “the double work 
incumbent upon him [because] he was to make men of them, ere he could hope to see 
them saints; they must be civilized ere they could be Christianized” (560).  
Unsurprisingly, Mather’s history closes not with the successful conversion of the Native 
Americans, but with the threat of their destruction as they wage war against the Puritan 
colony of New England. 
 
As we saw in the last chapter, Mather’s rhetorical justification for Anglo-American 
violence against Native Americans is grounded in the logic of erasure exemplified by 
Beverly as well: the Indians, in his mind, deserve to disappear because, not having 
writing—or, for that matter, religion—they were never fully there—they never made a 
mark, so to speak.  For Mather this double lack—religion and writing—is more than 
coincidental.  As he explicitly states in the Magnalia, it is the work of “the devil[, who] 
decoyed those miserable salvages hither, in hopes that the gospel of the Lord Jesus Christ 
would never come here to destroy or disturb his absolute empire over them” (556).  Thus 
where many earlier English, French, and Spanish colonists saw the Native Americans’ 
lack of religion as an opportunity to convert large numbers of people to their respective 
Christian sects, Mather here interprets it as evidence of their being destined to damnation. 
 
Despite Mather’s extensive efforts to proselytize among other oppressed populations, 
including such varied groups as North American slaves, South American Catholics, 
French Huguenots, and members of the Greek Orthodox Church, he generally evinces 
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little interest in the possibility of converting Native Americans to Christianity.177  His 
biography of Eliot in the Magnalia, in addition to casting his work among the 
Algonquian peoples of New England as an impossible task, reduces it to less than a third 
of his life story despite Eliot’s own regard for his missionary activities—including his 
translation of the Bible into Algonquian—as the culmination of his life’s work.178  Given 
the overwhelming bulk of evidence, then, Bercovitch is quite correct in his assessment of 
the role of Native Americans in Mather’s epic history of New England: for Mather, the 
Native Americans were nothing more than an obstacle to be overcome in a narrative of 
Puritan ascendancy. 
 
Then again, Mather himself published a bilingual (English-Algonquian) catechism in 
1700, An Epistle to the Christian Indians (Wussukwhonk En Christianeue asuh 
peantamwae Indianog), then a quatrilingual (English-Latin-Dutch-Iroquoian) catechism 
in 1707, Another Tongue brought in, and he further made a point of including an 
appendix on the recent activity in the Praying Indian towns at the conclusion of his 
                                                
 
177 For more on Mather’s apostolic writings to these groups, see Mark Weiner’s “This ‘Miserable African’: 
Race, crime, and disease in colonial Boston,” Common-place.  4.3 (April 2004), online at <http://common-
place.dreamhost.com/vol-04/no-03/weiner/index.shtml>; Elisabeth Ceppi’s “Come When You Are Called: 
Racialized Servitude and the Division of Puritan Labor,” Literature Interpretation Theory.  16 (2005): 213-
231; William Hyland’s “‘American Tears’: Cotton Mather and the Plight of Eastern Orthodox Christians,” 
New England Quarterly.  77.2 (June 2004): 282-291; and Howard C. Rice’s “Cotton Mather Speaks to 
France: American Propaganda in the Age of Louis XIV,” The New England Quarterly.  16.2 (June 1943): 
193-233. 
 
178 Compare to Constance Post, who, in her article “Old World Order in the New,” presents the contrary 
argument that Mather in fact emphasizes the role of Eliot’s missionary work in his biography; however, her 
calculations of the relative number of pages devoted to each aspect of Eliot’s life do not seem to fit with the 
edition of the Magnalia to which we both refer.  Post states that “[o]f the forty-two pages comprising his 
biography of Eliot, eight are about Eliot as a Christian (part 1); seven about Eliot as a minister (part 2); and 
21 about Eliot as an evangelist to the Indians (part 3). (The remaining 6 pages include the dedication, 
introduction, and conclusion.)” (419).  By contrast, I find the respective numbers to be fifty-seven total 
pages, thirteen for part 1, eleven for part 2, nineteen for part 3, and fifteen of dedication, introduction, and 
conclusion.  See Magnalia 1.526-583. 
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Bonifacius: An Essay to Do Good, published in 1710.  Given these dates of publication, 
there is no question of Mather’s having reversed an earlier, more positive assessment of 
the Native Americans when he wrote the Magnalia—unless, that is, we are to accuse him 
of being completely inconsistent on the question of the theological status of Native 
Americans.   
 
In a recent essay, however, Sarah Rivett offers another path out of this conundrum by 
demonstrating how Puritan missionary work among Native Americans was driven by a 
desire to accumulate empirical evidence in support of their religious theories as much as 
by a desire to convert them to Christianity.  The focus of Rivett’s analysis is Eliot’s 
published tracts, particularly A Brief Narrative of the progress of the Gospel amongst the 
Indians in New-England which appeared in London in 1671 (at the same time as his 
Indian Dialogues were being printed in Cambridge, Massachusetts), as well as his 
correspondence with the members of Royal Society in London.  As Rivett explains, the 
relationship between the Royal Society and the major Puritan intellectuals in New 
England was a strong one—Mather, too, had a great deal of correspondence with the 
Society, and in 1713 he became a member himself.   
 
The reasons for this strong connection are many and varied, but foremost among them 
was a shared vision of the Americas as a privileged locale in which to study the natural 
world—a vision that, in the English tradition of empirical science, can be traced back at 
least as far as Francis Bacon (see, for example, the frontispiece to his Instauratio 
Magna). Thus, given the religious outlook of the members of the Royal Society, the 
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Americas were likewise seen as a privileged place in which to gain insight into the 
divine.  As Rivett shows, Eliot’s writings are filled with the rhetorical hallmarks of 
empiricism, which enable him to “represent the New World as a space in which the 
divine bec[omes] visible in a more distilled form and c[an] thus be more accurately 
described and understood” (20).  This method of writing requires that Eliot reduce the 
Native Americans from speaking subjects as such into mere, “natural” evidence to be 
interpreted, very much in the manner of Lafitau in his Mœurs. 
 
Rivett further identifies Mather’s appendix to the Bonifacius as a late example of this 
“empirical desire” that places Native Americans in a “framework of racial subordination” 
while portraying “the figure of the Praying Indian as a site of epistemological and 
empirical plentitude” (43).  Thus, Mather’s interest in missionary activities among the 
natives and his conviction that they are the minions of Satan are in accord inasmuch as 
they are both dependent on a general subordination and reduction of Native Americans as 
a people.  Furthermore, both this interest and this conviction are rooted in Mather’s drive 
to rediscover the lost origins of the Christian church, precisely the task that Lafitau had 
set himself in the Mœurs. 
 
And this is where custom comes back into the picture.  Custom, according to the 
humanist scholars of the Renaissance, was a force that, as Montaigne puts it, “hebete nos 
sens” (1.23.109), and thereby is able “de nous saisir et empieter de telle sorte, qu’à peine 
soit-il en nous de nous r’avoir de sa prinse et de r’entrer en nous, pour discourir et 
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raisonner de ses ordonnances” (1.23.115).179  What’s more, the nature of custom was 
multiply and to mutate, producing social and religious strife as it increased the 
differences between people.  In a brilliant rhetorical move, however, Mather and Lafitau 
blame the very proliferation of custom itself upon the fall from grace.  Thus Mather, in a 
sermon on the danger of “Evil Customes,” argues that “all Unregenerate people, are 
ACCUSTOMED TO DO EVIL; are under the power of Evil Custome” and that “the 
Original Sin, which we are born withal, is a Complication of all Sinful Habits” (197).  
Lafitau, for his part, avers that all pagan religions bear “une telle conformité dans le culte 
avec celui de la Religion véritable, qu’il semble que presque tout l’essential a été pris 
dans le même fonds” (1.9), using his comparative analysis of customs to trace that origin 
back beyond Moses to Adam and Eve (1.10-13/1.32-33).180 
 
In his understanding of custom, Mather pinpoints the very concern that drove the 
Reformation itself, which is well expressed by a passage he recorded in his Quotidiana: 
that “the church was gradually corrupted, as in her Doctrines, so in her worship; an 
infinity of ceremonies, by degrees insensibly sliding in; one eminent man perhaps 
invented and practiced a certain action, which he used himself … others being led by his 
exemple, performed the same, and others again imitated them, till at length, the Action 
became a Tradition, and custome” ([45.89]).  The aim of Mather’s Magnalia Christi 
Americana, then, was wholly in keeping with the aim of the Reformation: to return to, in 
his words, “the profession of the purest Religion … lost, in the loss of primitive 
                                                
179 “stupefied the senses” (1.23.94); “seize and ensnare us in such a way that it is hardly within our power to 
get ourselves back out of its grip and return ourselves to reflect and reason about its ordinances” (1.23.100) 
 
180 “such conformity in forms of worship with those of true religion that it seems that almost all its essential 
points have been based on the same foundation” (1.30-31) 
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principles, and the primitive practices, upon which it was first established” (40). As 
Lafitau’s work demonstrates even more clearly than Mather’s, the system itself 
empowers the analysis of custom as a means of restoring that primal condition through 
the mechanism of the empirical method itself, which relies on the power of reason to 
abstract meanings from raw data. 
 
That Lafitau should share Mather’s obsession with reestablishing the original practices of 
the Christian church may not fit with our conventional understanding of the 
Protestant/Catholic divide, yet recent criticism has suggested that the effects of the 
Counter-Reformation upon Catholic theological and institutional practice mirrored those 
of the Reformation upon Protestant practice in many respects—a feature of the Counter-
Reformation that Montaigne noticed at its very beginning (1.23.119-120/1.23.105). 
 
For both Mather and Lafitau, then, the path up (or back) to God requires them to produce 
a coherent and global vision of the human world in order to correctly—that is, 
reasonably—ascertain those rituals and practices that correspond to those of the early 
church.  The process of reasoning—and its adjunct, alphabetic writing—allows them to 
reconstruct, from both historical and anthropological evidence, what those practices must 
have been, but it requires that they come to regard Native Americans as unlettered 
savages lost in the depths of pre-history, and thus incapable of the kind of reasoning 
needed to become subjects of history rather than subject to it.  Thus, while Andreas 
Motsch has argued that anthropological discourse and historical discourse both 
“partageant … la notion d’un temps unique, linéaire et progressif” (“Temps 
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anthropologique” 196),181 the work of Mather and Lafitau suggests that time in these 
discourses is both linear and parabolic, tracing, on the one hand, civilized humanity’s 
progress from the fall from grace through to its final regeneration and, on the other, the 
perpetual fall of the savage. 
 
 
“DID THE SPANIARDS DEFEAT THE INDIANS BY MEANS OF SIGNS?” 
 
As Anthony Pagden notes in his foreword to a recent reissue of the English translation of 
Tzvetan Todorov’s classic text, “[s]ince its publication in 1982, The Conquest of America 
has aroused a great deal of controversy” (ix).  The basic thesis of Todorov’s work, which 
marked a major shift in his own critical focus, is that “la conquête de l’Amérique … 
annonce et fonde notre identité présente” because it forced European society to truly take 
account of human alterity, a process which culminated in the victory of “civilisation 
occidentale” over the indigenous peoples of South America “grâce à sa supériorité dans 
la communication humaine” (14, 255).182  Thus, the main critique of his work has been 
“the supposition that Todorov is merely re-enforcing a myth of European superiority the 
Spaniards themselves had initiated” (Pagden xi).  Pagden defends the text, stating that 
“Todorov’s objective was thus to understand the process of conquest in order to prevent 
it, in order to recognize it when we encounter it today” (xii), and I fully accept that this is 
Todorov’s objective.  However, we might say the same thing of Beverly or Lafitau 
                                                
181 “share the notion of a unique, linear, and progressive time” (translation mine) 
 
182 “the conquest of America … heralds and establishes our present identity” (4); “Western civilization has 
conquered … because of its superiority in human communication” (251) 
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(though it would be much harder to say it of Mather, given his frequent, vitriolic 
rhetorical attacks on Native American peoples). 
 
Fairly early in the book, Todorov poses the question that drives his analysis: “[l]es 
Espagnols auraient-ils triomphé sur les Indiens à l’aide des signes” (68)?183  Given our 
reading of Mather and Lafitau, we will have no trouble answering this question for 
Todorov—victory goes to the holders of the alphabet, just as Marc Lescarbot had 
expected it would (Histoire 3.6.370-371)—and yet, it is especially striking to see how 
closely Todorov’s analysis and his method hew to that of Mather and Lafitau.  Deborah 
Root offers, in “The Imperial Signifier,” a critique of La conquête that strikes me as 
especially even-handed, since she grants (as I do) every point that Pagden makes in 
Todorov’s defense.  In that essay, Root carefully demonstrates how “Todorov’s 
understanding of the radical difference between ‘Indian’ and European culture rests on 
three interrelated notions he believes pre-Columbian native society exhibits: a concept of 
time which was almost completely past-oriented, a profound social conformity, and a 
cultural stasis which rendered change nearly impossible” (201): in other words, precisely 
those qualities that an anthropologist following in Lafitau’s footsteps would be inclined 
to recognize in it.  Meanwhile, Todorov treats the Spanish conquerors as modern 
individuals, making “European conventions and ‘rituals’ … invisible” through “his 
silence” while he reduces the “Aztecs [to] a list of traits and abstract qualities” (Root 204, 
205).  Thus, as Pagden puts it, “Todorov has argued that European logos has conquered 
mythos—reason has triumphed over fable—as language has taken the place of ritual and 
                                                
 
183 “Did the Spaniards defeat the Indians by means of signs?” (62) 
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divination” (xii).  Or, as we might put it, the Baconian conception of custom as a natural 
force that can be harnessed to the betterment of humankind by the empirical method has 
triumphed over the Montagnian notion that meddling in matters of custom can only lead 
to social strife—except, of course, that it is hardly as simple as this. 
 
At the conclusion of the previous chapter, I suggested that the writings of Pierre-Esprit 
Radisson and Mary Rowlandson chart out two broad lines by which identity would be 
conceived in the eighteenth century: on the one hand, Radisson’s cosmopolitanism, 
grounded in a broadly-conceived principle of “interest”; on the other, Rowlandson’s 
binaristic chauvinism, grounded in the identification of nation with familial “relations.”  
Both of these lines work their way through the writings of Mather and Lafitau—in fact, 
we can readily identify both of these lines of thought in the work of Bercovitch and 
Todorov as well.  What is surprising, though, is how these lines have combined here to 
produce a cosmopolitan universalism that still demands that the world be divided into a 
hierarchically ordered “us” and “them.”  More surprising still is the troubling idea to 
which all four authors seemingly accede: that Native Americans had, in one fashion or 
another, to be jettisoned into the void of pre-history in order to pave the way for the 
emergence of the modern Euro-American. 
 
And it is precisely this accession that we must recognize and challenge if we are to 
perform the kind of critical analysis that Todorov would like for us to do.  Like Todorov, 
Bercovitch appeals to a principle of ongoing dialogue as an ideal that provides “the 
prospect of achieving an Americanist criticism worthy of our time” (Rites 376).  Yet his 
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monolithic model of American society, based on a Geertzian notion of culture as a 
coherent ideological totality (see Rites 362), emphasizes the process by which dialogue 
results in consensus, rather than the material effects of dissensus, not to mention the 
latter’s ongoing presence, regardless of the efficacy of dialogue.  This insistence on 
consensus is the core of the cultural pluralism that, as I have already noted, Leonard 
Tennenhouse criticizes in his review of Bercovitch’s The Cambridge History of American 
Literature for “effectively conceal[ing] the exclusions and hierarchies that enable specific 
groups of people to formulate … notions of community” (219-20).   
 
This concealment is akin to the “slate-wiping” tactics of many of the colonial authors I 
have examined here, from Lescarbot to Rowlandson to Mather and Lafitau: in order to 
produce a theoretically all-inclusive whole it replaces multiplicity with a binary.  In the 
course of this chapter and this project, I hope that I have demonstrated the virtues of a 
Montaignian approach—that is, one that observes differences without seeking to 
assimilate, negate, or subordinate them—as much as I have charted the development of a 
series of binaries—savage/civilized, orality/writing, anthropology/history—that managed 
to reduce that key Montaignian term of custom to a mere datum, as capable of showing 
Bercovitch and Todorov the superiority of Euro-American culture as it is of telling 
Mather and Lafitau how far a given people has fallen from grace. 




EPILOGUE – LETTERS FROM AN AMERICAN FARMER,  
NOTES TOWARDS A GLOBAL “CULTURE” 
 
[W]hence came all these people?  they are a mixture of English, Scotch, 
Irish, French, Dutch, Germans, and Swedes.  From this promiscuous 
breed, that race now called Americans has arisen. … [U]rged by a variety 
of motives, here they came.  Every thing has tended to regenerate them; 
new laws, a new mode of living, a new social system; here they are 
become men: in Europe they were as so many useless plants, wanting 
vegitative mould, and refreshing showers; they withered, and were mowed 
down by want, hunger, and war; but now by the power of transplantation, 
like all other plants they have taken root and flourished!  
–– J. Hector St. John de Crèvecœur, Letters from an 
 American Farmer (49-50) 
 
J. Hector St. John de Crèvecœur is in many ways ideal for concluding my analysis of the 
role of custom in the colonization of North America and indicating something of the 
future course of those figures and concepts that emerge in custom’s wake.  In his travels 
he embodies the continually intersecting trajectories of England, France, and North 
America during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.  Born in Normandy in 1735, 
Crèvecœur arrived in French Canada in the 1750s and enrolled in the militia, rising to the 
rank of Lieutenant.  In 1759, after the defeat of the French army in the French and Indian 
(or Seven Years) War, he moved to New York, where he married, became a practicing 
surveyor and a landowning farmer, and composed the majority of his famous Letters from 
an American Farmer.  During the Revolutionary War, he fled with his eldest son to
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 England and then to France, whence he returned to America after the conclusion of the 
war to serve as the French Consul in New York. 
 
The Letters, first published in English in 1782 and then in French in 1784, touch upon 
many of the same concerns that animated the writings of those earlier North American 
colonists I have examined in previous chapters—what does it mean to live in a “new 
world”?  How is one to negotiate one’s relationship with the metropole?  With the native 
inhabitants?  And, most importantly of all, what is it that binds people together in a 
community with a shared identity?  Crèvecœur resorts to many of the same rhetorical 
strategies in his quest to answer these vexing questions—like Bradstreet he suggests that 
North America can offer succor to a troubled Europe, like Rowlandson and Mather he 
effectively writes Native Americans out of the future of the continent (at least until the 
final letter, where his authorial persona, “Farmer John,” decides to hide among them to 
escape the vicissitudes of the Revolutionary War), like many of them he places the family 
at the conceptual center of the nation, and like Lafitau he uses ethnographic writing as a 
method of identifying universal human traits through the examination of the 
particularities of individual communities.  Yet, as the operative simile in my epigraph 
indicates, all this leads Crèvecœur to a radically different answer to my final question 
from any of the earlier colonists I have considered.  The character of human societies, for 
Crèvecœur, is formed in direct response to their environment, most especially their 
natural environment: people are like plants, according to their soil they either wither and 
waste or take root and flourish. 
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This focus on the natural environment as the key factor determining human development 
is in keeping with many of Crèvecœur’s contemporaries on both sides of the Atlantic, 
particularly those who adhered to the central tenets of the physiocratic school of 
economic thought first expounded in print in François Quesnay’s 1758 Tableaux 
Économiques: that wealth depends on agricultural production, which, in its turn, depends 
on a strong legal support for private property and the liberty of individuals to pursue their 
own self-interests.  Crèvecœur himself returns to these principles throughout the Letters, 
repeatedly insisting that the primary virtue of America is that “we are strangers to those 
feudal institutions that have enslaved so many” and that thereby “nature opens up her 
broad lap to receive the perpetual accession of new comers, and to supply them with 
food” (7).  Crèvecœur likewise produces evidence throughout his Letters for the 
influence of climate upon society, noting of the inhabitants of Charleston, for example, 
how the “rays of their sun seem to urge them irresistibly to dissipation and pleasure” 
(215) and later insisting that “each climate produces … vices, and miseries peculiar to its 
latitude” (228).  This climatological determinism, having been rejected and refuted by the 
early North American colonists, had been restored to a central place in American thought 
most particularly through the influence of the Baron de Montesquieu’s De l’esprit des 
lois, which appeared in French in 1748 and in an English translation in 1750. 
 
Crèvecœur is, of course, habitually cited in support of the continuist and exceptionalist 
vision of American literature and society—not only the above epigraph, but several 
passages scattered throughout the Letters offer a paean to his adoptive homeland, 
particularly those in the often-anthologized third letter, “What is an American?”, which 
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emphasize the power of America to radically transform the character of the people who 
settled there: “The American is a new man, who acts upon new principles; he must 
therefore entertain new ideas, and form new opinions” (53).  That chapter concludes with 
an account of “Andrew the Hebridean,” offered as an example of those Europeans who 
came to America and found political liberty, ample land, hospitable neighbors, financial 
security, and domestic happiness.  And yet, Crèvecœur hardly assumed that America 
could only have a positive influence on its transplanted inhabitants; for every “Andrew 
the Hebridean” who comes to America there is an instance of his bestial counterpart, the 
“Frontier Man.”   
 
It is worth taking a closer look at Crèvecœur’s description of the “Frontier Man” because 
it illuminates how fully he has left behind the shared central principle of Bacon and 
Montaigne’s conception of custom: its power to drive the transformation of human 
society through iteration and emulation.  Where Montaigne’s account of the New World 
natives in “Des coches” emphasizes their status as a people relatively free from the bonds 
of custom, and where Bacon valorizes a direct communication with nature without the 
inhibiting influence of custom and tradition, Crèvecœur emphasizes the antagonistic 
relationship of the frontier settler with his natural environment as driving him to 
degenerate through the loss of his civilized habits: 
 
By living in or near the woods, their actions are regulated by the wildness 
of the neighbourhood.  The deer often come to eat their grain, the wolves 
to destroy their sheep, the bears to kill their hogs, the foxes to catch their 
poultry.  This surrounding hostility, immediately puts the gun into their 
hands; they watch these animals, they kill some; and thus by defending 
their property, they soon become professed hunters; this is the progress, 
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once hunters, farewell to the plough.  The chase renders them ferocious, 
gloomy, and unsociable. (63) 
 
Thus, for Crèvecœur, as for many of his colonial contemporaries, it is not the shackles of 
custom that prevent humankind from realizing their natural capacities, but rather an 
irrational nature that violently forces people to conform to its dictates, overwhelming, at 
least initially, attempts to restrain its force through the countermeasures of civil manners 
and enlightened reason.184  What Crèvecœur advocates in place of Bacon’s vision of a 
humanity purged of its irrational customs—or, for that matter, in place of Mather and 
Lafitau’s quest to return to some originary body of customary practices—is a balance 
between the neighborly culture of civil society and the invigorating effects of an ongoing 
engagement with a natural world controlled and contained through agriculture.185   
 
For Crèvecœur, as Myra Jehlen suggests, this felicitous balance is best epitomized by the 
nuclear family, whose gentle yoke, as Crèvecœur himself indicates, helps to tie a man to 
the land (Jehlen 208; Letters 23-24).   Crèvecœur’s account of the family as a social 
institution greatly resembles that of Bradstreet or Rowlandson: it serves both as a figure 
of larger political institutions and as a political institution in itself (see also Jehlen 210).  
                                                
 
184 As Eric Kaufman notes, “the pride implicit in America’s agrarian republicanism (often contrasted with 
Europe’s sinful urbanism) was offset by the low esteem accorded to frontier, as opposed to sedentary 
societies. … This image of frontier depravity is a stigma that even the most ardent of Revolutionary-era 
nationalists could not overcome” (670).   Kaufman goes on to demonstrate how the frontier figure gained 
greater prominence over the course of the following century, particularly through the emergent mythology 
of Daniel Boone (673-674).  Interestingly, the preface to the 1785 French edition of John Filson’s The 
discovery, settlement and present state of Kentucke, which latter contains the first printed account of 
Boone’s adventures, emphasizes the importance of this text as a counter to the Buffon’s theories of the 
degenerate nature of American wildlife. 
 
185 Crèvecœur’s positive attitudes towards the independent farmer are echoed by any number of his 
contemporaries, including Thomas Jefferson, who wrote that “[t]hose who labour in the earth are the 
chosen people of God, if ever he had a chosen people, whose breasts he has made his peculiar deposit for 
substantial and genuine virtue” (164). 
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And yet Crèvecœur’s family is more insistently naturalized and sentimentalized than 
either of these previous authors’.  Take, for example, this domestic idyll: 
 
When I contemplate my wife, by my fire-side, while she either spins, 
knits, darns, or suckles our child, I cannot describe the various emotions of 
love, of gratitude, of conscious pride which thrill my heart, and often 
overflow in involuntary tears.  I feel the necessity, the sweet pleasure of 
acting my part, the part of an husband and father, with an attention and 
propriety which may entitle me to my good fortune. (25) 
 
 
Crèvecœur’s reference to “acting his part” may remind us of the rhetorical conventions 
underlying this sentimentality, but it is overwhelmed by the emphasis he places on the 
“involuntary … necessity” of a strong emotional response (and the subsequent moral 
action) produced by observing one’s own spouse and progeny in such a setting. 
 
Throughout the Letters, Crèvecœur’s “Farmer John” reasons out his course of action 
from his family as though he were reasoning from first principles.  Thus while 
considering the outbreak of the Revolutionary War, he opposes “state policy” and the 
“dictates of nature” such that the latter are not only given pride of place, but are strongly 
identified with the nuclear family: 
 
Oh! did he [King George III] but know the circumstances of this horrid 
war, I am sure he would put a stop to that long destruction of parents and 
children.  I am sure that while he turned his ears to state policy, he would 
attentively listen also to the dictates of nature, that great parent. … Must I 
then, in order to be called a faithful subject, coolly, and philosophically 
say, it is necessary for the good of Britain that my children’s brains should 
be dashed against the walls of the house in which they were reared; that 
my wife should be stabbed and scalped before my face; that I should be 
either murdered or captivated; or that for greater expedition we should all 
be locked up and burnt to ashes as the family of B—n was?  No, it is 
impossible!  (282-283) 
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While this passage may resemble the complaints earlier colonists (and their metropolitan 
counterparts) made against the tyrannical force of custom, Crèvecœur couches his in the 
proto-Romantic terms of reason versus sentiment, linking state policy with the coolly 
philosophical dashing of children’s brains against the wall.  When we place this passage 
alongside Mather’s account of the captivity of Hannah Dustan, where the murder of her 
child by her Native American captors is cast as the product of an absolute lack of social 
institutions, we see how far we have come in moving from the 1690s to the 1780s and we 
can see where things will go in the nineteenth century. 186 
 
Such a thoroughgoing domestic outlook on Crèvecœur’s part would seem to support the 
widely-held notion that his political vision was limited to the American mainland. 187  
Christopher Iannini and Yael Ben-Zvi have convincingly argued, however, that 
Crèvecœur aspired to a global political significance for his work—and thereby help to 
make the case for a comparative and transnational approach to American studies.  
                                                
 
186 In his move to an increasingly sentimentalized nuclear family Crèvecœur is simultaneously in keeping 
with his times—see, for example, the writings of Thomas Paine—and anticipatory of later American 
writing, especially novelistic fiction by authors like Louisa May Alcott.  Paine, of course, famously states 
in Common Sense that “Europe, and not England, is the Parent Country of America” (14) as part of a 
discussion of the duty of America towards England couched in the terms of filial piety; Elizabeth Barnes, in 
her “Affecting Relations: Pedagogy, Patriarchy, and the Politics of Sympathy,” has analyzed Paine’s work 
alongside William Hill Brown’s The Power of Sympathy in order to draw out the broader symbolic 
implications of the former’s familial metaphors.  Paine’s close contemporaries Benjamin Rush and Judith 
Sargent Murray, meanwhile, are indelibly associated with the concept of “Republican motherhood” 
identified by Linda Kerber in her Women of the Republic: Intellect and Ideology in Revolutionary America.  
As for Alcott, Caroline Levander’s “The Science of Sentiment: The Evolution of the Bourgeois Child in 
Nineteenth Century American Narrative” uses her novel Little Men to demonstrate the central role of a 
cultural education that binds sentiment with science in the “process through which antisocial children are 
transformed into bourgeois citizens” (29). 
 
187 As Christopher Iannini notes, readings of the Letters prior to the 1960s “tended to stress the idyllic 
aspects of the text” while later critics “have complicated that vision by arguing that the narrator undergoes 
a profound shift in consciousness”—and yet virtually all of these critics “focus … on questions of 
[American] mainland society and identity” (note 3). 
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Crèvecœur announces his global aspirations by dedicating the English edition of his text 
to the Abbé Guillaume Thomas François Raynal, author of Histoire philosophique et 
politique des établissemens et du commerce des européens dans les deux Indes.  Iannini 
offers an apt and succinct description of the range and import of this work: “Its six 
volumes assay a comprehensive history and analysis of the major European colonialisms 
and the societies they conquered and enslaved, from the first voyages of discovery 
through the revolutionary ferment of the late eighteenth century” (paragraph 9).  By 
linking his Letters with the work of Raynal, Crèvecœur seeks to position himself as a 
member of the “secret communion of good men throughout the world,” who are 
connected “by a similitude of sentiments” (A6r).  Rather than emphasizing his 
Americanness as a virtue that ought to encourage his admission to this sentiment-based 
république des lettres, Crèvecœur treats it as something to be excused: “why, though an 
American, should I not be permitted to share in that extensive intellectual 
consanguinity?”188  This last phrase, of course, encapsulates the biologizing of culture 
that is as much a trademark of Crèvecœur’s time as it is of his text. 
 
As both Iannini and Ben-Zvi note, the limiting of Crèvecœur’s scope by his critics has as 
much to do with their own limited sense of Crèvecœur as with their nationalist focus.  As 
                                                
 
188 This is perhaps why Crèvecœur barely figures in Sacvan Bercovitch’s critical writings at all.  In The 
American Jeremiad he appears only in a brief footnote, where he is cited as sharing, along with Benjamin 
Franklin, the Puritan belief in the power of agrarian self-sufficiency to cure the twin ills of parasitism and 
poverty produced by European feudal society (22).  In Rites of Assent Crèvecœur is mentioned twice, both 
times in support of Bercovitch’s argument that Americans in the early Republic felt threatened by the social 
forces unleashed by the Revolutionary War and thus sought to contain them by portraying the revolution as 
“an extension of indigenous rights, rather than a break from the past” (174).  This statement is certainly true 
as far as George Bancroft’s History of the American Revolution, the main text Bercovitch considers in this 
particular chapter, goes.  But for Crèvecœur, as for many of his contemporaries, the power of America was 
precisely its ability to cause people to break with the past and pursue an entirely new way of life by placing 
them in a radically new environment. 
  238 
Iannini points out, “[t]he core of Letters from an American Farmer was extracted from a 
larger body of work, the cosmopolitan geography of which spanned the Atlantic and the 
hemisphere” (paragraph 7).  Ben-Zvi also cites Anne Godlewska’s account of the 
excellent geographic education Crèvecœur received from the Jésuits in France and his 
later experience serving as a surveyor for the militia in New France (78, citing 
Godlewska 23, 26).  Earlier critics, either unaware of or uninterested in Crèvecœur’s 
larger, global engagements, have thus been apt to misread his work as applying strictly to 
America, when in fact it offers a distinctly American viewpoint on the emergence of a 
global political and commercial system of national empires. 
 
The perfect illustration of this broader perspective can be found in the changes 
Crèvecœur made when he published the French edition in 1784.  Though Crèvecœur 
himself refers to this edition as a “traduction” or “translation,” it includes a large number 
of letters that were not part of the English edition and which extend the work to two long 
volumes, as opposed to the moderately sized single volume of the English version.  This 
extended version captures something of the global significance that Crèvecœur sought, 
providing descriptions of American colonies from Hudson’s Bay clear to the Falkland 
Islands, including the various islands of the Caribbean, in addition to accounts of various 
other locales and peoples.189  In this edition Crèvecœur also explicitly addresses the 
question of what “America” means, geographically speaking: “Toutes les fois qu’un 
François parle de l’Amérique, il veut dire ses Isles; un Espagnol, son Pérou et son 
                                                
 
189 Even in the English edition of the Letters, Crèvecœur includes Nova Scotia as part of America and 
laments the expulsion of the Acadians as “[t]he greatest political error the crown ever committed in 
America” (51). 
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Méxique.  L’idée que j’attache à ce mot, est celle du Continent Septentrionale, possédé et 
colonisé par les Anglois” (1-2).190  Crèvecœur thus articulates a notion of what America 
is that exceeds our conventional understanding of the term; as Ben-Zvi and Iannini show, 
he also articulates a vision of what American means, in geo-political terms, that 
confounds the exceptionalist theories of American identity and culture. 
 
Rather than retracing their argument further, however, I would like to look more closely 
at the strange dynamic of Crèvecœur’s ninth letter, the “Description of Charles-Town,” 
which captures the emergent power of the concept of culture at the same time as it 
illuminates Crèvecœur’s disgust at what that power will lead to. 
 
As I noted above, this letter offers some of Crèvecœur’s most expansive claims for the 
influence of the natural environment on the character of human society.  As such, it also 
offers us a glimpse into a transitional moment when culture was beginning to take on 
something of its primary modern senses—summarized by Raymond Williams in Culture 
and Society as a “general state or habit of the mind” and “the general state of intellectual 
development, in society as a whole” (xiv)—and yet still retained its strong association 
with both agricultural development and the influence of the natural world itself.191  This 
                                                
 
190 “Anytime a Frenchman speaks of America, he means his islands; a Spaniard, his Peru and Mexico.  The 
idea I attach to this word is that of the Northern Continent, possessed and colonized by the English” 
(translation mine).  
 
191 Crèvecœur himself never uses the word culture, having adopted the modern practice of referring to the 
“culture of the soil” as agriculture.  Neither does he use the word “cultivate” to refer to the development, 
intellectual or otherwise, of human beings; each of the ten times that this word appears in the English 
edition of the Letters it is in clear and direct reference to the cultivation of the earth.  Yet a number of his 
contemporaries had already begun to use “culture” in the senses Williams outlines.  Take, for example, 
Noah Webster, Jr., who writes in the third part of his Grammatical Institute of the English Language of a 
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letter portrays, in opposition to the descriptions of “Andrew the Hebridean” and the 
islands of Nantucket and Martha’s Vinyard, the potential negative effects of the process 
by which nature “cultures” (or cultivates) human beings.   
 
The central association that Crèvecœur makes over the course of the letter is that between 
the harsh, sun-drenched climate of South Carolina and the intemperate behavior of the 
male plantation owners, who “enjoy a short and merry life” (214), eating and drinking to 
excess while remaining willfully ignorant of the ill effects of chattel slavery.  This 
climate, in Crèvecœur’s assessment, not only encourages the institution of slavery by 
making its European perpetrators insensible to the harm it causes, but compounds its 
sorrows, producing “showers of sweat and tears … from the bodies of Africans” (216).  
Slavery, in its turn, proves central to the imperial economy, becoming part of a global 
system of exchange that Crèvecœur traces in devastatingly explicit terms: 
 
With gold, dug from Peruvian mountains they [the wealthy inhabitants of 
Charles-Town] order vessels to the coasts of Guinea; by virtue of that 
gold, wars, murders, and devastations are committed in some harmless, 
peaceable African neighbourhood, where dwelt innocent people, who even 
knew not but that all men were black.  The daughter torn from her 
weeping mother, the child from the wretched parents, the wife from the 
loving husband; whole families swept away and brought through storms 
and tempests to the rich metropolis! (217) 
 
Strongly provoked by this vision of peaceful domesticity disturbed, however, the letter 
takes a rapid turn, suggesting the paradoxical possibility that slavery, at least as practiced 
                                                                                                                                            
“good clergyman and his lovely daughter” who combined “the guileless manner of the earliest times, with 
the culture and accomplishments of the most refined ones” (55).  The explanatory notes attached to an 
edition of François de Salignac de la Mothe-Fénelon’s Les aventures de Télémaque published in 
Philadelphia in 1784 distinguish between the “culture des arts” and the “culture des terres” (22, 89).  One 
might also point to the ambiguous usage in a 1782 American translation of Abbé Raynal’s Révolution de 
l’Amérique, which lists the triumvirate of “Culture, arts, commerce” as the fruits of civilized society (68). 
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in the American South, is an unnatural product of nature: “Oh, Nature, where art thou?—
Are not these blacks thy children as well as we” (217)?   
 
Crèvecœur’s Farmer John goes on to consider in ever more psychologically nuanced 
terms the manner in which chattel slavery undermines the natural bonds of family 
because the children of slaves are, at best, forced to work alongside their parents 
“bear[ing] the burden of nature—a fatal present—as well as that of unabated tasks” (218).  
African fathers, by indulging the natural instinct to have children, “become the authors of 
double misery to their wives” and themselves, as well as their children (218).  The 
“unnatural state” produced by the institution of slavery means that, “[l]ike their masters, 
they are not permitted to partake of those ineffable sensations with which nature inspires 
the hearts of father and mothers; they must repel them all, and become callous and 
passive” (218-219).  This slyly inserted “like their masters” points, of course, towards the 
pervasive and universal effects of chattel slavery, but also marks yet another transition in 
the letter, as Crèvecœur gestures towards an alternative explanation for this seeming 
paradox. 
 
In a striking passage that does not fit with Crèvecœur’s writings as I have characterized 
them to this point—indeed, it would be more at home amid Montaigne’s reflections in 
“Des coches” or “Des cannibales”—Farmer John wonders: “Can it be possible that the 
force of custom should ever make me deaf to all these reflections, and as insensible to the 
injustice of that trade, and to their miseries, as the rich inhabitants of this town seem to 
be” (220)?  In this passage alone among the hundreds of pages in the two editions of the 
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Letters Crèvecœur threatens to give the cumulative “force of custom” pride of place over 
the influence of nature.  Given his overwhelming prioritization of the power of nature 
elsewhere, why does this Montaignian sense of custom suddenly appear in this context? 
 
The answer lies in the context itself.  As the practice of chattel slavery became ever more 
entrenched, and ever more brutal, in the American colonies (mainland and otherwise), it 
found intellectual sustenance in a discourse of scientific racism rooted in the division of 
human societies according to their continental origin, a thesis most influentially 
propounded by Johann Friedrich Blumenbach in his 1775 De generis humani varietate 
nativa [On the Natural Varieties of Humankind], and subsequent works which appeared 
in numerous German, French, and English editions over the next forty years.  Slavery 
seen in this light was a reasonable response to the natural inferiority of the African race, 
and could even be lauded as offering Africans a degree of cultivation that they would 
otherwise be unable to attain, since, as an anonymous British pamphleteer noted, “we 
have no example of a body of negroes under their own government, or in a state of 
freedom, making a figure in agriculture or useful arts” (Candidus 11).  In questioning the 
natural basis of slavery by suggesting that it depends on the force of custom, Crèvecœur 
thus revives the Pascalian figure of custom as a second nature that can appear so natural 
as to be taken for a first nature, as well as anticipating a body of abolitionist writings that 
simultaneously seeks to establish the equal inborn capacities of Africans and portray the 
seeming naturalness of slavery as the product of habituation. 
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Read in this light, Crèvecœur’s Letters constitute not only the death-knell of custom as a 
significant analytical concept, but also suggest something of its afterlife as a means of 
opening up a space from which to criticize the newly redefined, and thus newly 
empowered, concepts of nature and culture. 
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